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Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, established 
policy requiring equivalent proficiency in conducting stability operations as in the 
conduct of combat operations. The Instruction further stated the requirement to 
“explicitly address and integrate stability operations-related concepts and capabilities 
across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 
facilities, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans” (DoD Instruction 3000.05, p 3). 
These requirements present new challenges to all organizations across DoD, including the 
educational and research objectives of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Traditional 
modeling approaches that emphasized kinetic aspects of combat are ill-suited for the 
warfare decision-making needed today. New modeling approaches are required to help 
determine what forces and force packages the Navy needs to employ now and in the 
future to provide greatest benefit in the battle for “hearts and minds.” Over the past two 
years, the Navy Modeling and Simulation Office (NMSO), in cooperation with the 
Navy’s Campaign Analysis and Modeling Branch (OPNAV N816), has funded the NPS 
Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES) Institute to promote 
education and research in the challenges facing the Modeling and Simulation community 
to address Stability Operations. This report summarizes instructional and technical 

































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iv







C.  PROJECT ACTIVITIES ................................................................................5 
D.  ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT .................................................7 
II.  INSTRUCTION AND STUDENT RESEARCH ......................................................9 
A.  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 
B.  M&S FOR SSTR OPERATIONS COURSE.................................................9 
C.  STUDENT THESIS RESEARCH................................................................12 
D.  SUMMARY ....................................................................................................14 
III.  INSTITUTE AND COMMUNITY TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES.........................17 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................17 
B.  MOVES INSTITUTE TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES ..................................17 
1. Recognizing Patterns of Anomie that Set the Conditions for 
Insurgency: NPS Proposal to the ONR Human Social Culture 
Behavior (HSCB) Modeling ..............................................................17 
2. The Human Social Cultural Behavior Modeling Initiative at the 
Naval Postgraduate School: MOVES/OR Proposal to the ONR 
HSCB Program ..................................................................................20 
3. Architecting an HSCB Data Handling Framework: Industry 
Proposal to the ONR HSCB Program..............................................24 
4. TRAC-Monterey Cultural Geography Project .......................................25 
5. Identification of NPS Expertise ................................................................26 
6. Best Practices for Validation of IW Models ............................................29 
7. Investigation of Irregular Warfare Command Staff Training 
Requirements: FY2010 Proposal to NMSO ....................................30 
8. Directed Research for N81 Concerns.......................................................30 
C.  COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES.......................................................................31 
1. MOVES Research Summit........................................................................31 
2. SISO HSCB Forum and Study Group Formation..................................31 
D.  SUMMARY ....................................................................................................32 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS .........33 
APPENDIX A.  CLASS PROJECT REPORTS .........................................................35 
APPENDIX B.  NPS CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS SURVEY.......117 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................177 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS..................................................................179 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi




Figure 1. Anomie Project Conceptual Framework ..................................................................20 
Figure 2. NPS Multi-Disciplinary Activities for Application to HSCB Modeling..................23 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 viii



































Over the past two years, the Navy Modeling and Simulation Office (NMSO), in 
cooperation with the Navy’s Campaign Analysis and Modeling Branch (OPNAV N816), 
has funded the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Modeling, Virtual Environments, and 
Simulation (MOVES) Institute to promote education and research in the challenges 
facing the Modeling and Simulation community to address Stability Operations. This 
report summarizes instructional and technical activities performed at NPS under this 
funding. 
Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, 
established policy requiring equivalent proficiency in conducting stability operations as 
in the conduct of combat operations. The Instruction further stated the requirement to 
“explicitly address and integrate stability operations-related concepts and capabilities 
across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 
facilities, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans.”1 These requirements present 
new challenges to all organizations across DoD, including the educational and research 
objectives of NPS. Traditional modeling approaches that emphasized kinetic aspects of 
combat are ill-suited for the warfare decision-making needed today. New modeling 
approaches are required to help determine what forces and force packages the Navy 
needs to employ now and in the future to provide greatest benefit in the battle for “hearts 
and minds.”  
Over the past three years, OPNAV N81 has placed significant emphasis on 
identification of requirements for advanced approaches to modeling and simulation of 
human social and cultural elements of today’s battlespace. There is considerable interest 
in being able to understand possible effects of Naval operations on the stability of a 
nation through shaping operations, including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. 
Further, requirements for modeling and simulation of Stability Operations are a growing 
area of concern across all of DoD. 
                                                 
1 DoD, 2009, p 3. 
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In the educational setting, MOVES has the opportunity to explore these 
requirements in its curriculum, primarily through the course, “Modeling and Simulation 
for Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” (course 
designation MV4657). Properly coordinated, example use cases, student assignments, 
and student projects can engage in specific research questions or problems of interest to 
N81. For example, a potential topic area that could be addressed by the students in the 
class (with possible carry-over into thesis research) was documented in the DoD M&S 
requirements tool as REQ-08-049, Global Fleet Station Asset Mix – Sea Shaping.  As 
stated there, “the Global Fleet Station is intended to provide a persistent presence for 
phase 0 operations in order to increase regional maritime security through cooperation 
with multinational partners, joint, inter-agency, and non-governmental agencies.” 
Methods of modeling are needed to determine the effectiveness of the employment of 
adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest. It may be possible to adapt 
recent models, such as the Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM), to be a useful tool 
for such studies. Other approaches can be investigated and compared. The key point is 
that the student and faculty resources available at the school need to be utilized in pointed 
studies of interest to N81 to maximize benefit to all concerned, both to increase relevance 
and value of research conducted at the school and to increase value of the products of the 
research to N81. Coordination between MOVES principal investigator(s) and N81 
representatives needs to occur more effectively to identify as precisely as possible what 
areas of concern can provide greatest benefit to N81.  
Early work by N81 and partner organizations identified a number of M&S 
challenges that need to be addressed to improve modeling and simulation support to 
operational analyses. Several of these relate to modeling of irregular warfare or 
investigation of the application of non-traditional modeling techniques, including:  
(1) Irregular Warfare and its impact on the “scalable Sea Base”;  
(2) explore agent-based modeling techniques to evaluate theater security 
cooperation initiatives;  
(3) determine the utility of agent-based modeling techniques for command and 
control decision-making in mission and campaign level models;  
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(3) model populations of interest to help determine cultural response to naval sea-
shaping activities;  
(4) irregular and disruptive threats;  
(5) modeling of smart swarming tactics;  
(6) interactive red/blue networks;  
(7) agent-based model baseline scenario that will help in evaluating various agent-
based models in analyzing the impact of diplomatic, information, military and 
economic actions on political, military, economic, social, and infrastructure 
systems within a population;  
(8) modeling the cultural and behavioral impact of Navy interventions;  
(9) improvement in incorporation of civilian behavior (refugee flows, looting 
behavior, creation and sustainment of insurgency, crowd behavior, protests, 
unrest, civil violence, tactical decision-making in the face of rapidly changing 
public mood or unrest, and mitigating factors in public attitudes towards the 
Navy.   
Clearly, interest in these areas is driven by analytical needs – i.e., the nature of the 
problems that the analytical community is trying to address for the future Naval force. It 
is not clear, however, that these requirements, with respect to specific warfare missions, 
have been fully articulated in a way that enables the M&S community to focus its 
modeling and simulation efforts towards effective solutions and capabilities. The 
MOVES Institute finds itself in a unique position to address several of these issues, but 
can only do so successfully if there is continual interaction between MOVES faculty and 
N81 analysts. 
One of the challenges facing the US Navy is determining the kinds of missions 
and requisite assets and readiness needed to support today’s many non-traditional warfare 
operations.  Agent-based simulation techniques show promise for addressing some of 
these issues, but the techniques for supporting such analyses are not well proven.   
Furthermore, a close partnership between the MOVES Institute and N81 has 
opportunity to address some of the issues identified as far back as the FY07 N81 M&S 
workshop, including:  
(1) Joint Campaign – agent-based modeling utility (C2 decision-making processes 
in mission and campaign level simulation);  
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(2) Sea Shaping – model populations of interest, including terrorist networks, 
looking for trends/anomalies;  
(3) Sea Basing – irregular warfare and small scale sea bases;  
(4) FORCEnet – modeling terrorist networks. 
In FY07, NMSO provided its initial seed funding to the MOVES Institute to 
foster development of technical expertise and education in agent-based modeling of 
irregular warfare. That funding supported further development of instructional materials 
for a course initially developed in 2005 following involvement in the Flexible 
Asymmetric Simulation Toolkit (FAST) program (sponsored by what was then called the 
Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, now known as the Modeling and Simulation 
Coordination Office) (Cipparone et al., 2005). It also enabled a MOVES research 
professor to attend a workshop on verification and validation of agent-based models in 
irregular warfare (Northrop Grumman, 2007) and for one MOVES research professor and 
two MOVES graduate students to attend the DIME/PMESII2 Workshop sponsored by 
OPNAV N81 (JHU/APL, 2007). With this initial impetus, MOVES proposed continuing 
work in FY08 under the annual NMSO funding to the Institute.  
Funding over the past three years for promotion of M&S activities relating to 
stability operations is summarized in Table 1 (we include FY07 as a point of 
comparison). The funding level grew larger each year as the focus on this area of research 
and education within the DoD enterprise and the Institute increased. The funding level in 
the FY09 provided approximately 33% coverage for a senior researcher (approximately 
12% in FY08 and 6% in FY07), enabling considerable level of effort to promote and 
develop activities in this area. Chapters II and III of this report summarize the educational 




                                                 
2 DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic 
PMESII: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure 
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Table 1. NMSO Funding to MOVES for Investigations into Modeling 
Stability Operations, FY07-FY09 
Fiscal Year Labor Travel Total 
FY07 $15.9K (131 hours) $4.8K $22.5K 
FY08 $32.5K (242 hours) $16.6K $49.1K 




The original objectives for the efforts were stated as: (1) investigating the breadth 
and depth of N81 Naval analyses to identify M&S requirements for modeling social and 
cultural factors that influence Naval operations; and (2) to design, develop, and 
demonstrate modeling approaches that represent these nontraditional factors to provide 
insights on how they can be applied in future force structure analyses. However, the close 
collaboration between the MOVES Institute and N81 needed to guide and direct activities 
to achieve these objectives did not occur, resulting in achievement of objectives that were 
less directly related to N81 needs but still valuable in building a strong foundation for 
future educational and research goals. In terms of actual achievement, the following 
objectives better describe the effort of the past two years:  
Develop expanded, multi-disciplinary capabilities within the MOVES 
Institute and NPS at large to address educational and research needs 
of the US Navy in the domain of Stability Operations and Irregular 
Warfare. 
In this, the activities of the past few years have been very successful, as will be 
described in this report. 
 
C. PROJECT ACTIVITIES 
The original intent of the tasking was to articulate the requirements for M&S 
capabilities in areas of irregular warfare (including DIME and PMESII issues) and then 
to perform focused excursions into modeling approaches to address those requirements 
using students in the MV4657 class and through student thesis research. However, N81 
engaged in requirements identification through other activities and organizations 
(principally, the JHU/APL study cited earlier). Through no fault of either party 
(admittedly, colleagues from N81 and the MOVES Institute were engaged in numerous 
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other activities that made effective collaboration difficult), the envisioned coordination 
between the two organizations did not occur, the opportunity to focus attention of the 
course on N81 topics of interest did not occur. The nature of the opportunity can be 
described as follows. Over 20 students have taken this course over the past two years, 
including a special provision to conduct the course as a directed studies class for one 
German Naval officer and a directed studies course for 3 students in an advanced version 
of the course. Often, at the time the students take this course, they are just beginning their 
thesis work to be performed over the following year, so there is opportunity to attract 
student thesis research into specific topics of interest to other organizations. For example, 
in the Fall 2008 class, some of the student thesis topics dealt with modeling social and 
cultural factors for Marine Corps training, social and cultural factors for Naval analyses, 
urban area traffic patterns, and effects of military operations on social and cultural 
factors. The course provides a continuing opportunity to guide such efforts towards 
insights and capabilities that can directly benefit OPNAV N81 and USMC analysis 
requirements by identifying topics that can be addressed by the collective efforts of future 
offerings (the course will be taught again in the Fall of calendar year 2010). To maximize 
the benefits of these efforts, however, it is essential that the analytical community be 
engaged so that relevant topics and problems of interest can be identified and 
investigated.  
Lacking the close coordination needed to focus the efforts on specific N81 topics 
of interest, the funding was principally applied to build up technical and instructional 
capability within the Institute and to establish collaborative relationships with others in 
NPS at large. A portion of the task budget was allocated to student and faculty travel to 
conferences, workshops, and other relevant technical exchanges to obtain data and 
modeling ideas.  The funding enabled the MOVES Principal Investigator to closely 
monitor the Army TRAC-Monterey Cultural Geography model development and to 
participate in proposal efforts to expand the number of efforts at NPS looking at the 
modeling of irregular warfare and stability operations. Significant effort was spent 
investigating capabilities of the PSOM from the United Kingdom Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory (Dstl), both for instructional use and for application to research 
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problems. Overall, tasking to the MOVES Institute in FY08 and FY09 enabled faculty 
and students to engage in a number of efforts related to these concerns, including: 
• Faculty and student collection of resources and references on SSTR operations 
from military and non-military perspectives3 
• Faculty and student travel and participation in conferences and workshops dealing 
with SSTR operations 
• Faculty and student participation in related initiatives at NPS; in particular, the 
Cultural Geography (CG) model in development by the Army Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center, Monterey (TRAC-Monterey) 
• Outreach to faculty across the school to identify various relevant expertise 
available to address N81 concerns 
• Faculty support to student thesis research 
• Planning and conduct of a panel session on the topic at the 2008 MOVES Open 
House and presentations at the 2008 MOVES Open House and 2009 MOVES 
Research Summit 
• Investigation into a number of simulation techniques, tools, and products 
• Faculty research into Navy M&S requirements for stability operations 
• Faculty support for pursuing other related initiative to further enhance NPS and 
MOVES capabilities to perform in this area of study 
While these efforts have had significant impact on creating a new focus for the 
MOVES Institute, work to date has fallen short of fully engaging and leveraging 
capabilities available through the school in N81 M&S activities. A good foundation for 
continued activity in this growing area of M&S education and research is in place. 
However, greater coordination between the school and N81 in the coming years can 
produce even greater benefits.  
 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT 
Chapter I provides introduction, background, identification of project activities, 
and description of the organization of this report. Chapter II summarizes educational and 
                                                 
3 A major stimulus for initiating research and education activities in MOVES relating to modeling of 
SSTR operations came out of the November 2005 DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” (DoD, 2005). This has since been superseded 
by DoD Instruction 3000.05, which no longer uses the SSTR terminology, but simply refers to these 
operations as “Stability Operations.” 
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student research activities supported by or related to this project. Chapter III describes 
various technical activities that have been stimulated by this project. Chapter IV provides 
conclusions and recommendations for follow-on activities. Appendix A contains several 
student project papers from the MV4657 courses taught in FY08 and FY09. Appendix B 
contains a list of resources available at NPS relevant to this area of study. The 
information was collected by the NPS Center for Complex Operations and indicates the 
breadth of expertise available at the school for consultation, as well as the courseware 
available to personnel in other DoD organizations. The report concludes with a list of 
references and a glossary of terms and acronyms. 
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II. INSTRUCTION AND STUDENT RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
NMSO tasking to the MOVES Institute supported development and delivery of 
instruction in current M&S challenges for supporting and investigating SSTR operations. 
The tasking also supported faculty time assisting student thesis research relevant to this 
domain. This chapter provides an overview of instruction and student research supported 
by the project funding. 
B. M&S FOR SSTR OPERATIONS COURSE 
Recognizing the new challenges facing the M&S community and in light of the 
DoD instruction putting Stability Operations on equal footing with combat operations, 
NPS has been conducting a course on M&S for SSTR operations since late 2005.  The 
course investigates issues, challenges, and opportunities for application of modeling and 
simulation (M&S) to military support for SSTR operations. The course considers 
application of M&S for SSTR from the perspectives of analysis, training, acquisition, and 
mission planning/rehearsal. Students are given the opportunity to develop models of a 
situation or scenario of interest and to conduct well-designed analyses of the model 
outcomes. Students are given hands-on experience with current and emerging SSTR 
M&S simulations and computational tools. A continuing strategy to leverage the 
curriculum and student activities in this course is to work with interested sponsors to 
identify problems/questions of interest for the students to address during the course, with 
the potential of one or more students delving deeper into the problem areas through 
extended thesis research. 
A list of topics covered in the most recent conduct of the course (October to 
December, 2009) is provided below: 
• Introduction to Stability Operations 
o Resources: DoD Instruction 3000.05; Hayes and Sands, Doing 




o Objective: Students gain an appreciation for the complexity and 
high dimensionality of stability operations. 
• Measuring Progress in Stability Operations 
o Resources: Interim Semi-Static Security Model (ISSM) 
spreadsheet files, User’s Manual, and Analyst’s Guide; Measuring 
Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) Initial Metrics 
Analysis Tool description (Tousley, 2006); Tactical Conflict 
Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) description 
(USAID, 2009) 
o Objective: Students gain an appreciation for the complexity and 
high dimensionality of stability operations. 
• Modeling Approaches: Cultural Geography (CG) Model 
o Resources: TRAC-Monterey CG model briefings; CG model 
execution files 
o Objective: Students gain a general understanding of the underlying 
social theories used in designing and developing the model.  
• Modeling Approaches: Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM) 
o Resources: PSOM executable software files; PSOM program 
documentation 
o Objective: Students gain a general understanding of the capabilities 
and limitations of the model and are able to enter orders for a 
faction and evaluate model outcomes based on their orders. 
• Modeling Approaches: Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) 
Agent Based Model 
o Resources: MANA executable software files; MANA scenario 
samples; MANA tutorial document 
o Objective: Students gain an understanding of MANA capabilities 
and limitations, have the ability to construct MANA scenarios, and 
are able to analyze outcomes of MANA execution. 
• Modeling Approaches: Pythagoras Agent Based Model 
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o Resources: Pythagoras executable software files; Pythagoras 
scenario samples; Pythagoras tutorial document 
o Objective: Students gain an understanding of Pythagoras 
capabilities and limitations, have the ability to construct 
Pythagoras scenarios, and are able to analyze outcomes of 
Pythagoras execution. Students are able to identify differences in 
capabilities between Pythagoras and MANA. 
• Modeling Approaches: StarLogo Biologically-Inspired Modeling 
o Resources: StarLogo software files; StarLogo example models; 
online resources 
o Objective: Students gain an understanding of the design and use of 
models based on reactive behaviors observed in biology. Students 
are able to read, understand, and execute StarLogo models.  
• Modeling Approaches: Agent-based Simulation Tools 
o Resources: Repast and MASON software files and online 
resources 
o Objective: Students become familiar with the availability of other 
modeling environments for creating agent-based models. 
• Conducting Studies: Design of Experiments 
o Resources: NPS SEED Center design of experiment tools; 
Sanchez, “Work Smarter, Not Harder: Guidelines for Designing 
Simulation Experiments” (Sanchez, 2005) 
o Objective: Students are able to develop an experimental design for 
statistical analysis of results from multi-run executions of a 
simulation. 
Often the instruction includes guest speakers when the opportunity arises to have 
particular experts in the field address the class. For example, in the Fall quarter of 
academic year 2010 (October-December 2009), Dr. Debbie Duong briefed the class on 
her Nexus model and the Oz modeling framework.  
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Mid-way through the course, the students select topics of personal, professional, 
or technical interest to investigate for an end-of-quarter project in the class. The student 
prepares a paper and presentation of topic, approach, and findings to the class at the end 
of the quarter. Appendix A contains a number of final project reports prepared by the 
students.   
C. STUDENT THESIS RESEARCH 
The project funding provided a modest degree of labor support to MOVES faculty 
to assist the following students with relevant thesis research:  
Defining Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations 
Requirements for Future Department of the Navy Training and Analytical Models 
and Simulations, Jonathan Beris, LCDR, USN, and Eric Whittington, Maj, 
USMC, September 2008 
Naval operational concepts toward nation building and stability operations are 
evolving to have equal footing with combat operations.  This thesis reviews how 
Navy-Marine Corps leaders are focusing civilian population’s essential needs, 
via the guidance of The Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 and National 
Security Presidential Directive 44.  The objective for this thesis is to create a 
documented methodology, define requirements, and provide metrics that will 
assist analysts and instructors during naval support to Stability, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.  With 75 percent of the 
world’s population located in the littorals and 90 percent of the world’s trade 
falling within the maritime domain, the Navy-Marine Corps team is poised to be 
the country’s instrument of choice for military support to Stability Operations.  
This brings the need to train and plan for these non-traditional missions.  
Furthermore, simulations are force multipliers in both the training and planning 
arenas.  This thesis provides a history and background of military support to 
SSTR Operations and focuses on restoration of essential services.  In addition, it 
defines requirements for modeling and simulating restoration of essential 
services and identifies capability gaps in current simulations.  Lastly, a 
conceptual model is proposed using water as a proof of concept essential 
service, and a prototype framework simulation that can assist analysts and 
instructors in this problem domain is presented. 
 
Framing Cultural Attributes for Human Representation in Military Training and 
Simulations, LT Tellis Fears, USN, September 2008 
This thesis provides insight to improve training of personnel that will support 
United States Security, Stability, Transformation and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
operations in the social and cultural context of the Middle East. SSTR 
operations require competencies far beyond conventional fighting skills. 
Necessary skills include rounded knowledge about the history and culture, and 
language, of the indigenous people in the operational area. Through personal 
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interviews, social science research, and historical literature reviews, this thesis 
provides a framework for training military personnel on culture and social 
interactions using modeling and simulation. I propose the use of computer 
agents, bots or avatars with the cultural/social attributes explained within to be a 
solution to the lack of training in this field. These enhanced interaction skills 
will further support regional stability, increase cooperative engagements, and 
decrease insurgent activities. 
 
Small Boat and Swarm Defense: A Gap Study, Andre Tiwari, LT USN, September 
2008 
United States Naval forces conducting straits transits face a host of unique force 
protection challenges. Traffic density is often high, with many ferries, fishing 
and pleasure boats, and large cargo ships maneuvering in a small area. Although 
the Rules of Engagement (ROE) will generally designate query and warning 
ranges, International law and freedom of navigation allow vessels to operate in 
very close proximity to warships. Small vessels are often difficult to regulate 
and many lack basic equipment such as bridge to bridge radios. These 
conditions make the identification of and defense against hostile small craft 
extremely difficult. Even after a craft is designated hostile, the timeline for 
mounting an effective defense is often very short. This thesis shows that a gap 
in capability exists in the surface force to defend itself against small threat craft. 
It adds functionality to the Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection (AT/FP) Tool 
initially developed by Lieutenant James Harney and significantly enhanced by 
Lieutenant Patrick Sullivan. It further expands the simulation’s capabilities by 
adding the functionality to simulate small boat and swarm attacks against ships 
conducting straits transits. The simulation did not reach full capability during 
the allotted period due to unidentified code errors. However, the framework for 
scenario generation is in place and after debugging it will allow future 
researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of prototype sensors, weapons, and 
tactics visually or through output analysis in order to make more informed 
decisions regarding systems acquisition or doctrinal changes. 
 
Ascertaining Validity in the Abstract Realm of PMESII Simulation Models: An 
Analysis of the Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM), Benjamin Marlin, 
MAJ, USA, June 2009 
Asymmetric threats pose increasing challenges to combatant commanders in 
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. Threats 
once confined to littoral waters now extend out to the green water theater. Many 
NATO countries operate their post Falkland war built frigates in these missions, 
in which lightly armed small, agile and fast craft are often encountered. This 
study uses freely available real-world data to build a simulation using an agent-
based modeling platform called MANA. The simulation is exercised over a 
broad range of factor settings that are determined by an efficient experimental 
design. Using linear regression and partition trees, a robust analysis is 
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performed on the resulting dataset to create statistical models. Conclusions 
gained through these models suggest that a swarm of small craft, armed with 
handheld weapons, could attack and achieve a mission kill on a typical NATO 
FFH operating in a SSTR mission. It further implies that the FFH’s mission 
survival is dependent on the sophistication of installed weapons, and that a mix 
of advanced, automated weapons is best suited for close-in defense against 
multiple small seaborne attackers. Therefore, it will benefit mission 
survivability to improve or replace existing body-aimed weapons of frigates 
serving on SSTR missions. 
 
Analysis of Change in Population Stance on Infrastructure using a Cultural 
Geography Model for Stability Operations, Edward Valdez, LT, USN, September 
2009 
Operations in counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability, security, transition, and 
reconstruction (SSTR) require a cultural understanding of the population in 
which they are conducted. TRAC Monterey has embarked on the development 
of a stochastic, discrete-event simulation model called the Cultural Geography 
(CG) model, intended to aid the decision maker in understanding the effects of 
his actions on the local population.  The simulation model incorporates theories 
in social science, along with data pertaining to a specific region, to demonstrate 
how the population’s culture will influence their stance on issues relevant to the 
region.  We conduct a preliminary investigation of the capabilities of the CG 
model.  We use techniques in data mining and experimental design to determine 
the inputs or factors that have a significant effect on the output or results of the 
model.  The methods we employ were able to aid in debugging the 
infrastructure portion of the CG model, and demonstrate the utility of efficient 
experimental design in developing and exploring simulations that represent 
human populations.  Ongoing, in-depth explorations of CG and related models 
will be beneficial as these models are refined, and will help establish the class of 
questions for which they are suitable. 
 
Other relevant thesis research currently in progress includes: 
Representation of Threat Networks within the Cultural Geography Model, 
LtCol Sotiris Papadopoulos, Greece, graduation September 2010 
Simulation Analysis of Defense against Small Boat Swarm Attacks, LT Kevin 
Jacobson, USN, graduation September 2010 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The project proved to be valuable in supporting continued evolution of 
courseware in the MOVES curriculum as well as student thesis research. Greater benefits 
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are expected in the future as N81 technical requirements are communicated more directly 

















III. INSTITUTE AND COMMUNITY TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The project supported a variety of technical activities over the past two years, 
including enabling the Institute to participate in several proposal efforts to create new 
research opportunities in modeling Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare and in 
promoting collaboration across NPS. This chapter describes several of the technical 
activities that were initiated from the NMSO seed funding. Efforts continue to find ways 
to leverage the growth in capabilities in the Institute to address specific N81 needs. 
B. MOVES INSTITUTE TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES 
This section provides a description of several technical initiatives and activities 
conducted during FY08 and FY09 supported by the project funding. 
1. Recognizing Patterns of Anomie that Set the Conditions for Insurgency: 
NPS Proposal to the ONR Human Social Culture Behavior (HSCB) 
Modeling  
A proactive approach to the problem of insurgency requires analysis to begin 
before the violence starts – to develop a working model of the origins of insurgency. This 
project proposes to identify patterns of anomie that set the conditions for insurgency, 
categorize the events that trigger the start of an insurgency, and simulate the path of a 
nation state from peace into political violence in wargaming and modelling. Anomie – the 
loss of compelling norms that enable populations to meaningfully interpret social change 
– threatens nation states with instability-induced conflict.  Nation-states that experience 
anomie-induced conflict are similar in that they share common factors that make them 
susceptible to insurgency. The project will utilize pattern classification algorithms to 
identify associations of conditions to outbreaks of insurgency.  The presence of anomie 
alone does not lead to insurgency, but helps establish conditions upon which pivotal 
events trigger the political violence. Micro-level analysis will complement macro-
structural concept and data analysis.  The project will develop case studies for nation-
states that have suffered insurgency to understand the types of triggers that were 
involved. Understanding the roots of anomie that set the conditions for insurgency and 
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the triggers that initiate the violence will enable creation of wargames and models to 
examine the onset of an insurgency and develop mitigation strategies. These allow 
vicarious learning for decision makers to experience the onset of an insurgency before the 
first shot is fired, providing time and understanding to potentially prevent or mitigate the 
outbreak of the violence in real-world regions of interest.  The project’s multi-level 
approach offers a needed methodological step forward, and its outputs include new 
empirical grist for fellow scholars and field practitioners.  
International relations scholarship has traditionally focused on the problem of 
interstate war and statistical indicators of conflict at the nation-state level of analysis, but 
in recent years has recognized the prevalence and deadly significance of internal conflict, 
including insurgency.4  The prospect of conflict contagion and the moral responsibility to 
protect civilian populations, as in the event of genocide, underline the relevance of 
internal conflict for the international community at large. This creates a tremendously 
challenging requirement for political and military decision makers:  to understand social 
structures and processes that are commonly hidden from view.5 Only in this way might 
decision makers anticipate the emergence of violent extremism and appreciate the 
international and local governance needs for large swaths of ungoverned spaces.  
A shift in conceptual framework is required for a proactive approach to conflict 
management, that addresses micro and macro structural factors together in human and 
socio-cultural behavior. First, although United States strategy emphasizes prevention, as 
in the 2008 document by the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’s declaration that preventing wars is as 
important as winning wars, analysis typically begins after violence is already a large part 
of the problem. The literature on insurgency, which has developed considerably in this 
generation, still suffers from a critical gap: a working model of the origins of insurgency. 
                                                 
4 Human Security Report Project, Human Security Brief 2007 Simon Fraser University, Canada, 2007 
available online at http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/HSRP_Brief_2007.pdf; Chester A. Crocker, et al., 
Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2007; J. David Singer, Measuring the Correlates of War, Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1990. 
5 International Commission on Conflict and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001; 
Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, “Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies,“ Journal of 
Peace Research  35, 3: 551. 
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Practitioners typically arrive in  force after violence has begun and then try to construct a 
peace; analysts follow. A second conceptual shift is methodological.  The international 
peace and conflict studies literature, with some exceptions, has tended to rely on large 
number quantitative studies and country-level data. A missing piece is micro-level data 
and comprehension of the dynamics of micro factors in a macro context.   
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) call for better cross-cultural and 
interdisciplinary understanding of motivations and influences underlying human 
behaviour, and development of decision and non-kinetic operational tools recognizes this 
challenge.  In response, we propose research that investigates the micro-level anomie 
factors in a tandem effort with macro-level analysis in a learning system.  We seek to 
uncover micro-level data to complete the macro-level picture, to provide better 
visualization of patterns for decision-makers, and to provide our practitioner community 
opportunities for vicarious learning in wargaming.  These then create fuel for model 
development, based upon data and wargaming information. In doing so, we will draw 
upon research innovations in anomie, advances in pattern recognition, modeling, and the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s excellent access to data and expertise. 
A conceptual framework for the study is shown in Figure 1. This work was 
awarded in February 2009 and has recently entered its second year of funding. For more 





Figure 1. Anomie Project Conceptual Framework 
 
2. The Human Social Cultural Behavior Modeling Initiative at the Naval 
Postgraduate School: MOVES/OR Proposal to the ONR HSCB 
Program 
ONR Broad Agency Announcement 09-026, “Human Social Culture Behavior 
(HSCB) Modeling,” was announced in mid-FY09 (ONR, 2009). The following is an 
excerpt from the announcement to provide an overview of its requirements: 
As a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review Report on lessons learned in 
ongoing Irregular Warfare (IW) and Security, Stability, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO), beginning in Fiscal Year 2008 the 
Department of Defense created a new R&D program to develop a science base 
and associated technologies for human, social and culture behavior (HSCB) 
modeling. The military capability needs being addressed center on enablement 
of modeling for IW and SSTRO and on using computational models to support 
operations analysis, intelligence analysis, training and joint experimentation. 
The overarching goal is to provide DoD and the US Government with the 
ability to understand and effectively operate in human/social/culture terrains 
inherent to nonconventional warfare missions. The Office of Naval Research is 
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one of several offices through which the HSCB Program is supporting 
research and development efforts. 
Broad Agency Announcements may also be issued by the Counter Terrorism 
Technology Support Office (CTTSO), the US Army Corps of Engineers 
Topographic Engineering Center, or possibly other DoD entities. The HSCB 
Program will also be working through the DoD Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program to sponsor projects. 
HSCB funded projects are, or will be, focused on: 
• Developing an applied science base and general-use, cross-domain 
capabilities/tools to support all HSCB applications. These shall include 
collection of social, cultural computational/analytic datasets, 
development of data models, theory development, and application 
methodologies and tools using social science knowledge; 
• Maturing, hardening, and validating human, social, cultural, and 
behavior modeling (HSCB) related software for integration into 
existing programs of record architectures, or maturing software via 
open architectures to allow broad systems integration; and 
• Development of computational modeling capabilities, visualization 
software toolsets, and training/mission rehearsal systems that provide 
forecasting capabilities for socio-cultural (human terrain) responses at 
the strategic, operational and tactical levels. 
There are many DoD-supported efforts already underway (or about to start) to 
collect HSCB data and develop and leverage computational models for use in 
planning, operations, and training. There should be investment now in 
techniques and tools that will build the DoD’s internal capacity to leverage the 
data and models across user communities, in operational settings, and for 
multiple HSCB contexts. This requires development of generic capabilities, 
including: 
• Making existing data useable by multiple communities; 
• Equipping operational-level personnel with the ability to assess, 
compare, and contrast models or model-based tools; and 
•  Converting model outputs to forms that will have greatest impact in the 
human decision space. 
With these needs in mind, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is interested in 
receiving proposals for work in one more or the following areas: 
a. Tools for HSCB data dissemination and use across the DoD user 
environment [description omitted] 
b. Visualization and related tools for translating model outputs to decision-
support products [description omitted] 
c. System to assess and select socio-cultural behavior models [description 
omitted] 
      (ONR, 2009, pp 2-5) 
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The project funding supported participation in one proposal to develop 
conceptual, predictive, and training models of socio-cultural influences on civilian 
attitudes and behaviors. This proposal was rejected by ONR.  
The project funding also supported participation in a joint MOVES/Operations 
Research proposal offering technical and educational support to the program through a 
number of initiatives. The proposal hinged on a small set of task areas that are unique to 
NPS and critical to the HSCB program: 
1. Tightly coupled collaboration between social science, computational science, and 
warfighting specialties NPS brings two unique attributes to bear: (1) we have a 
wealth of resident warfighting specialists who are ready and able to participate in 
this program and bring real world experience to the research topics, and (2) our 
social scientists and computational scientists are defense specialists, not generalists. 
They already spend all their time working defense related problems and are highly 
knowledgeable in these areas.  
2. Immediate export of HSCB content and findings to officers via educational 
programs. NPS is one of the only graduate schools that provide education to military 
officers who will be the immediate customers for HSCB products. Where better to 
develop and test new ideas with the aim of getting them into the field as quickly as 
possible and in a form that will be useful? Our students will serve in Operations 
Research Analysis, Special Forces, Intelligence, Civil Affairs, PSYOPS and 
Information Operations positions, and many have previous experience serving in 
similar positions. 
3. Unbiased, objective perspective on architectures, protocols, and approaches to 
HSCB problems. Many parts of the HSCB program are what is referred to as 
inherently governmental work. Issues such as the development of architectures, 
network protocols, and the evaluation of models must be performed by objective 
personnel never driven by profit. NPS researchers and students fit this description 
and will provide these services to the program. 
The proposed program will eventually contain four coordinated, mutually 
supporting lines of operation: Education, Assessment, Performance, and Transition.  The 
effort will focus on Education and Performance only in the first year. The education of 
today’s and tomorrow’s leaders is critical to developing and sustaining DoD readiness to 
address problems in complex operating environments of the future. Assessing HSCB-
produced prototypes using faculty, student, and NPS lab environments is a key strength at 
NPS that will be leveraged. NPS faculty are key research performers, contributing to the 
most complex problems facing DoD for the foreseeable future. Transitioning HSCB 
program products to users is a complementary area where NPS will play a key role. As 
 23 
 
HSCB products are examined and utilized through the assessment process, promising 
models and tools will be integrated into operational, analytic, and training organizations 
that could ultimately leverage the products as end-users.  
Figure 2 outlines the breadth of expertise NPS can bring to bear on the HSCB 
program. The diagram labels contributions by academic discipline (A, M, or S), and lists 
where each type of academic discipline can be found on the NPS campus (bottom 
banner).  
 
Figure 2. NPS Multi-Disciplinary Activities for Application to HSCB Modeling 
 
There are three main components to the program:  
(1) Data, which is everything from manually collected surveys to election polls to 
gleanings from web crawlers. We have an interest in open source as well as 
professional regional studies, and we link social science with computational 
science here via data models.  
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(2) Models, which are created from the data, and are the reason for its existence in 
the context of this program. The models are driven by social science theories, 
but they must be extensible, composable, interoperable, validatable, and 
transparent so that anyone can see how they work. This is neither the time nor 
the place for closed, proprietary models that make honest, objective evaluation 
impossible.  
(3) Presentation, which is intimately tied to the purpose of the models. The end 
users are what really matters, but these are trainees, operators, analysts, 
decision makers, policy makers, etc. We need to understand how to most 
effectively visualize and otherwise present these models. More importantly, 
we need to develop clear requirements for what the models and encapsulating 
applications need to be to best serve the end users. 
The set of tasks proposed were obtained from input from TRAC-Monterey, the 
MOVES Institute, the National Security Affairs Department, the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (affiliated with the NSA Department), the Defense Analysis 
Department, the Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI), the Systems 
Engineering Department, the Business School, the Center for Civil Military Relations 
(CCMR), and the Operations Research Department. Additional information about this 
effort can be provided upon request. 
ONR provided initial funding for the work in the second quarter of fiscal year 
2010.  
3. Architecting an HSCB Data Handling Framework: Industry Proposal to 
the ONR HSCB Program 
The project funding also supported participation in an industry response to the 
ONR HSCB Modeling Broad-Agency Announcement 09-026. NPS was bid as a member 
of a team of industry and academia partners. The proposal, titled “Architecting an HSCB 
Data Handling Framework,” was written against the requirements for tools for HSCB 
data dissemination and use across the DoD user environment. Due to the proprietary 
content of the proposal, it is not possible to provide further information about the team 
composition or the content of the proposal. If the reader is interested in learning more 
about the proposed work, contact the author of this report to be put in touch with the 
prime contractor for that proposal. Unfortunately, this proposal was not accepted for 
funding in FY10. 
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4. TRAC-Monterey Cultural Geography Project 
The CG model is a discrete-event, stochastic, agent-based model designed to 
support military decision-making at the Brigade level in estimating the effects that 
operations will have on the civilian population. The CG model consists of entities 
(people) interacting with each other and responding to specific events. Each entity is 
defined by a set of demographic dimensions that collectively shape the entity’s beliefs, 
values, interests, stances on issues (i.e. security, infrastructure, governance), and 
behaviors. The narrative paradigm is the underlying social theory upon which narrative 
identities are developed to form entity beliefs, values, and interests. 
The CG model enables the user to schedule events that impact population beliefs 
and stances on critical issues through implementation of Bayesian networks for issues. 
An example of a scheduled event may be insurgents killing a community leader or a Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) providing services. Population behaviors, such as 
acquiring essential services, may also impact beliefs and issue stances. Finally, 
population belief may be impacted through communication channels in a social network. 
The CG model supports representation of a social network by applying concepts of 
propinquity (physical proximity) and homophily (tendency to associate with those of 
similar interests).  When an entity’s belief changes, the entity attempts to communicate 
the result to other entities within a pre-defined physical distance that possess similar 
interests. If communication is successful, the receiver’s beliefs are impacted accordingly. 
An overview of the conflict ecosystem represented in the CG model is shown in 





Figure 3. Conflict Ecosystem Represented in the TRAC-Monterey Cultural 
Geography Model 
 
5. Identification of NPS Expertise 
We are seeing increasing challenges and opportunities for conducting research 
and development in modeling and simulation in support of training, analysis, and 
operational planning for military support to SSTR Operations and their interplay with 
Human, Social, Cultural, and Behavioral (HSCB) Sciences. To best address these 
challenges and opportunities, we identified a number of faculty members having specific 
expertise that can support emergent endeavors. Applicable expertise includes sociology, 
economics, cultural anthropology, computational social science, and other fields related 
to DIME/PMESII concerns (diplomatic, information, military, economic; political, 
military, economic, social, information, infrastructure). In addition, the MOVES Institute 
and tenant activity TRAC-Monterey are interested in modeling such phenomena and 
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determining how military operations interact with those phenomena in order to properly 
train our warfighters and to provide effective tools for military analysts. 
NPS possesses a unique blend of technical and operational experience and 
capabilities across a number of disciplines. A sampling of people and expertise was 
gathered to identify multidisciplinary resources that can be made available to address new 
challenges to Modeling and Simulation in SSTR and HSCB. A summary is provided 
below: 
• Dr. Thomas Bruneau, Department of National Security Affairs and Center for 
Civil-Military Relations: Latin America politics; civil-military relations 
• Rex Buddenburg, Information Systems: extending internet to mobile platforms for 
combat, emergency services, and rapid reconstruction supporting stability 
operations 
• Dr. Ann Clunan, National Security Affairs: regional and area studies; implications 
of globalization for state sovereignty and governance; response of states to new 
national security threats; information-sharing networks among public and private 
actors 
• Dr. Sophal Ear: political economy of aid, governance, and policy-making, 
particularly in Southeast Asia; post-conflict reconstruction (especially Cambodia); 
stabilization and reconstruction; sustainability of information and communication 
technology in humanitarian civic assistance activities 
• Dr. Deborah Gibbons, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy: social 
psychology; social relations; networks; computational social science; learning, 
motivation, and persuasion; organizational systems, development and change; 
diffusion of new beliefs, values, practices, and innovations.  
• MAJ Timothy Hawkins: strategic purchasing, marketing, and supply chain 
management 
• Dr. Susan Heath: psychology; information, risk, and operations management; 
disaster planning and response (civilian and military) 
• Dr. Susan Hocevar, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy: negotiation 
and consensus building; information sharing in insecure environments; inter-
organizational collaboration 
• Jack Jackson, TRAC-Monterey: modeling civilian populations in stability 
operations; social networks and influence models; Bayesian belief networks 
• Dr. Erik Jansen: organizational design; inter-organizational collaboration 
• Dr. Abbas Kadhim: Iraq politics, history and culture; Middle East politics and 
history; Islam history, theology and law; Political Islam sectarianism, 
fundamentalism and militant groups 
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• Gary Langford: systems engineering; social economics, commercialization, and 
marketing; social economic consequences of military actions 
• Dr. Bob Looney, National Security Affairs: economic development planning and 
programming, with field work in the Middle East (human terrain teams) 
• Dr. Robert McNab, Defense Resources Management Institute: irregular warfare, 
IEDs, distribution and prediction of violence in conflict, and non-lethal weapons 
• Dr. Francois Melese, Defense Resources Management Institute: economic 
development, energy markets, international trade, defense management applied 
game theory, labor compensation and incentives, public procurement, and public 
budgeting 
• MOVES (Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation) Institute professors 
Bailey, Blais, Dr. Brutzman, Dr. Buss, Dr. Chris Darken, Hiles, and Norbraten: 
agent-based simulation, 2D/3D visualization, computational perceptual and 
cognitive modeling, and discrete event simulation across a variety of topics 
• Dr. Tom Murphree, Meteorology: climate and climate change and impacts on 
human activities, including how climate stabilizes and destabilizes societies 
• Dr. Mark Nissen: computation social science (POWer environment to model and 
simulate diverse organizations); anthropology (ethonography and other qualitative 
methods; human terrain teams 
• Dr. Daniel Nussbaum: cost estimating 
• Operations Research professors Dr. Alderson, Dr. Brown, Dr. Carlyle, Dr. Royset, 
Dr. Salmeron, Dr. Washburn, and Dr. Wood: optimization and simulation-based 
modeling of disaster relief logistics 
• Guillermo Owen: theory of games; mathematical approaches to economics, 
political science, and social science 
• Timothy Perkins, TRAC-Monterey: urban planning, sociology and infrastructure; 
cultural data analysis 
• Dr. Ned Powley: social dynamics associated with crisis; leadership and leadership 
development; anthropology 
• Dr. Neil Rowe, Computer Science: deception, relating to psychology and 
sociology 
• Dr. Amela Sadagic, MOVES Institute: kinetic and non-kinetic drills in urban 
warfare training events 
• Dr. George Satterthwaite, Defense Resources Management Institute: public 
administration, decision analysis, foreign relations 
• Jim Suchan: intercultural communication and strategic communication 
• Brian Steckler, Hastily Formed Networks Research Group: communications, 
information sharing, and challenges socially at the civil-military boundary 
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• Dr. Gail Fann Thomas, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy: strategic 
communication addressing DIME/PMESII; interagency collaboration 
• Robert Tomasovic, Leadership Development and Education for Sustained Peace 
(LDESP): instruction toward understanding customs, culture, language, 
negotiations techniques and the PMESII elements of a specific operational 
environment 
• MAJ Glenn Woodson, Deputy Director, Center for Security and Globalization 
Effects (SAGE) 
In addition to these and other faculty at the school, the following research centers 
have been established to address current issues (web sites are given where applicable): 
• Center for Security and Globalization Effects (Karen Guttieri) 
http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/sage/sgei.html  
• Center for Contemporary Conflict (Zachary Davis) 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/  
• Center for Civil-Military Relations (Rich Hoffman) 
http://www.ccmr.org/public/home.cfm  
• Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (David Tucker) 
• Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (Matthew Vaccaro) 
http://www.csrs-nps.org/logistica/public/home.cfm  
• Center for the Study of Potential Outcomes (Ted Lewis) 
• Simulation Experiments and Efficient Design (Susan Sanchez and Tom Lucas) 
http://harvest.nps.edu/  
• Leadership Development and Education for Sustained Peace (Bob Tomasovic) 
http://ldesp.org 
Appendix B provides supplemental material collected in the Spring of 2008 for 
the Center for Complex Operations (https://www.ccoportal.org/about). The material 
describes organizational and educational capabilities of the school that may be useful to 
N81 for particular studies of interest. 
6. Best Practices for Validation of IW Models 
The project funding supported preliminary efforts to participate in a new Army 
initiative to develop a set of best practices for validation of IW models. Prior MOVES 
involvement in verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) tool development for 
the M&S CO, together with support from this project to attend and monitor the USMC 
efforts to define practices for validation of agent-based models of IW, provided a solid 
base of knowledge and experience to be recognized as a valuable partner in the IW model 
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validation effort. That work started near the end of FY09 and is in progress at the time of 
writing of this report.  
7. Investigation of Irregular Warfare Command Staff Training 
Requirements: FY2010 Proposal to NMSO 
Legacy systems used for Marine Corps command staff training are ill-suited to 
the many dimensions of irregular warfare crossing human, social, cultural, and behavioral 
concerns. The purpose of this proposed task is to investigate and identify Marine Corps 
command staff training requirements applicable to this domain in light of current 
capabilities of existing M&S support and to identify potential approaches for addressing 
these requirements through new development or integration of emerging modeling 
capabilities. Enhancing USMC M&S with human, social, cultural, and behavioral 
modeling will enrich training for Marine Corps command staffs.  
The following work will be performed: 
• Examine current USMC literature addressing command staff training 
requirements in the domain of military support to SSTR operations.  
• Meet with USMC training experts to solidify a consolidated set of 
requirements serving as the base for this investigation. 
• Examine current and planned capabilities of USMC M&S systems 
supporting command staff training. Propose modeling approaches that 
introduce relevant HSCB capabilities into existing systems. 
• Investigate integration of HSCB capabilities of emerging models, such as 
the Army Cultural Geography model under development by TRAC-
Monterey, with existing USMC systems, such as the MAGTF Tactical 
Warfare Simulation (MTWS). 
• Propose new developments that may be needed to address M&S support 
requirements that cannot be met through modification of existing systems 
or integration of other models with existing systems. 
This work has been funded by NMSO for FY2010. 
8. Directed Research for N81 Concerns 
A proposal for support from N81 for faculty and student support for thesis 
research into small boat attacks is in negotiation at the time of this writing. In the FY2010 
proposal to NMSO, the MOVES Institute did not request follow-on funding to support 
N81 as described in this report. Rather, the Institute considers the “seeding” of the work 
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to be completed, as indicated by the variety and number of efforts now underway or 
proposed in this area. Research for N81 in modeling Stability Operations and Irregular 
Warfare concerns should come as a result of specific problem tasking to correct the lack 
of collaboration and direction in the prior efforts. 
 
C. COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES 
This section describes community-building efforts that have been supported by 
project funding.  
 
1. MOVES Research Summit 
MOVES annually conducts a research summit to highlight Institute research 
projects, student research, and current challenges to the field of M&S. The project 
funding supported conduct of special panel discussions and presentations on M&S 
challenges in modeling Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare in the 2008 and 2009 
programs, and is planning a continuation of the theme in 2010.  
2. SISO HSCB Forum and Study Group Formation 
The Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) is an international 
organization for development and promotion of standards for interoperability across 
systems. The organization holds two workshops in the United States each year, one in the 
spring and one in the fall. It also holds a workshop once a year, generally in June, outside 
the United States to promote greater international participation. SISO has a number of 
technical forums, one of which has long dealt with Human Behavior Representation but 
has recently been broadened and re-defined as the HSCB Modeling Forum. In late FY09, 
funding from this project supported efforts to re-invigorate this forum and to begin 
promotion of the group for the Spring 2010 Simulation Interoperability Workshop to be 
held in April in Orlando, Florida. Follow-on efforts supported by the ONR HSCB 
Modeling project will initiate a new Study Group in SISO to determine if standards need 
to be developed to aid HSCB modeling efforts, to include concerns for interoperability of 





While the project fell short of initial goals to directly support N81 requirements, 
the NMSO funding enabled the MOVES Institute to grow from very limited involvement 
in modeling of Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare to involvement in a variety of 
projects that are making significant contributions to M&S research in this area. As a 
result of the success in developing such capabilities from this funding, no further funding 
was requested from NMSO in FY2010 for study of N81 requirements. Instead, individual 




IV. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Use of the NMSO funding by the MOVES Institute to promote growth in 
instruction and research in M&S for Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare was 
extremely successful. Even though the funding provided just quarter-time coverage for 
MOVES faculty over the two-year period, the funding was well leveraged to support 
multiple initiatives and create a foundation for the Institute to pursue and become 
involved in a variety of technical and educational activities in this domain. The key 
failure, however, was in focusing the efforts on specific N81 problems. One particular 
opportunity missed was using the funded research to participate in the important 
DIME/PMESII requirements work started in late 2007 and completed in 2009 (OSD, 
2009). MOVES faculty and students could have contributed to the work or could have 
been used to test out the concepts to address problems of interest. Certainly, from this 
point forward, application of the findings should drive collaboration between N81 and 
MOVES. One immediate use will be inclusion of the DIME/PMESII report as a principal 
text in the next offering of the M&S for SSTR Operations course (October-December 
2010).  
While frequent communication occurred between the MOVES Institute Principal 
Investigator and the N81 technical representative, identification of specific problems for 
study by MOVES faculty and students did not occur. There is no clear reason for this 
failure. As a lesson learned, however, greater attention to the specification of problems of 
interest needs to occur in any future endeavors of this nature. On the other hand, now that 
capabilities to address M&S issues in Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare, both by 
the MOVES Institute and in collaboration with research partners across NPS, another 
effort of this kind is not expected. Rather, the MOVES Institute stands ready to address 
specific N81 concerns and to negotiate and perform projects to directly address those 
concerns. If, in retrospect, this was precisely what N81 expected from the NMSO funding 
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APPENDIX A. CLASS PROJECT REPORTS 
This appendix contains several papers prepared by students in the MV4657 class 
(Modeling and Simulation Challenges for Security, Stability, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations) as end-of-quarter projects (written descriptions and oral 
presentations). These exemplify the type of work possible by the students. There is great 
potential for concerted focus in the courseware and through student assignments and 
project activities to address problems of interest to particular organizations such as N81.  
The following papers are included: 
LT Nathan W. Conger, USN, and LT Robert L. Betts, USN, Defeating Small Boat 
Attacks 
Yew Chong Foong, Singapore, Airlift Operation Modeling Using Discrete Event 
Simulation (DES) 
MAJ William Glaser, USA, Military Intelligence Training Using Virtual 
Battlespace 2 (VBS2) in the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) 
LT Ryan M. Hernandez, USN, MANA Simulation of a Potential Sea Base 
Enabler: Innovative Naval Prototype Transformable Craft (T-Craft) 
LT Kevin R. Jacobson, USN, Application of MANA to Test the Survivability of a 
Littoral Combat Ship that is Attacked by Patrol Craft Class Vessels and is 
Hindered by ROE 
LCDR Richard B. Morrison, USN, Insurgency Actions and Popular Attitudes 
Modeled in REPAST 
LtCol Sotiris Papadopoulos, Greece, Modeling Crowd Behavior with MANA: 
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Defeating Small Boat Swarm Tactics  
 
LT Nathan W. Conger, USN 
LT Robert L. Betts, USN 
MOVES Institute 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93940 
831-656-3754 




Small boat, swarm tactics  
 
 
ABSTRACT: As tensions with Iran increase, the United States Navy is forced to 
prepare itself for an improved and somewhat unstable Iranian Navy.  Iran is currently 
increasing its number of small attack boats capable of disrupting US Naval operations 
and commercial oil traffic in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.  Iranian officials 
have stated that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy will employ swarm tactics with its 
fast attack missile boats, creating a difficult problem for US warships.  Multiple craft 
employing anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) from all sides is a challenging situation for 
even the most capable warship.  What is the best use of naval assets in order to protect 
and defeat this agile, destructive threat?  We intend to model a scenario in MANA that 
may provide a technological answer to that question.  The use of Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UASs) equipped with passive radio frequency detection sensors has the 
potential to provide US warships with enough of an advantage to effectively defend itself 




US warships have become increasingly more vulnerable to small boat attacks.  
With a larger number of military operations being conducted in littoral areas, US 
warships have had to break away from blue water tactics and engage in less conventional 
forms of warfare.  This is especially difficult because of the larger mass and tonnage of 
US warships when compared with the smaller, more agile vessels of its adversaries.  US 
ships are also vulnerable when pulling into and out of foreign ports, making this a 
prevalent force protection issue.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy has stated 
publicly that it will use swarm tactics when combating US warships.  The situation 
creates a perfect opportunity for the M&S community to take the lead in diagnosing and 




1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Guerilla swarm tactics have been used for thousands of years.  There are reports 
of Alexander the great devising tactics to defeat horse-archer swarm tactics as early as 
329 B.C. (SAND2004-4764, 2004).  The purpose of swarming is to encircle the enemy, 
providing no route of escape and maximizing the number of targets available.  In small 
boat swarm tactics, the boats generally swarm around a single, much larger warship in 
order to mass their firepower and give themselves a better chance of achieving victory. 
 
In a one on one scenario, a US warship will easily defeat a smaller, quicker 
missile boat.  However, if the small boats swarm against the warship in large numbers, it 
is extremely difficult for the warship to defend itself properly.  Hughes used his salvo 
equations model to show that a force of six small missile boats can achieve a firepower 
kill (render the ship operationally useless) against two US destroyers (Hughes, 1994).  
The missile boats are destroyed in the process, but the enemy forces are willing to 




1.2 Model Selection 
 
We used the Map Aware Nonuniform Automata (MANA) model designed by the 
New Zealand Defence Technology Agency.  MANA was designed as a cellular 
automata-based simulation model of conflict (Lauren, Stephen, 2001).  A MANA 
scenario is based upon the user-designed battlespace and the properties of the red and 
blue forces.  The units have the ability to perceive their environment and then decide 
upon the most effective and desirable course of action.  MANA also allows the user to 
input waypoints into the system, giving the red or blue forces a predetermined route to 
follow.  Using MANA gave us a large degree of flexibility when creating the scenarios, 
and allows future users of the model to adjust the scenario to their individual needs. 
 
2. Scenario Description 
 
The modeled scenario is quite simple.  We have a US warship entering littoral 
waters, transiting through an island chain on a predetermined route to its destination.  
There are 20 enemy missile boats hiding throughout the islands waiting to ambush and 
swarm the warship upon detection.  The warship has an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) 
onboard with a prototype sensor package, and it will use this UAS to gain knowledge 
about the enemy’s position. 
 
3. Modeling Approach 
 
The first step in creating our model was to determine what our assumptions would 




- The small boats are communicating via radio 
- The small boats are hiding, using terrain as cover.  They cannot be picked up by 
visual lookout or radar. 
- Losses and heavy casualties are acceptable and expected for the small boat forces, 
as long as the American Warship is taken out of commission. 
- UAV can differentiate between blue and red force communications 
- UAV can relay accurate target information (location, heading, speed, etc.) 
 
The next step was to determine which ships we would model our red and blue 
forces after.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy received ten Houdong class missile 
boats from China, and this was determined to be the most capable small missile boat in 
their arsenal, so the red forces are modeled after this class of vessel.  The Houdong 
missile boats have a displacement of 205 tons, a maximum speed of 35 knots, and a range 
of 800 nautical miles at 30 knots (Jane’s).  The vessel carries a crew of 28, including 
three officers.  The Houdong class is capable of carrying four Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles 
(ASCMs) of either the C-801 or C-802 variant (Jane’s).  The ASCM is modeled as the 
missile boats’ only weapon. 
 
The C-802 specifications were used for the ASCM carried by the red forces.  It is 
an upgraded version of the C-801, and is also supplied by China.  The C-802 has a cruise 
speed of 0.9 Mach and a range of 120 kilometers, with a warhead composed of 165 
kilograms of time-delayed, semi-armor-piercing high explosive (Jane’s).  This is going to 
allow the ASCM to penetrate its target’s hull and explode on the inside of the vessel, 
inflicting much more damage than if the warhead exploded on the exterior of the hull. 
 
 





Figure 2. C-802 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
 
For the blue force, an Arleigh-Burke Class Destroyer was used as the template.  
The later, Flight IIA, models were used due to their increased warfighting capabilities, 
specifically the new 5/62 inch gun.  The destroyer has a displacement of 9200 tons, a 
maximum speed of greater than 30 knots, and a range of 4,400 nautical miles at 20 knots 
(Jane’s).  The crew complement is 380, with 23 officers.   The Arleigh-Burke Class 
Destroyer has several weapons available for use in defending itself or attacking an 
enemy.  It has two 25mm and four 12.7 mm guns, two Mark 32 triple torpedo tubes 
capable of launching six Mk-46 or Mk-50 torpedoes, and one 5 inch (127mm/62) gun 
(Jane’s).  The 5 inch gun was the weapon we modeled for the destroyer.  This is going to 
be one shortcoming for our model.  The destroyer has the capacity to carry up to 90 SM-2 
or RIM-162 ESSM Surface-to-Air missiles, which provide the destroyer with a defense 
against ASCMs (Jane’s).  Modeling this capability in MANA proved to be extremely 
difficult, and an accurate representation was unable to be attained, so this capability is left 
out of our model.  In reality, the surface-to-air capability of the ship would be a large 
portion of its defense.   
 
The destroyer’s 5 inch gun has the ability to fire an unguided 110 lb projectile up 
to 63 nautical miles (Jane’s).  When using a standard projectile, the firing rate is 20 
rounds per minute.  The Flight IIA gun is able to fire the new Extended Range Guided 
Munition (ERGM), delivering a more precise projectile, however the firing rate decreases 
to ten rounds per minute with the newer projectile.  
 
The UAS is modeled after the Scan Eagle.  The Scan Eagle weighs 40 pounds, 
has a flight time of over 15 hours and a cruising speed of 50 knots (Jane’s).  The UAS in 
the model carries a prototype sensor package, capable of passively detecting radio 
emissions.  The UAS will be able to detect radio transmissions as the small boats 
communicate with each other, and use these transmissions to locate the hidden enemy 
vessels.  The UAS will relay this information back to the warship, providing the destroyer 





Figure 3. Arleigh-Burke Class Destroyer 
 
Figure 4. Scan Eagle preparing for recovery 
 
One important discussion point for our model is that there is no accurate 
Probability of hit (Ph) or Probability of kill (Pk) information for any of the weapons for 
the blue or red forces.  This information was purposely omitted in order to keep the 
model UNCLASSIFIED.  If desired, this information can be determined and input into 
the model to give a more accurate assessment of the scenario.  Currently, the red force 
weapons have a Ph of .3 diminishing as range increases and taking 3 hits to incapacitate 
the destroyer, while the blue forces have a Ph of .15 while target is in range and needing 
only one hit to destroy their target. 
 
The battlespace has been designed to represent an island chain.  The Philippine 
Islands were used as a template.  After the image was put into MANA, obstruction lines 
were drawn around the individual islands to force the ships to go around the islands 
instead of going through them (Figure 5). 
 
Our model has only one Measure of Effectiveness, the number of Blue casualties.  
If the destroyer makes it to the end of the route, there are no casualties and it was 
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successful run.  If there is a Blue casualty, the destroyer did not make it to the end of the 
route, but was instead intercepted along its route. 
 
The model is going to be run with and without the UAS.  We expect the destroyer 
to have a small amount of success without the UAS, but to be defeated the majority of the 
time.  During the runs with the UAS, we are hoping the destroyer will make it to the end 
of the run the majority of the time. 
 
4. Design of Experiment 
 
The design of our experiment is very simple.  The only factor we are changing 
from one run to the next is either the inclusion or exclusion of the UAS.  
 
 
5. Data Analysis 
 
Both scenarios were run for 100 iterations, and the results were analyzed.  The 
results were as expected for both situations. 
 
When the UAS was not included in the simulation, out of 100 trials the destroyer 
did not make it to the end of the route once.  That means it was intercepted and defeated 
in every trial.  Another interesting data point is that the mean number of red forces killed 
was 1.34 (SE ± 0.11).  This means that the blue force did very little damage to the red 
forces before it was terminated. 
Saying that the blue force did better with the use of the UAS is an understatement.  
Out of 100 trials, the blue force reached the end of the route 92 times.  The mean number 
of red forces killed increased to 13.34 (SE ± 0.30). 
   
6. Results and Conclusions 
 
The model worked as predicted.  Without the UAS, the destroyer relied on visual 
lookouts and radar to find the enemy vessels, which were hiding behind terrain.  As soon 
as the enemy vessels saw the destroyer and were able to communicate the destroyer’s 
location to the other missile boats, they swarmed upon its position and bombarded it with 
ASCMs (Figure 6). 
 
 
With the UAS, the destroyer gained the advantage by finding the missile boats 
first.  Its 5 inch gun gave it the ability to fire accurately from over the horizon and 
prosecute the missile boats before they had a chance to find it and begin their swarm 
tactics (Figure 7).   
 
We felt that the big takeaway from the model was that the UAS can give the 
destroyer an advantage when dealing with small boat swarm tactics.  It allows the 
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destroyer to find enemy vessels before they become an issue.  This allows the destroyer 
to attack first, maintain the element of surprise, and prevent the missile boats from 
commencing their swarm tactics. 
 
7. Lessons Learned, Recommendations, and Future Work 
 
One of our lessons learned comes from our inability to correctly model the 
surface-to-air capability of the destroyer.  In the model, once the red forces began firing 
the destroyer was finished.  In real life this would not be the case.  The destroyer has 
surface-to-air missiles capable of defeating enemy ASCMs in-flight.  MANA does not 
currently have the ability to model one weapon system defeating another one.  This is an 
area worthy of consideration for future versions of the MANA software. 
 
In order to realistically model the blue and red forces, CLASSIFIED Ph and Pk 
information should be included.  This will increase the fidelity of the model and provide 
more accurate information towards defeating the small boat threat. 
 
Our model was designed as a template for a small boat swarm scenario.  We 
intended only to show one possible solution, and a technological one at that.  The benefit 
of the model is its flexibility.  It can be used to analyze the effects, if any, of new systems 
introduced to the fleet.   
 
The small boat threat poses a significant threat to US warships.  In order to protect 
our ships and, more importantly, our sailors, we need to examine all possibilities to defeat 
swarm tactics.  The M&S community can assist by building models designed to evaluate 
tactics and weapons systems.  This will provide US forces with the best chance to defeat 
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Discrete Event Simulation, Airlift Operation   
 
 
ABSTRACT: The recently completed integrated project by the Systems 
Engineering and Analysis Cohort 15 in NPS has devised a regional Maritime Theater 
Security Force to conduct Phase Zero operations based on a tasking from OPNAV N8F.  
The force’s airlift capability was identified as a critical component in the 
accomplishment of the missions and the required force structure was determined using a 
mix of mathematical and linear optimization modeling. This paper describes a stochastic 
model developed using Discrete Event Simulation (DES) that can be employed to analyze 
the devised force structure’s airlift operation performance at the operational/tactical 
level to augment the analysis work performed under that project.  The intent is to provide 
a more complete solution for any stakeholders who want to take the project further, to the 
next level.  The resulting model demonstrates the ability to measure the airlift operation 
performance and provide insights into the operation workflow efficiency.  The 
experiments conducted support the earlier findings on the devised Phase Zero force’s 
ability to meet the most stringent mission requirements but suggested a different 





The recently completed integrated project by the Systems Engineering and 
Analysis Cohort 15 (herein referred to as Project SEA-15) in NPS has devised a regional 
Maritime Theater Security Force to conduct Phase Zero operations based on a tasking 
from OPNAV N8F [1], which requires the “system of systems to be deployable by 2020, 
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and using total procurement and operating costs of $1.5B (FY08 constant dollars) per 
annum.”  The recommended Phase Zero force comprised of both current and future 
platforms as summarized in the following table.  The amortized annual cost was 
estimated at $360M, allowing four such task forces to be deployed at different areas of 
responsibility given the $1.5B annual budget.   
 
Ship Organic Assets 
One JMSDF DDH 
class destroyer 
Seven CH-53K Sea 
Stallion helicopters and 
six RQ-8 Firescout 
UAVs  
One LPD-17 class 
amphibious assault 
support vessel 
Two SH-60S Seahawk 
helicopters, six RQ-8 
UAVs and two M-80 
Stiletto 




One Visby class 
corvette 
Six RQ-8 UAVs 
Table 1 – Recommended Phase Zero Force Structure 
 
In the course of devising the force structure, the Project SEA-15 team has 
identified the force’s airlift capability as a critical component in the accomplishment of 
the involving missions.  However, with the analysis skewed towards addressing strategic 
level requirements, the specifics of airlift operation capabilities were not fully addressed.  
 
This study explored the use of a stochastic model developed using Discrete Event 
Simulation (DES) to support analysis of the devised Phase Zero force’s airlift operation 
performance at the operational/tactical level to augment the analysis work performed 
under that project.  The intent is to provide a more complete solution for any stakeholders 
who want to take the project further, to the next level. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement and Relevance to Stability and Support Operations 
 
Phase Zero operations, as described by Joint Operations doctrine, are “designed to 
shape the governmental, economic, civil society, and security components of the 
operating environment in such a manner that violence and conflict are made less likely or 
even unnecessary” [2].  Project SEA-15 team has further defined the mission statement 
for the devised task force as follows: 
 
A Phase Zero force will work closely with multinational, interagency and other partners to maintain or 





The team has highlighted airlift capability as a critical component for the civil 
support aspect of the Phase Zero operations, i.e., “to support any humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief (HADR) operation when called on by the political masters”.  It is 
essential to accomplish the involving missions, being the only means for transporting the 
required resources into the affected area as assumed by that project, i.e., taking worst case 
situations where all other forms of access are cut off. 
 
The force structure required for the airlift operation support was determined by 
using a mix of mathematical and linear optimization modeling to ensure that all critical 
requirements defined for the mission scenarios could be satisfied at the lowest cost.  The 
modeling was done using high-level and static performance parameters that did not take 
into consideration the tactical operation factors in a dynamic operating environment.  
While the abstraction may be adequate to support front-end strategic level planning, it 
does not have the resolution to support a proper performance analysis for the 
recommended force structure at the operation/tactical level.  For example, the 
optimization model has assumed unlimited landing spots and logistics crews that can 
support the concurrent loading of airlift platforms using a fixed loading time.  The 
missing details are particularly important in this case, as the airlift operations are meant 
to support disaster relief missions characterized by short notice, high-load demands with 
a compressed delivery schedule, whereby the task force’s real-time throughput 
performance matters. 
 
1.2 Model Selection 
 
The author has adopted the DES approach to model the airlift operation.  In this 
case, the model was developed from scratch using simkit toolkit with java programming 
in order to provide maximum flexibility in constructing the model’s behavior and 
resolution, as well as defining the input and output parameters.        
 
DES is a modeling technique widely used to simulate systems where the 
phenomena of interest changes value or state at discrete points in time, rather than 
continuously across the time horizon [3].  DES was adopted for this analysis work, i.e., 
versus using traditional time-stepping simulation, because it provides a much more 
efficient means of modeling such systems as it skips through all dormant moments in 
time where there are no occurrences that would matter to the simulation outcome.  
 
Simkit is a free, open-source programming toolkit developed by Professor Arnold 
Buss of NPS to create DES models from an Event Graph methodology, i.e., the simplest 
and most natural way of presenting the model.  It is written in Java and runs on any Java 




2. Scenario Description 
 
For Project SEA-15, the airlift operation requirements were developed based on 
civil support scenarios modeled after the need to support the Latin American populace 
following a natural disaster with three different levels of severity.  Given that the 
recommended Phase Zero force was devised to meet all three scenario requirements, the 
most stringent (i.e., high severity) scenario was chosen for the investigation to analyze 
the force’s ability in satisfying the requirement as well as to establish its maximum 
transfer capability as described below. 
 
Following a high severity natural disaster, the Phase Zero force was activated to 
provide “temporary critical support while a more suitable and substantial force can be 
formed and dispatched, and not as complete civil relief” [1].  Examples of critical support 
are limited food delivery, limited clean water supply, and limited electrical power 
(portable generation for hospitals, etc.).  In this situation, the Phase Zero force was 
required to provide support for five-day endurance prior to subsequent force arrival. 
 
The affected population was assessed to be 150,000, of which 5% would require 
seriously injured medical assistance.  The affected zone was 50 nm inland with the naval 
fleet for the Phase Zero force standoff at 5 nm offshore.  Transportation and security 
onshore were meant to be provided by Non Government Organizations (NGO) and 
Interagency support. However, if capacity is available, the Phase Zero force will support 
the transportation and security onshore.  The following are the specific critical support 
items that need to be delivered/provided for the mission:  
 
 food: 2.5lbs per person per day, 
 water: 0.5 gal per person per day, 
 shelter: 50% of population affected, 
 first supplies delivered within 24 hours, 
 all supplies delivered within five days, 
 each “camp” sites provide for 20k displaced personnel, 
 one doctor and four nurses for every 400 injured, 
 one surgeon and two assistants for every 800 injured in addition to doctors and nurses, and 
 50% of doctors accessed off site via telecommunications. 
 
The airlift requirements essentially culminated into the following maximum daily 





Cargo 1,238,200 lbs/day 






Passenger 99 pax/day 
Table 2 – Airlift Requirements for High Severity Scenario 
 
3. Modeling Approach 
 
3.1 Conceptual Model 
 
The airlift operation process was modeled using the Shipboard-Helicopter 
Operational Procedures Manual [5] and Multiservice Helicopter Sling Load: Basic 
Operations and Equipment manual [6] as the two main references and with additional 
assumptions made.   
 
The DES model mimicked the airlift operation by abstracting the process into six 
main phases with a central management system responsible for planning and coordinating 
the involving activities.  Figure 1 illustrates the broad-level modeling approach for the 
airlift operation process. 
 
Based on Project SEA-15’s recommended force structure, the platforms that have 
direct involvement in the air operations were the three ships, namely JMSDF DDH class 
destroyer, LPD-17 and JHSV, and the two helicopter types: CH-53K and SH-60S.  These 
platforms will herein be referred as JMSDF, LPD-17, JHSV, CH-53 and SH-60 
respectively. 
 
Figure 1 – Airlift Operation Process 
 
Each ship was modeled a unique entity having its own set of landing spots and 
logistics (or ground) crew to support the airlift operation with an allocated quantity of 
loads to be transferred.  In this case, there were three load types to be transferred, cargo, 
equipment and passengers.  Each set of logistics crew was assumed to be an independent 
group capable of performing all the subtasks involved in preparing the load and for the 




In terms of the workflow, all loads will first go through the preparation phase to 
be transferred from the holding area to the landing spot and set up for loading by the 
logistics crew.  When the load is ready, the assigned aircraft (if available) will be called 
in for the load-up, again supported by the logistics crew.  Once loaded up, the aircraft 
will commence the delivery sortie and the logistics crew and landing spots will be freed 
up to prepare for another loading.  The aircraft will unload upon reaching the designated 
target site and recover back to the ship after that.  If the aircraft is still in serviceable 
state, i.e., not requiring refueling or repair work, it will continue with the next airlift 
assignment.  Otherwise, it will seek service support first, before continuing with the next 
assignment, in which case, a landing spot would be required for each aircraft servicing 
operation.  For each of these six phases, there is an associated variable “service time” to 
perform the tasks involved, based on a mean value with a distribution function.   The 
cycle will repeat itself for the whole mission duration until all the loads have been 
transferred.             
 
In essence, the logistics crew, landing spots and aircraft are direct resources 
supporting the airlift operation with the ships serving as depots to supply the load and 
provide facilities (other than landing spots) for the service support, e.g., fueling system, 
maintenance crew, etc., which are not explicitly modeled.  The aircraft, however, can 
become a constraint to the operation at times, such as when they require service support, 
which then draws landing spots away from supporting the airlift operation. 
 
Below are the further considerations and assumptions made in modeling the airlift 
operation process: 
 
 All ships have facilities to support the refueling and repair for both aircraft types. 
 All ships are stationary and positioned at the same distance from the designated target sites. 
 No adverse weather conditions that will substantially impact the aircraft airspeed. 
 There are ample landing spots and ground crew support at the target sites, i.e., no queuing required for 
unloading. 
 The recovery of the cargo nets, pallets, and hoisting slings used for the sling 
operations can be performed as part of the recovery sortie after transporting 
passengers to the target site with no additional lead time.        
 
3.2 System Design 
 
The following flow chart summarizes the high-level design used for constructing 






Figure 1 – Flow Chart for Airlift Operation Model 
 
There were two user-selectable schemes implemented each for the load 
allocation and the landing spot reassignment, which are described in the following:  
 
(a)  Load Allocation.  The load-to-aircraft assignment is driven by the aircraft’s relative 
transfer advantage based on its capacity ratio in order to optimize the aircraft usage.  
For example, while the SH-60 has lower absolute capacities in transporting both 
passengers and cargo, as compared to CH-53, it is relatively more efficient for 
carrying passengers based on the capacity ratio of 12–55 (pax) versus 4,500–27,000 
(lbs) respectively.  For this reason, the SH-60 will always serve the passengers first. 
 
The first load allocation scheme, i.e., ship-level allocation, adopts a micro 
management approach whereby the allocation of load is optimized at the ship-level 
only.  In other words, the model will only check for the remaining load onboard the 
ship and determine the optimal load type that the landing spot should prepare for the 
 55 
 
next anticipated aircraft that will be available.  For example, if the next available 
aircraft is a SH-60, passengers would be assigned to the landing spot if it is among 
the load types remaining onboard the associated ship.  Otherwise, the landing spot 
will be assigned the next optimal load that is onboard the ship for the SH-60; the 
model will not consider holding off the aircraft for another ship that still has 
passengers onboard. 
 
The second scheme, i.e., fleet-level allocation, on the other hand, will do that 
in an attempt to optimize the load allocation at the fleet-level.  The general concept is 
to get the next available aircraft for both aircraft types and, based on their expected 
available time difference and the remaining load in the fleet to determine the load 
type and aircraft for the assignment.   
 
As the study is about a new naval force structure, the two options were 
implemented to at least allow one to analyze the impact of employing different 
management schemes to the said situation.   
  
(b) Landing Spot Reassignment.  The schemes were incorporated to handle situations 
when a landing spot has prepared the load but the assigned aircraft failed before it 
could pick up the load.  For the first scheme, i.e., replacement mode (depicted as 
mode #0 in the flow chart diagram), the landing spot will find the next available 
replacement of the same aircraft type as the failed aircraft so that the prepared load 
can be readily transferrable to the newly assigned aircraft.  The second scheme, i.e. 
reset mode (depicted  as mode #1 in the flow chart diagram), is essentially a “start 
fresh” approach whereby the prepared load will be returned to the holding space to 
free up the landing spot to check for the next task.  Again, the options were 
implemented to analyze the various possibilities of handing the stated situations. 
 
3.3 Performance Measures 
 
The following are the measures deemed essential for measuring operation 
effectiveness and/or providing insights to the operation workflow efficiency for 
conducting operational/tactical level analysis: 
          
 Mission Completion Time.  This is time taken for all the loads to be delivered to the designated target 
site (or affected area).  
 Mission Sorties.  This is the total number of delivery sorties flown in order to transport all the loads to 
the designated target site with breakdown for each aircraft type.   
 Aircraft Utilization.  This is the overall utilization rate for all airlift aircraft in the task force over a 
mission day with breakdown for each aircraft type.  The “idle” state is defined as the period where the 
aircraft is ready for a delivery sortie but with no assignment given.    
 Landing Spot Utilization.  This is the overall utilization rate for all landing spots onboard the ships 
over a mission day with breakdown for each ship.  The “idle” state is defined as the period where the 
landing spot is not used for any ongoing activity or in standby (planned) for an impending activity. 
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 Crew Utilization.  This is the overall utilization rate for all logistics crew onboard the ship over a 
mission day with breakdown for each ship.  The “idle” state is defined as the period where the crew is 
not supporting any ongoing activity. 
 Duration of Aircraft in Various Operation Phases.  This is the average time the aircraft spent in a 
particular phase of the operation (e.g. delivery, recovery, etc.) over the mission duration.  
 Load Delivered Over Time.  This is the quantity of the various load types delivered to the designated 
target sites measured at fixed time intervals over the mission duration. 
 
4. Design of Experiment 
 
To demonstrate the model’s ability in meeting the objectives set forth this study, 
the following three experiments were conducted: 
 
(a)  Operation Performance.  The high severity scenario defined in Section 2 was used to 
assess the Phase Zero force’s operation performance in meeting the airlift 
requirements.  In a nutshell, three ships, i.e., JMSDF, LPD-17 and JHSV with seven 
CH-53 and two SH-60 were required to airlift 1,238,200 lbs of cargo, 16 sets of 
equipment and 99 passengers to an affected area 55 nm away from the ships within 
the mission day (i.e., 12-hour operation day).  The input parameters, where available, 
adopted those used or referenced in Project SEA-15 or otherwise, were based on 
notional values.   
 
(b)  Performance under Different Simulation Schemes.  The experiment was designed to 
compare the simulation outcomes of using the different load allocation and landing 
spot reassignment schemes highlighted in Section 3.2.  The same high severity 
scenario and input parameters for experiment (a) were used as baselines for this 
experiment, except for the load allocation and landing spot reassignment modes 
selected.  As experiment (a) was already based on fleet-level allocation and using 
rest mode for landing spot reassignment, three additional sets of scenarios were 
simulated using the other combinations based on the two modes available. 
 
(c)  Maximum Load Transfer Capability.  The experiment was conducted to assess the 
maximum load transfer capability of the Phase Zero task force given the high 
severity scenario.  The intent was to compare the results from this stochastic model 
with that documented in the Project SEA-15 report.  However, there were 
discrepancies in the figures presented in that report and as such, the findings from 
another simplified deterministic-based DES model have to be used as the reference 
instead. The deterministic-based model was driven by the same input parameters 
(only) from Project SEA-15 and the output was verified prior to the conduct of this 
experiment.  
 
Again, the same high severity scenario and input parameters from experiment 
(a) was used except that the cargo load quantity was increased to 2.5M lbs as a 
“goal” to assess how much the task force could transfer within the 12-hour mission 
 57 
 
day.  Transfer capability for cargo load type was used for the experiment because it 
was the benchmark adopted by Project SEA-15 for the same purpose. 
   
For all the three experiments, the airlift model was run 1,000 times in order to 
gather a good statistical estimate for the performance measures. 
 
5. Data Analysis  
 
(a)  Experiment on Operation Performance.  The main performance measures captured 




Ave. cargo delivered  1,238,200 lbs (100%) 
Ave. equipment 
delivered  
16 sets (100%) 
Ave. passengers 
delivered  
99 pax (100%) 
Ave.  time to complete 
delivery  
8.11 hrs 
Min. time to complete 
delivery  
7.24 hrs 
Max. time to complete 
delivery  
10.45 hrs 
Std deviation for 
delivery time  
0.48 hrs 
Completed delivery   1000 (100%) 
Ship-related  JMSDF LPD-17 JHSV 
Ave. cargo remaining  0 lbs 0 lbs 0 lbs 
Ave. equipment 
remaining  
0 set 0 set 0 set 
Ave. passengers 
remaining  
0 pax 0 pax 0 v 
Ave. crew utilization 16.39% 22.12% 26.41% 
Ave. landing spots 
utilization 
71.96% 63.43% 58.89% 
• Preparation/loa
ding activities 
16.39% 22.12% 26.41% 
• Standby for 
load-up 
13.58% 16.62% 24.69% 
• Service support 41.98% 24.69% 6.30% 
Aircraft-related  CH-53 SH-60 






16 sets  
(100%) 
0 set  
(0%) 
Ave.  passengers 
delivered  




Ave. sorties flown 54.7 14.5 
Ave. aircraft utilization 64.5% 66.7% 
• Waiting 2.57% 2.51% 
• Loading 1.13% 3.25% 




• Unloading 1.13% 3.26% 
• Recovery 21.08% 22.71% 
• Refuel 1.77% 1.20% 
• Repair 3.10% 2.86% 
Table 3 – Performance Measures for Phase Zero Force Supporting High 
Severity Scenario 
 
The experiment has demonstrated the model’s ability to support the defined 
performance measures for operational/tactical level analysis with the higher resolution 
modeling of the airlift operation process using DES.  To illustrate, based on the 
assumptions and input parameters used, the model suggested that the recommended 
Phase Zero force would be able to support the high severity scenario requirement with the 
following findings that can be drawn from the data collected:  
 
 Mission Completion Time.  The mission duration, on average, would last about 8.1 hrs with 95% 
confidence that the mission can be completed within 8.9 hrs based on the standard deviation observed 
(and through further statistical analysis).  
 Mission Sorties.  It would take about 70 sorties to complete the delivery where each CH-53 and SH-
60 aircraft accounts for 7.8 and 7.25 sorties on average respectively.  In this case, the higher sortie rate 
for CH-53 was largely attributed to its faster airspeed.   
 Aircraft Utilization.  The CH-53 and SH-60 aircraft would be utilized about two-thirds of the time, on 
average.  There would be some waiting expected for the required resources to execute the load-up 
and/or provide the service support at times.  Longer loading/unloading time for SH-60 aircraft would 
also be expected by virtue of the fact that it will be used more often for transporting passengers, due to 
its relative advantage in doing so as discussed earlier.          
 Landing Spot Utilization. The utilization rate is dependent upon the amount of loads and the number 
of landing spots onboard the ship.  The gathered data can facilitate the planning of the load 
distribution based on the resources available for each ship.  For this experiment, the load distribution 
seemed reasonable, with an overall utilization rate difference of less than 10% off the average.  The 
higher usage rates for service support observed for JMSDF and LPD-17 is because more landing spots 
were set aside for that purpose, especially for the JMSDF.  For JHSV, there is only one landing spot 
and it was therefore set up to do load transfer full time until all the loads had been transferred, before 
providing service support.           
 Crew Utilization.  Similarly, crew utilization is dependent upon the amount of loads to be transferred 
and in this case, the JHSV has a higher utilization for the reason cited above.   
 Duration of Aircraft in Various Operation Phases. The gathered data provided an indication of the 
expected time spent for each aircraft type in each of the operation phases.  With good data on the 
mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) and mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) for the aircraft, the simulation 
would be able to provide a good indication on the overall Ao for the aircraft fleet based on the ship 





Figure 2 – Load Delivered Over Time for High Severity Scenario 
 Load Delivered Over Time.  In order to determine the load “arrival” rates, at the target site, for 
planning the supporting and follow-on ground activities, the model also generates the transferred load 
quantity over the mission duration based on the timing resolution that one is interested in monitoring.  
Figure 2 depicts the load-versus-time graph plotted, based on the data collected for experiment.  In 
this case, the time interval was set at six minutes, and the delivered quantity presented in percentages, 
with reference to load transfer requirements. 
 
(b)  Experiment on Different Simulation Schemes.  All loads can be delivered within the 
mission time for the all schemes implemented.  The following table summarizes the 
key performance measures recorded for these four sets of simulated scenarios. 
 
LAM#0** LAM#1** Measures 
LRM#0* LRM#1* LRM#0 LRM#1 
Overall      
Ave. time to
complete delivery 
8.15 hr 8.13 hr 8.11 hr 8.11 hr 
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LAM#0** LAM#1** Measures 
LRM#0* LRM#1* LRM#0 LRM#1 
Min. time to
complete delivery 
7.25 hr 7.18 hr 7.17 hr 7.24 hr 
Max. time to
complete delivery 
11.61 hr 11.38 hr 10.84 hr 10.45 hr 
Std deviation for
delivery time  
0.53 hr 0.50 hr 0.48 hr 0.48 hr 
Ship-related      
Ave. crew
utilization 
20.95% 21.39% 21.17% 21.64% 
Ave. landing
spots utilization 




20.95% 21.39% 21.17% 21.64% 
• Standby 
for load-up 
19.16% 18.46% 19.36% 18.79% 
• Service 
support 
24.52% 25.09% 24.10% 24.33% 
Aircraft-related     
Ave. cargo delivered by 
• CH-53 
(lbs) 
1,208,066 1,208,113 1,210,103 1,209,669
• SH-60 
(lbs) 
30,134 30,087 28,097 28,531 
Ave. equipment delivered by 
• CH-53 
(sets) 
16 16 16 16 
• SH-60 
(sets) 
0 0 0 0 
Ave. passengers delivered by 
• CH-53 
(pax) 
12.33 11.76 6.696 6.909 
• SH-60 
(pax) 
86.67 87.24 92.304 92.091 
Sorties flown by 
• CH-53 54.93 54.95 54.72 54.73 
• SH-60 14.19 14.22 14.38 14.46 
Ave. aircraft
utilization 
67.27% 66.70% 67.18% 66.59% 
• Waiting 3.16% 2.59% 3.14% 2.54% 
• Loading 2.11% 2.11% 2.19% 2.19% 
• Deliver
y  
33.36% 33.38% 33.18% 33.30% 
• Unloadi
ng 
2.11% 2.11% 2.19% 2.19% 
• Recover
y 
21.72% 21.74% 21.82% 21.90% 
• Refuel 1.46% 1.47% 1.49% 1.49% 
• Repair 3.37% 3.29% 3.17% 2.98% 
Notes 
** LAM = Load Allocation Mode: #0 for Ship-level allocation and #1 for Fleet-level allocation. 
* LRM = Landing Spot Reassignment Mode: #0 for Replacement Mode and #1 for Reset Mode. 




Based on the gathered data, the average and maximum delivery completion times 
for both scenarios, using the fleet-level load allocation (i.e., LAM#1) were shorter, but of 
no significant difference.  In fact, the overall performance profiles for the task force 
under these various schemes were found to be very similar except for the specific areas 
where the implemented schemes have a direct effect.  Under the fleet-level load 
allocation scheme, there was a better load-aircraft match observed than expected, with 
more than a 5% increase in passengers being transported by SH-60 aircraft.  As for the 
landing spot reassignment scheme, the landing spot usage for preparation/loading 
activities was observed to be slightly higher and correspondingly less time was spent 
standing-by for aircraft under both scenarios using the reset approach (i.e., LRM#1), 
which is to be expected.  However, the secondary effect on the waiting time, which was 
found to be shorter (i.e., >20%) under the reset approach, was not something perceivable 
at the design stage. 
 
(c)  Experiment on Maximum Load Transfer Capability.  The performance measures 




Ave. cargo delivered  1,697,000 lbs 
Ave. equipment delivered  16 sets 
Ave. passengers delivered  99 pax 
Ship-related  JMSDF LPD-17 JHSV 
Cargo allocated  1M lbs 1M lbs 500K lbs
Ave. cargo remaining  11,526 lbs 283,438 
lbs 
7,974 lbs
Equipment allocated  6 sets 6 sets 4 sets 
Ave. equipment remaining  0 set 0 set 0 set 
Passengers allocated  63 pax 24 pax 12 pax 
Ave. passengers remaining 0 pax 0 pax 0 pax 
Ave. crew utilization 25.50% 36.63% 52.71% 
Ave. landing spots
utilization 




25.50% 36.63% 52.71% 
• Standby for load-
up 
22.23% 26.68% 40.68% 
• Service support 46.30% 40.68% 3.72% 
Aircraft-related  CH-53 SH-60 
Ave. cargo delivered  1,994,291 lbs 54,340 lbs 
Ave. equipment delivered  16 sets 0 set 
Ave. passengers delivered  0 pax 99 pax 
Ave. sorties flown 86.0 22.2 
Ave. aircraft utilization 99.70% 99.53% 
• Waiting 3.34% 2.90% 
• Loading 1.17% 4.04% 
• Delivery  55.13% 50.32% 
• Unloading 1.63% 3.96% 
• Recovery 31.29% 32.69% 




• Repair 3.97% 3.95% 
Table 5 – Maximum Load Transfer Capability for Phase Zero Force 
Supporting High Severity Scenario 
 
The data gathered from the final airlift model suggested that the load transfer 
capability for Phase Zero force is, on average, about 2M lbs for cargo.  It met the 
equipment and passengers transfer requirements on most occasions, except for one 
instance where an additional sortie was required to complete passenger delivery.  If this is 
disregarded, there is 95% confidence that the task force can deliver 2.18M lbs of cargo 
based on the observed standard of about 80K lbs. 
 
The average load transfer capability, based on this final airlift model, is 
substantially higher (>65%) than that obtained from the deterministic-based model, i.e., 
1,318,500 lbs.  This vast difference is largely attributed to the assumptions made in 
deriving the effective operating hours.  For the deterministic-based model (and in the case 
of Project SEA-15), a three-hour block was set aside for refueling and other overheads 
with the further assumption of an 85% Ao, which resulted in the 7.65 effective operating 
hours for the mission day.  For the stochastic model, the settings for the meantime for 
refueling was five minutes, meantime for preparing cargo/equipment at 15 minutes and 
for passengers at five minutes, with MTBF and MTTR at 20-hours and 1-hour 
respectively (giving an equivalent Ao of about 95.2%) for both aircraft types.  Based on 
the gathered aircraft utilization data in Table 5, the equivalent effective operating hours 
can be approximated by discounting the average time spent for each aircraft in the 
waiting, refueling and repair phases.  This value worked out to be 10.85 hours, i.e., at 
least three hours more than what the other approach used. 
 
To further illustrate the Ao impact on the load transfer capability, additional 
simulations were conducted with MTBF inputs ranging between 10 to 20 hours using a 
2.5-hour time block and MTTR inputs between one to three hours with a 1-hour time 
block.  Table 6 summarizes the computed Ao (based on MTBF and MTTR), observed 
effective operating hours, and the average load transfer capability for cargo for each of 
the scenarios (with 1,000 simulation runs each).  Again, for most of the simulation runs, 
the delivery of passengers and equipment were complete.  Figure 3 depicts the average 
load transfer capability trend over the tested ranges for MTTR and MTBF using linear 














10 0.91 10.31 1,932,883 
10 0.83 9.64 1,777,221 
10 0.77 9.21 1,681,635 
12.5 0.93 10.65 1,974,621 
12.5 0.86 10.15 1,898,456 















15 0.94 10.65 2,006,324 
15 0.88 10.15 1,898,456 
15 0.83 9.78 1,815,096 
17.5 0.95 10.76 2,027,820 
17.5 0.90 10.32 1,932,200 
17.5 0.85 10.02 1,867,651 
20 0.95 10.85 2,048,631 
20 0.91 10.47 1,968,564 
20 0.87 10.16 1,899,240 
Table 6 – Operational Availability Impact on Load Transfer Capability for High 
Severity Scenario  
 
 
Figure 3 - MTTR and MTBF impacts on Load Transfer Capability for High 
Severity Scenario 
The simulation results still show a higher load transfer capability for the task 
force versus the deterministic approach for MTTR and MTBF ranges tested.  For the 
“worst-case” scenario, with MTBF and MTTR set at 10-hours and 3-hours respectively, 
i.e., giving a lower 77% Ao than the 85% used for the baseline model, the average load 
transfer capability is still higher, at about 1.68M lbs and 27% more than the deterministic 
value. 
 
6. Results and Conclusions 
 
The objectives of this study were achieved with the successful implementation of 
a stochastic, dynamic model using DES that can be used to analyze the airlift operation 
performance of the naval force structure recommended by Project SEA-15 at the 
operational/ tactical level.   
 
Three sets of experiments were conducted, with the first one set up to demonstrate 
the airlift model’s ability to meet the performance measures using the high severity 
scenario requirement as the case study.  The experiment showed that the airlift mission 
could be accomplished within nine hours, with more than 95% confidence, and utilizing 
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about 66% of the airlift fleet capacity for a mission day.  Further experiments were 
conducted to assess the effectiveness of the different load allocation and landing spot 
reassignment (in the event of an assigned aircraft failure) schemes implemented in the 
model, and there were no significant performance differences observed.  The final 
experiment, using the airlift model (i.e., with stochastic data), suggested a much higher 
maximum load transfer capability (>60%) for the Phase Zero force as compared to the 
deterministic-based model.  Further data were also collected to illustrate the collective 
impact of the aircraft MTBF and MTTR on the Phase Zero force’s load transfer 
capability.  
 
7. Lessons Learned, Recommendations, and Future Work 
 
This thesis work has demonstrated the model’s potential in assessing the Phase 
Zero force’s airlift capability by providing operational/tactical level insights to the 
operation process.  It should be considered for supporting future analysis work for the 
Phase Zero force if the stakeholders intend to bring the project to the next phase.        
 
The model was developed primarily as a proof-of-concept, and as such, it did not 
cover all aspects of the airlift operation and/or the depths necessary to support full 
analysis work.  With the Phase Zero force being the primary design focus, some aspects 
of the model were implemented specifically (e.g., hard-coded) to that task force.  Hence, 
its immediate use for supporting other analysis work of a similar nature is limited.  
However, with the component-based framework adopted for the model, components can 
be readily added /replaced to expand the modeling scope or enhance the model fidelity to 
address these needs, as and when required.  The following are possible future 
enhancements of the model’s capability:   
 
 There were no intermediate delivery requirements/conditions simulated in the model, e.g., the 
different load types must be delivered in sequence, or 50% of the equipment must be delivered first, 
before passengers can be delivered, etc., because there were no specifications for that based on the 
Project SEA-15 report.  The model currently allocates the load based on what the aircraft is best suited 
for, which is reasonable, but there may be other overarching requirements, at times, that need to 
supersede that.  Incorporating a utility to handle these additional delivery conditions will improve the 
model’s robustness.     
 The maintenance and logistics support for the aircraft, in terms of the required repair/refueling 
facilities and support crew, were not explicitly modeled.  Modeling these elements would provide 
more complete shipboard operation coverage and assess its impact on the airlift capability.  
 The load delivery was modeled one-way, i.e., from the ship to the affected area, based on the mission 
scenarios defined for Phase Zero force.  Expanding the model to cater to two-way delivery would be 
useful given that relief missions would include the need to evacuate affected personnel from disaster-
hit sites.        
 The airlift operation was modeled as a single continuous process (per simulation run), meant for 
analyzing the performance for a single-day (in the case of Project SEA-15) or 24/7 type of missions.  
Expanding the model’s capability to simulate the operation as a “piecewise” continuous process, by 
retaining certain entities’ state information at the break-points, would enable it to better mimic non-
continuous multi-day missions (e.g., simulating daylight operation only).  
 65 
 
 The setting up of a scenario is currently done within the software development environment and 
interface may not necessarily be intuitive to a non-programmer.  Providing a user-friendly front-end 
user interface would help to improve its usability.    
 Parameterize or encapsulate the platform-specific built-in (hardcoded) logics into subcomponents to 
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ABSTRACT: The driving force behind successful military operations in today’s 
contemporary operational environment (COE) is a comprehensive intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield (IPB).  Part of the IPB process is the development of 
intelligence products by junior military intelligence soldiers.  The Military Intelligence 
Gaming Integration Team has produced a VBS2 training scenario designed to exercise a 
soldier’s ability to collect, analysis, and produce intelligence products that can be 
evaluated by a certified trainer.  This paper looks at how VBS2 is being used to training 






As the civilian gaming market has matured its product line other communities 
have considered the training value of this software.  The military uses such games for 
training or analysis.  To distinguish computer gaming with an actual military purpose, 
Ben Sawyer, a high-tech freelance writer and technology consultant coined the term 
“serious games”, and the term has caught on (Macedonia, 2005).  Serious games can 
contribute to the military.  Two Canadian researchers summarized potential uses for 
serious games in a paper prepared for the 2008 Interservice / Industry Training, 
Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC).  Uses include showing viewpoints of 
opposing forces, teaching action drills, improving post exercise analysis with different 
perspectives, and representing future technologies not yet available for conventional 




This paper summarizes a work of the Military Intelligence Gaming Integration 
Team (MIGIT) conducted as part of a project to use virtual games to train military 
intelligence (MI) Soldiers military occupational specialties (MOS) specific skills in the 
contemporary operational environment (COE). 
  
1.1 Problem Statement and Relevance to Stability and Support Operations 
 
The driving force behind successful military operations in today’s COE is a 
comprehensive intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).  The US Army has 
provided tactical commander with the training, capabilities, and authority to execute 
successful lethal and non-lethal operations in the COE.  The challenge today is where and 
when to apply his combat power in order to shape his environment to his desired ends.     
 
The training of junior military intelligence Soldiers on collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of intelligence is based reading, briefings, and classroom instruction.  The 
overhead training requirement to provide junior MI soldiers with a realistic live practical 
exercise using his this skill set is simply too high to consider practical.  A training 
simulation is required to provide junior MI Soldiers an opportunity to exercise what they 
have learned in the classroom. 
 
1.2 Model Selection 
 
The virtual simulation selected to provide this training was Virtual Battlespace 2 
(VBS2).  VBS2 is a fully interactive, three-dimensional, PC-based training system 
providing a synthetic environment suitable for a wide range of military training and 
experimental purposes. VBS is developed by Bohemia Interactive Australia (BIA).  
Australian and British forces have used this software to provided pre-deployment training 
for their forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.  The United States Army purchased 
rights to Bohemia Interactive’s Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2) in 2009 to train small unit 
tactics in a personal computer based environment.     
 
VBS offers realistic battlefield simulations and the ability for individuals to 
operate land, sea and air vehicles. The VBS2 After-Action-Review (AAR) module, 
allows recreation of events in 2D and 3D with statistics. The AAR module has been 
widely accepted by users to be one of the most useful tools in VBS that facilitates 
training. As part of the package, VBS2 provides a scenario editor, which allows 
instructors new scenarios to be created through placement of characters, objects and 
vehicles on terrain and then saved the layout as a scenario file that can be executed at 
runtime.  
  
In addition to scenario editor, VBS2 also provides a development suite, which 
allows users to generate terrain and 3D representations for virtual simulation. For terrain 
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development, the tool provided is able to import raw Digital Terrain Elevation Data 
(DTED), shape and imagery files to generate high-fidelity VBS2 terrain areas. The 3D 
image modeling and texture mapping tool allows users to import, generate or export to 
the open source FBX format. The development suite also includes a Finite State Machine 
editor, which allows users to customize AI behavior through scripts created using a 
Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
  
Some of the limitations of VBS2 are insufficient fidelity for tank crews, 
unrealistic aircraft performance and behavior, tank weapon platform characteristic not 
modeled, limited visibility and Field-of-View (FOV).  
 
2. Scenario Description 
 
The player(s) is assigned to a generic Forward Operating Base (FOB) as an 
embedded Intelligence professional whose mission is to collect on the potential threats in 
the area. There is a group of militia members operating throughout three fictitious 
villages (Sarah, Dormah, and Gordah). The group poses as an insurgency and calls itself 
Freedom by Force, but is in actuality a criminal element involved in kidnapping, 
extortion, and murder. Very little is known about the group aside from a few aliases 
given during the initial briefing. As the player proceeds from village to village collecting 
clues the identities, tactics, activities, and locations of the group is ascertained. 
 
3. Modeling Approach 
 
The student receives their mission briefing and information requirements at the 
beginning and this is reinforced through the information gleaned from personnel in the 
Operations and Threat sections on the FOB. The student then proceeds to the first village 
(Sarah) to gather information. When the student believes they have exhausted all leads in 
the first village they are to report to the instructor. Breaks are forced into the game 
reminding the student to coordinate with the instructor for guidance, report writing, 
analysis, etc.  
 
Once information is collected the student would then create or update their 
corresponding products utilizing applicable programs based on the Program of Instruction 
(POI). They should then inform the instructor their products are complete and brief their 
plan for collection in the next village. 
 
The exercise has three phases, one per village, and by the end of the game they 
should have identified the majority of the actors, their areas of operation, and basic 
tactics. The original concept was designed around creating a Link Analysis product, a 
Target Package, and a Threat or Decision Briefing. 
 
The timeline for each phase considered included approximately 30 minutes 
exploring a village, 30 minutes  discussing their collection efforts and conducting 
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baseline analysis, and 1 hour of product development. This creates a full day of training 
comprised of a 6-hour exercise and leaving time for instructor input, After Action Review 
(AAR), and administrative minutia. 
 
4. Design of the game 
 
The game begins with the MI Soldier on the FOB in front of the MI Company 
(MICO) facility. From there the player moves into the MICO and receives briefings 
ranging from Administrative to Threat. Once complete they enter a HMMWV and drive 
to the first village where they navigate on foot interacting with the local populace and the 
environment. 
 
Information collected includes hints of who to talk to, weapons caches, graffiti, 
and interactive dialogue sessions. The majority of the information gleaned is displayed in 
a hint box automatically displayed on the screen when the player comes in contact with 
an applicable clue area or person. The dialogue boxes include questions the player 
chooses to ask of the individual; these range from two or more possibilities each. 
 
The militia members are not hostile in the initial stages of the game and many 
have dialogue boxes, though their information should be suspect. This is placed in the 
game to force analysis and to simulate the duality of some of the actors. This changes 
once the player enters the actual encampment on the outskirts of the village. At this point 
all of the militia members are hostile and will attack the player. This reinforces the fact 
that this is an MI exercise and reminds the student that their mission is not to directly 
engage the enemy.  
 
5. Data Analysis 
 
The data analysis does not come directly from the simulation but rather from the 
products the MI soldier produces based his interaction with the game.  The trainer 
evaluates the trainees’ products and compares them to the simulated environment in the 
VBS2 MI Game. 
 
6. Results and Conclusions 
 
VBS2 has been widely used by many militaries for pre-deployment training. The 
scenario and terrain editor included in the package are valuable tools which allows user to 
customize the training to meet their needs. The AAR tool allows users to review and 
learn from their mistakes. The US Army and USMC’s programs have shown some initial 




7. Lessons Learned, Recommendations, and Future Work 
 
The VBS2 MI Game does provide junior MI soldiers an opportunity to exercise 
their MOS specific skill as intel analyst.   
 
The most important lesson learned is that the training device, in this case the 
VBS2 MI Game, is only as good as the trainer.  The greatest training value does not 
occur during the game play but afterwards when the trainee briefs the products he 
produces after training (playing) the VBS2 MI Game.  The discussion between the trainer 
and the trainee during and after the product presentation is where the trainer can have the 
greatest impact.  As good as the VBS2 MI Game is, it is limited by the quality of the 
trainer. 
 
Most Army intelligence analysts are also trained in a second language.  We 
recommend that different versions of the game are developed for different languages.  
Currently the clues are given by the indigenous avatars in English.  These clue prompts 
could easily translated into another language expanding the training objectives to include 
language training.    
 
Future work in VBS2 is in developing training scenarios focused on cultural 
awareness.  The ability to interegrate the cultural awareness training in Aleo’s Tactical 
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ABSTRACT:  The development of a SeaBase Enabler concept was directed by 
the Chief of Naval Operations and is being investigated by the Office of Naval Research 
to analyze the potential capabilities in armed force operations. There are essential 
characteristics set by the Office of Naval Research that have been designated to be key in 
SeaBase Operations which include surface speeds of 40+ knots and cargo load-outs of 
500 Long Tons.  The purpose of modeling the SeaBase Enabler is to represent the 
Innovative Naval Prototype, Transformation Craft’s capabilities in an environment that 
can be further tested in multiple scenario situations.  A T-craft model will be generated in 
the MANA simulation program to be used in a scenario based study for an initial review 
for Transformation Craft capabilities.  The measures of performances are transits times, 
cargo amount transferred, and survival probability.  This study is designed to be a proof 
of concept for analysis of the SeaBase Enabler and determining the feasibility of 





The United States has contributed humanitarian aid to other countries, nations, 
and people around the world in many ways.  Relief efforts in Tsunami struck countries 
like Aceh Indonesia and Sri Lanka in 2008, India in 2007, and Thailand in 2008 have 
shown the versatility of the United States military to provide services other than tradition 
warfare operations.  This has been a major focus of the United States government to 
make aid just as important as force structure and warfare operations.  The modus 
operanda to enable humanitarian operations for US forces is the evolving SeaBase 
concept.   
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has stated that the Navy must maintain an 
ability that will reaffirm “the use of sea power to influence actions and activities at sea 
and ashore” (CNO, 2007).  Thus, Sea Power is becoming the key to any operation in the 
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Navy with Sea Power 21 being the concept wave of the future.  .  The Strategy for Sea 
Power 21 entails joint operational effectiveness and incorporates Sea Base Operations 
(SBO) and Sea Shield operations (Projecting Global Defensive Assurance) to make a 
unified front called Sea Strike (Projecting Precise and Persistent Offensive Power) with 
new technology that must be ready to support it.  One way of maintaining sea power is 
through research and development of new technologies in crafts that serve as Sea Base 
Enablers (SBE) by providing rapid transportation of needed heavy cargo and materials to 
and from the Sea Base to the debarkation point.  The Navy has recently started 
developing a new amphibious craft called Transformation Craft (T-Craft), one of three 
Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) systems under development by the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR), which is being designed for use in SBO and transfer of support 
equipment to and from the logistics hubs. 
SBO are becoming increasingly more important in today’s world operations.  The 
role of the US military in other than military operations is incredibly difficult due to the 
limitation to traditional force organizations.  There have been many changes to the 
military since the series of natural disasters that have occur in the Pacific Ocean in the 
last few years. 
 A group of researchers at Naval Postgraduate School are addressing the T-
craft prototype as a potential SBE.  Their purpose is essentially to perform a simplified 
Analysis of Alternatives of Advanced SBE culminating in a recommended alternative.  
Their work focuses on specific operational concepts and scenarios, with their 
recommendations addressing this realistic, yet narrowly focused perspective.  On the 
other hand, follow-on research identifies and develops, as necessary, the simulation 
capabilities and products needed for thorough analysis of the SBE.  Considerations 
include a broad range of relevant operational concept and scenarios, appropriate metrics 
and system requirements such as survivability, and the proposed options for SBE.  
ONR Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) # 05-020 requested proposal for a 
SBE capabilities.  The desired capabilities of for a SBE like T-craft are;  
1. 2500 nm range maintaining fuel efficiency (20kts). 
2. Operate in sea state of 4 at high speeds, with or without cargo. 
3. Maintain a maximum speed of 40+ knots and a 500 nm combat range. 
4. Amphibious mode for landing on the beach. 
5. Freely convert between modes at sea. 
6. Transfer cargo to SBO units and beach landings sites. 
7. Carry 500 Long Tons (LT) of Cargo. 
The SBE scenarios begin to evolve with the basic requirements set by ONR.  
There are four scenarios that SBE is directly involved with; Peace Keeping and Peace 
Enforcement operations, Major Theater War, Region Crisis, and Stability Operations.  
The purpose of this research is to develop a scenario in the Map-Aware Non-
homogeneous Automata (MANA) and analyze the effectiveness of a SBE. 
 The MANA Simulations Objectives with T-craft in the humanitarian role 
are to simulate a basic and advanced concept scenario where humanitarian relief 
operations will be modeled.  The Measure of Performance (MOP) is cargo transfers in a 
possible hostile environment and transit times associated with transfers to the shore.  The 
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advanced scenario will introduce a hostile environment for T-craft to transit through.  The 
MOP will specifically measure number of escort ships needed for a safe transit to the 
SBO.  The Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) for factor other than warfare is the 
population support of relief operations.  MANA is not designed to model or measure 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), therefore for in this study the MOE’s 
will not specifically measured and deferred for other Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
tools. 
 Tools in M&S available for the MOE analysis are social cultural 
simulations that are designed to measure the opinion of a population agent.  These 
include the Peace Support Operation Model (PSOM) or other agent-based simulations.  
Simulation model alternatives to this study are not limited to MANA.  There are many 
M&S models useful for this type of modeling that effectively represent the SBE scenario 
like Naval Simulation System (NSS). 
 
1.1 Understanding SeaBase Enablers impact to disaster relief through 
Modeling and Simulation 
 
The purpose of modeling the SBE is to represent a T-craft capability in a Peace 
Keeping operation.  The large amount of cargo that can be transfer to shore by a T-craft 
during humanitarian relief efforts could be a significant factor to disaster areas.  The SBE 
concepts will set-up scenarios to be used to ultimately answer the question; is the SBE 
capable of modeled in the SBO environment to provide aid and cargo in two types of 
missions.  This study will concentrate on varying cargo sizes and transit times from 
debarkation point to shore and back again.   
The SBE situation is limited to coast disasters or shore relief mission based on the 
capabilities and limitations of the T-craft prototype projected capabilities.  The T-craft is 
fully traversable from sea going mode to a hover mode.  This allows it to land on the 
shore and directly offload supplies to the beach.  And also eliminates taxing requirements 
current naval vessels have entering port.   
 The introduction of T-craft is a game changing capability that may have 
dramatic effects on current force structures and deployment considerations with the US 
Navy and US Army.  Another objective of this study is to investigate force structure 
required for relief, while maintaining a defensive stands.  What is an effective number of 
escort ships needed in an advanced concept for the safe transit of the SBE with limited 
defenses in an agent based simulation?   
 The T-craft load capability can make a significant impact in providing 
relief aid and provide aid in a rapid manner.  MANA will help analyze how much cargo 
can be transferred in a certain amount of time that may then be used in social cultural 
simulations.  How much assistance is needed to change the public opinion in one way or 
another will be determined separately. 
 MANA is capable of providing data that can be used in conjunction with 
other simulation tools.  The information obtained can be directly used to project 
requirements and force structures in SBO and in MOOTW areas.  The agent-based 
capabilities allows for a randomness to explore the different combination of parameters.  
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The MANA user interface is highly suitable for varying the scenario settings and 
obtaining a confidence interval to report the results to follow-on simulations. 
 The scenario used in this study is only as good as the inputs it receives.  
The issue of M&S being used in modeling Irregular Warfare (IW) and other real world 
events is that it is only limited to the user inputs.  The more M&S that is conducted the 
more understanding we get from working through those specific processes.  The down 
side to M&S is not one single simulation can be used to answer everything.  The higher 
the resolution in the simulation, the higher degree of accuracy the simulation may have.  
This may hold true for M&S of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and 
Information (PMESII) factors.  
 
1.2 Map-Aware Non-homogeneous Automata (MANA). 
 
 MANA was developed by a New Zealand company Defense Technology 
Agency (DTA) in 2008 as a agent-based model to simulation a bottom-up approach to 
warfare.  DTA had been researching on the implications of chaos and complex theory in 
military applications.  They discovered that cellular automaton models produced results 
that were different that those of traditional models.  The limitations of traditional models 
with areas like Command and Control (C2), situational awareness (SA), and 
heterogeneous forces fall short of providing realistic results.  The MANA program was 
designed to introduce certain functionalities to the current Complex Adaptive Systems 
(CAS) simulations.  MANA integrates a memory map to allow for agents to have share 
SA and maneuver around the battle space.   
 MANA began in 2000 when Project Albert, a Marine Corp. research 
development program, introduced three agent-based simulations in succession; ISAAC, 
EINSTein, and Pythagoras.  Agent-based models use Artificial Intelligence algorithms to 
have agents or actor in a simulation solve pathfinding and optimization problems that can 
be applied to military settings.   
 The benefits of using MANA is that a high resolution can now be 
generated to simulate a single unit in a battle and see how those single units in a squad 
will act together given certain personality traits.  The range at which the traits can be 
varied adds another level of complexity to the model.  The level of detail can now be 
modeled to fit situations that were previous unattainable by conventional warfare models.    
 The SBE scenario will attempt to model a single T-craft transiting with 
escort support to measuring the survivability rate as the size of forces are increased.  The 
power of MANA allows for the scenario to vary in number of units on both friendly and 
hostile forces while the agent’s actions remain independent of force size.  The usability of 
MANA allows a wide range of simulated runs to be conducted in a short amount of time 




2. Scenario Description 
 
Basic Concept: 
 There are two phases to SBE operations.  Phase I is a transit from 
debarkation points to the SBO areas.  A debarkation point is a logistic hub where T-craft 
may be loaded with cargo for further transport.  Naval operations are currently limited to 
a being resupplied from slow moving Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships that are 
severely limited in cargo capacity.  Another method is amphibious large decks ships that 
move large amounts of equipment to the SBO but require port facilities.  It is important to 
distinguish between cargo and equipment, cargo is fuel and supplies other than large 
machinery used for amphibious assaults.   
 The transit from debarkation points to SBO will vary from 2500 to 3500 
nm.  During this transit T-craft is vulnerable to attack.  The basic concept will model a 
simple transit from point A to point B with no external forces acting on it.  This concept 
is to determine a baseline for transit time and other MOE’s.   
 Phase II is the transfer of cargo, in relief situations, to a shore landing cite.  
In the phase I only the transit times and cargo load will be measures.  Phase II will also 





 Non-hostile environments are ideal for transfer of relief aid but not 
realistic.  The T-craft is a vulnerable to attack with a limited defense capability.  The 
advanced concept will attempt to introduce hostile threats into the basic concept.  Surface 
and air threats will be modeled to intercept T-craft in its transport Phase II to the shore 
and disrupt the relief effort.   
 An analysis will apply the designs of experiments to measure the full 
effects of varying forces and threats in Phase II.  T-craft will be escorted by varying 
number of warships and support aircrafts.  The escort’s area of operations will be focused 
on protecting T-craft in high threat regions of Phase II.   
 There are two regions of the in the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) 
which will be modeled to simulated two scenario, potential conflict on the Korea 
peninsula and Tsunami disaster relief missions to the Philippines island changes.  These 
scenarios offer a robust range of factors that the SBE will put into to measure 




3. Modeling Approach 
 
 The SBO area is easily represented in MANA.  The battle space will be a 
200 x 200 grid that will translate to a background chart that is measured in a nautical 
miles scale by using a conversion factor.  The debarkation point is defined as the port of 
origin for which the SBE is to transit to the SBO area.  In this scenario the debarkation 
port is Sasebo, Japan.  The SBO area is an off shore holding area used to transfer cargo at 
sea to the T-craft and further transport to the shore, located in the Sea of Japan.  MANA 
will attempt to model the continuous transfer of supplies to a disaster area without the 
need to leave the area for an extended amount of time. 
 The actions of the SBE will be modeled with a set of pre-defined 
personality traits.  MANA offers a personality state that will govern the actions of the T-
craft and trigger states to handle a situation if encountered.  The following settings will be 
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      Terrain Effect Range  10    
Squad 
Properties 
           
   General  Name  T‐CRAFT    
      Number of Agents  1    
      Flag Icon  0    





   Fuel Tank  Initial Fill (Fuel)  200    
   Embuss  Parent Squard  0    
Personality             





      Enemy Threat 1  0    
      Enemy Threat 2  0    
      Enemy Threat 3  0    
      Ideal Enemy  0    
      En. Class  2    
      Uninjuried Friends  10 
All 
FRND 
      Cluster  No    
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      Injured Friends  0    
      Neutrals  0    
      Next Waypoint  70    
      Advanced  No    
      Alt. Waypoint  0    
      Easy Going  0    
      Cover  0    
      Concealment  0    







   Squad SA  Enemy Threat 1   0    
      Enemy Threat 2  0    
      Enemy Threat 3  0    
      Squad Friends  0    
      Other Friends  10    
      Neutrals  0    
      Unknowns  ‐10    
   Inorganic SA  Enemy Threat 1   0    
      Enemy Threat 2  0    
      Enemy Threat 3  0    
      Squad Friends  0    
      Other Friends  10    
      Neutrals  0    
      Unknowns  ‐10    
Panel II     N/A       
Ranges             
   General  ICON  5    
      Allegiance  1    
      Threat  1    
      Agent Class  0    





      Armour Thickness  10    
      Stealth/Cls A Sensor  0    
      Stealth/Cls B Sensor  0    
   Fuel  My Fuel Usage Rate  ‐15    
      Refuel Trigger Range  0    
      Prob Refuel Enemy  0    
      Prob Refuel Friend  0    






      Slew Rate  180    
     








In  the  Absence  of 
Enemy: 
No Change    





      Release Child Squads  Checked    
Sensor             
   Sensor 1  Master Enable  Checked    
      Name  SPS‐55    
      Detail Level  Simple    






      Enable in the State  Checked    
      Class Range  20    
      Detect Range  35    
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      Lock to Class Range  Unchecked    
Weapons             
   Weapon 1  Master Enable  Unchecked    
      Name       
      Class       
      Detail level       
      Rounds       
      Fire Model/Target       
      Reload Time       
     







      Enable in This State  Unchecked    










      Shot Radius  0    
     







      Max Targets per step       
      Armour Penetration       






















      Fuse Time  0    





























      Fuse Time  0    









      Squad       
      Range       
      Capacity       
      Buffer       
      Latency       
      Self       
      Reliab       
      Acc.       
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      MxAge       
      Rank Filter       
      Include       
      Delivery       










      r x 100  50    





      Move Precision  50    
      Tau SoftMax  Unchecked    

























Table 1: T-craft agent settings. 
 
Personality             
Panel I  Agent SA  Enemies  0    













      Ideal Enemy  0    





































      Neutrals  0    























      Neutrals  0    
      Unknowns  0    











      Squad SA  100    
      Inorganic SA  30    










Ranges             
   General  ICON  36    
      Allegiance  2    
      Threat  2    













































      Squad  2    
      Range  30    
      Capacity  10    
      Buffer  ‐1    
      Latency  0    
      Self  5    
      Reliab  80    
      Acc.  95    
      MxAge  ‐1    
      Rank Filter  High    
      Include  SFUNETC    
      Delivery  Guaranteed    
      Group       
Table 2: Red Force agent adjustment settings. 
 
Personality             
Panel I  Agent SA  Enemies  50    















      Ideal Enemy  0    
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      Neutrals  0    
      Unknowns  0    
Ranges             
   General  ICON  11    
      Allegiance  1    
      Threat  3    



























Table 3: Blue Force agent adjustment settings. 
 
 The use of SBE in humanitarian relief efforts is to deliver supplies to 
needed areas around the world.  MANA can be used to measure the number of delivery 
T-craft will make in a given scenario.  The Basic and Advanced concepts described early 
were modeled in MANA.  The SBE, using T-craft’s projected capabilities, was modeled 
in SBO scenario with designated interaction points.   
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 The key to controlling sea lanes of communication are with naval power.  
The advanced concept attempted to model how the sea lanes will be defended against in a 
hostile environment.  Varying enemy forces based on the design of experiments will were 
applied in the scenarios to introduce an opposing force.  The SBE was then escorted by 
varying friendly forces.  These blue forces defended the SBE platforms around the SBO 
in the advanced concept.  The sea lanes it will be limited to tracks between debarkation 
points to SBO areas. 
 There are many assumptions in this scenario that allow the SBE to be 
modeled.  MANA is an agent based simulation that incorporated a memory map to allow 
the agents to explore and react to any given environment.  The simulation attempts to 
model combat interactions without the rigor of integrating environmental factor and real 
physic.  The fuel function in this study will be used to model cargo transfer from T-craft 
to shore landing areas, therefore refueling and logistic support that is typical in naval 
operations will assume to be adequate and not measured.   
 Other assumptions of the scenario related to the definition of the basic and 
advanced concepts.  The advanced concept will not actively use coordinated tactics by 
either sides.  The use of MANA will produce stochastic results to answer survivability 
questions posed by scenario objects.  The simulation will have a number of parameters 
that are adjusted to simulate realistic interaction in a hostile environment.   
 Resolution is important in simulation and is essential to exploring the 
cargo transfer aspect.  This study used MANA because of its ability to be used in high 
resolution scenarios.  The advanced concept is designed with opposing and escorts forces 
with one T-craft transiting to the SBO area.  Future studies many be modeled with 
multiple SBE being used to transfer cargo.   
 The last assumption that will be made within this study is capabilities of 
opposing forces.  The basic and advanced concept depicts UN Naval forces as escort 
elements and a generic third world naval force as the opposing force.  All opposing forces 
will be modeled with limited capabilities.  Escort forces will have a 2:1 advantage over 
opposing forces in the advanced concept. 
 The Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in a humanitarian relief scenario 
are based on public opinion and views of the population.  It is safe to assume that as more 
relief supplies are delivered the greater the public opinion will be towards the MOOTW 
until a tipping point.  A maximum point of public opinion may exist as the surplus of 
supplies and the level of military presence increase by the same bounds.  The first MOE 
is having a continued positive increase of public opinion with an increase of cargo 
delivered and a steady public opinion with no cargo delivered over an extended amount 
of time.  Any decrease in public opinion with affect the MOE in operations. 
 To provide the maximum amount of cargo and supplies the maximum 
numbers of T-crafts need to be available to cargo transfer.  The average number of T-
crafts lost should be as minimal as possible to increase the public opinion and provide the 
maximum amount of cargo from debarkation points and SBO areas.  The advanced 
concept posses a threat to T-craft survivable and requires naval escorts for transit routes.  
The second MOE is derived from the minimal loss of T-crafts and is measured by having 
a greater than 95% survivability of SBE vessels. 
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 There are specific Measures of Performance (MOP) associated with the 
MOE’s that can be easily measured in this study.  The first MOP is the average amount 
by cargo delivered by T-crafts with multi-run scenarios.  This is accompanied by the 
average transit time of the T-craft and average number of T-crafts surviving the advanced 
concept threats.   
 Complications in scenario design induce difficulties in modeling of the 
concepts by the MANA simulation tool.  Modeling the logics or mechanics of the 
scenarios posse the most challenges.  The concepts require detailed transit routes where 
the agents are modeled to maximize their actions in survivability.  The second challenge 
in modeling the concept presented here is behavior of the agents given the personality 
settings.  The simplest alterations in personality make significant changes to performance 
in the scenario.  A way to alleviate some of these issues is to only alter certain 
characteristics in dramatic ways keeping other settings constant.   
 Expected results of the basic concept will be straight forward measuring 
statistical outcomes.  The projected outcome will be that as T-craft delivers supplies to 
the shore the public opinion will increase in favor of operations.  The Advanced concept 
is not so straight forward.  It is expected that the T-craft will not statistically survive an 
unescorted transit in hostile environments.  The second expected value in an advanced 
concept is that the number of escorts needed will be proportional to the number of hostile 
forces in the area.  The third aspect that may be derived from this study is that convoys 
may be needed to ensure that the transfer of cargo is sufficient.  The attrition of supplies 
to disaster relief efforts may play role in public opinion verses military presence.  The 
protection of cargo ships in War World II may have applications in this scenario where 
the amount of supplies delivered is a measured factor. 
 
4. Design of Experiment 
 
There are three factors in the basic concept that will be varied in two phases.  The 
two phases are transit from debarkation point to SBO and from SBO to the shore.  The 
parameters that will be measured in this study are T-craft speeds, amount of cargo to 
include transfer rate, and number of trips to shore from the SBO.  The following chart 
shows the nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) design of experience between 






200/100 -5 200/100 -5 1 
400/400 -20 400/400 -20 3 
0 0 0 0 0 
Speed 
Cargo 
rate Speed Cargo rate 
Trips  
to shore 
200/100 -20 200/100 -20 3 
200/100 -10 200/100 -10 3 
200/100 -10 200/100 -10 1 
200/100 -15 200/100 -15 2 
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400/400 -20 400/400 -20 2 
400/400 -10 400/400 -10 2 
400/400 -10 400/400 -10 3 
400/400 -20 400/400 -20 3 
400/400 -15 400/400 -15 2 
400/400 -5 400/400 -5 1 
400/400 -15 400/400 -15 1 
400/400 -15 400/400 -15 3 
400/400 -10 400/400 -10 2 
200/100 -5 200/100 -5 2 
200/100 -15 200/100 -15 2 
200/100 -15 200/100 -15 1 
200/100 -5 200/100 -5 2 
Table 4: Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hyper-cube (NOLH) Design of Experiments 
(DOE) for Basic Concept. 
 
The Advanced Concept introduces varying numbers of opposing forces to T-
craft’s transit.  In an effort to counter the opposing forces, escort ships with be positioned 




200/100 -5 1 1 1 1 
400/400 -20 3 3 3 2 










200/100 -20 3 2 2 2 
200/100 -10 3 2 1 1 
200/100 -10 1 2 2 2 
200/100 -15 2 3 2 1 
400/400 -20 2 1 2 1 
400/400 -10 2 3 1 2 
400/400 -10 3 2 3 1 
400/400 -20 3 3 3 2 
400/400 -15 2 2 2 2 
400/400 -5 1 2 3 1 
400/400 -15 1 2 3 2 
400/400 -15 3 3 2 1 
400/400 -10 2 1 2 2 
200/100 -5 2 3 2 2 
200/100 -15 2 1 3 1 
200/100 -15 1 2 1 2 
200/100 -5 2 1 1 1 





The representation of transferring cargo was modeled in MANA by using triggers 
to simulate the increase of goods at the shore landing cite.  The shore landing cite enables 
a trigger when T-craft is within range of 1 and commences transferring cargo.  This value 
is then measured as a MOP.  My Fuel Usage Rate is adjustable and simulates large 
amounts of cargo transfer.  These parameters are in Table 4 & 5 as Cargo Rate. 
 
5. Data Analysis 
 
 There were two MOP’s that were measured for the basic concepts; transit 
times of the T-craft to and from the shore landing area and amount of cargo transferred to 
the shore landing area.  The T-craft is assumed to survive in an uncontested transit in the 
basic concept but was not the case for the advanced concept.  The survivability factor of 
T-craft in the advanced concept was measured a probability of survival.  MANA provides 
time and cargo in generic terms but tangible for simulation purposes.  The representation 
of time and cargo values allows for a translation to various units and measures.  The 
generic units will be reported to illustrate the versatility of the simulation for combat 
models.   
The following results are from the basic concept and list the average transits times 
with varying number of deliveries based on the design of experiments in section 4, made 
to a shore landing location.  The average amount of cargo transferred to the shore 
location is listed by varying rate transfers.  All trails conducted in MANA were replicated 
50 times for statistical analysis. 
 
Speed Cargo Rate Time + SD Cargo + 
SD 
200/100 5 (3 Trips) 457.84 + 8.29 398.60 + 177.27 
200/100 10 (3 Trips) 445.38 + 7.30 1173 + 316.74 
200/100 20 (3 Trips) 446.38 + 8.48 2295.2 + 780.76 
400/100 10 (3 Trips) 200.04 + 4.78 465.0 + 148.07 
400/100 15 (3 Trips) 201.20 + 5.77 702.10 + 253.51 
400/100 20 (3 Trips) 200.5 + 4.81 893.6 + 253.51 
200/100 5 (2 Trips) 347.76 + 5.04 364.4 + 110.3 
200/100 5 (2 Trips) 336.4 + 4.90 328.70 + 108.78 
200/100 15 (2 Trips) 338.36 + 5.21 1001.4 + 331.11 
400/100 10 (2 Trips) 160.82 + 3.55 295.8 + 117.21 
400/100 10 (2 Trips) 167.76 + 4.52 325.2 + 126.59 
400/100 15 (2 Trips) 157.72 + 3.50 441.6 + 180.87 
400/100 20 (2 Trips) 164.1 + 3.94 558.0 + 168.85 
200/100 10 (1 Trips) 283.28 + 13.81 331.2 + 131.59 
200/100 15 (1 Trips) 280.84 + 13.17 542.4 + 291.47 
400/100 5 (1 Trips) 136.32 + 1.63 97.6 + 33.12 
400/100 15 (1 Trips) 134.96 + 2.09 307.20 + 138.15 
Table 6:  Basic Concept Results for Phase I & II. 
 
The following results are from the advanced concept which lists the distribution 







Threat Survive % 
200/100 20 3 2 2 62 
200/100 10 3 2 1 48 
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200/100 10 1 2 2 52 
200/100 15 2 3 2 48 
400/100 20 2 1 2 80 
400/100 10 2 3 1 54 
400/100 10 3 2 3 68 
400/100 20 3 3 3 70 
400/100 15 2 2 2 74 
400/100 5 1 2 3 64 
400/100 15 1 2 3 84 
400/100 15 3 3 2 50 
400/100 10 2 1 2 90 
200/100 5 2 3 2 42 
200/100 15 2 1 3 76 
200/100 15 1 2 1 54 
200/100 5 1 1 1 64 
Table 7:  Advanced Concept Results for Phase I & II. 
 
The mean probability of Survival of T-craft in the given scenarios was calculated 
to 63.53 + 14.06%.   
 
6. Results and Conclusions 
 
Use of the MANA program shows that it is possible for the T-craft concept to be 
represented in computer based model.  MANA provides a set of characteristics and 
parameters, in the form of personal settings that can be used for modeling the T-craft to 
explore the capabilities that are desired for a SBE.  Desired results were obtained from 
fairly simple agent settings made user friendly and low level replication techniques.  
MANA posses power in graphical representation that allows for all operation research 
and analysis to be conducted.  MANA is a simple agent based application with the 
potential to be an effective tool, stand-alone or in combination, to be used for prototype 
analysis. 
The major usefulness in this study of MANA’s capabilities was the ability to 
collect data from the simulations for analysis.  The data obtained from the replications of 
concept scenarios was directly measured to determine statistical information.  Table 6 
indicates that there is an apparent correlation between the increase in transfer rate and 
speed.  One limitation to the MANA results is that the variation among the cargo 
transferred data ranges to nearly half of the mean values for 11 of the 17 measurements.   
The strongest argument for use of MANA in analysis of SBE concepts in a 
humanitarian scenario is the ability to take the results from this study and use the results 
in MOOTW models.  The given generic values of cargo transferred can be used as inputs 
for MOOTW simulation for further analysis of the effectiveness of SBE’s.  These 
methods of varying personal settings and force sizes shows that MANA can be used to 
model SBE scenarios and obtain tangible results.   
 
7. Lessons Learned, Recommendations, and Future Work 
 
The single most important aspect of MANA is the triggering of actions for agents 
in a scenario.  These triggers are sensitive to alteration is small amounts.  This is 
observed in the measured cargo transfers within the basic concept.  The trends seem to 
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suggest that as My Fuel Rate Usage is varied in the experience there is change in the 
amount of cargo transferred.  In contrast to varying settings slightly, there is a wide range 
available to change settings to test extreme limits of scenarios performance.  The speed of 
a ship compared to that of an aircraft is considerably less and can be represented in 
MANA.  MANA can be utilized in many different aspects in M&S. 
MANA is an open source program that is available online.  An advantage of this 
is that documentation is available to users.  However, the MANA user manual within the 
download source is out dated with reference to the version number.  There were several 
display and control settings that did match and were not explained in the user manual.  
This was only a minor unconvinced to representing the SBE. 
In modeling the SBE concepts there was a strong temptation adjust settings to 
favor the survivable of T-craft.  The difficult in building the scenarios was determining 
the effectiveness of weapons and defensives for forces to allow for favorable exchange 
rates on the blue sides while allowing for red force to realistically interfere with the SBE 
concept.  The other difficulty came with modeling capability strength of the T-craft to 
maintaining the desired ONR requirements.  T-craft speeds were overly extended to 
illustrate the extreme advantage it has over conventional forces.  
MANA is currently not integrated with other simulations and is capable in a stand 
alone mode.  One advantage that can be gained from the capable of MANA usability to 
create scenario might be integration with other processing programs.  One effective way 
may be to provide output data in a user defined format.  The current TCP/UDP output 
streams are useful for combining simulation but do not allow analysis data to be collected 
in an effective way.  In the basic concept cargo measurement were made from multiple 
excel spreadsheet entries taken from separate files across the multiple run output files.  
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Utilizing MANA to model enemy combatants of the patrol craft class disguising 
themselves as neutrals and obtaining first strike capability on a Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS).  This is to determine the survivability of an LCS type craft in a more realistic 
scenario in which the red forces are able to get within the most effective range of their 
weapons and get off at least one shot unhindered as blue forces will be following the 
standard US Rules Of Engagement (ROE) of firing only when fired upon.  This area has 
not been well represented in the past as in every survivability model I have seen for the 
LCS the combat started with the enemy forces at the maximum range of the LCS’s 
weapons systems, assuming that it was expected combat as opposed to the more likely 
scenario of red forces shooting first. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement and Relevance to Stability and Support Operations 
 
This project is simulating LCS conducting transit operations in a strait and being 
attacked without warning or provocation by red forces.  The relevance to stability and 
support operations lies in the fact that this will simulate routine transit operations in 
which red forces launch an attack as a precursor to closing down a vital chokepoint.   
 
1.2 Model Selection 
 
The model chosen was MANA, the Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata, 
currently at version 5.00.80, is actively developed by the New Zealand Defense Force.  
MANA is a time stepped, agent based modeling environment designed with a graphic 
user interface.  It was designed to be user friendly and to achieve fast run times and is 
delivered as a pre-compiled executable for any Windows based environment.  Due to 
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more familiarity, I am using version 4.04.1 as version 5 only came out recently and I am 
still learning the ropes so to speak.   
 
2. Scenario Description 
 
The scenario under investigation will involve a SUW module equipped LCS 
transiting some nonexistent straits during normal operations.  The ship will be under the 
standard Rules of Engagement, mainly not to fire unless fired upon but will have all 
weapons manned and ready.  Red force patrol craft, some armed with surface-to-surface 
missiles and some with medium caliber guns will approach the LCS and once within 
range will open fire.  LCS will not return fire until after the red forces have fired.  The 
number of missile armed boats and gunboats will vary as will the LCS having its SH-60 
helicopter armed and in the air.  Will also vary the number of Hellfire missiles that the 
SH-60 will be carrying when it is in the air to see how it affects the survivability of the 
ship.   
I had also planned on incorporating torpedo armed patrol craft in the scenario but 
I am still working on the appropriate way to simulate a torpedo in MANA.    
 
3. Modeling Approach 
 
Using a map of Chesapeake Bay as the chokepoint to transit, began with the LCS 
and its helicopter starting outside and entering the bay and with the red forces coming to 
intercept them at the narrowest point.   
 
 
For the SUW equipped LCS, I set Weapon 1 as the 25MM cannon, weapon 2 as 
the Netfire missile system, weapon 3 as the 57MM gun, and weapon 4 as the .50 caliber 
machine guns.  I will vary the probability of hit of these weapons and the availability of 
the Netfire system as it is still in development. 
I set the second squad to be the missile boats armed with short range surface-to-
surface missiles.  I kept the number of missiles per boat at four and varied the number of 
boats. 
I set the third squad as the gunboats armed with a deck gun similar to the 57MM 
but with less range, due in part to the height above water of the gun, and inferior targeting 
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capability.  I kept the number of rounds at fifty per boat and just varied the number of 
boats. 
The SH-60 helicopter I set as the fourth squad.  I armed it with hellfire missiles, 
varying the number of missiles onboard the helicopter from two to six and also varying 
whether the helicopter is available at the time of the transit.   
 
The main data I intend to collect is how frequently the LCS survives in the 
scenario and how this relates to the helicopter being available as well as weapons load-
out of the helicopter and the LCS itself.  Will also gather data on at what point the enemy 
threat becomes, on average, too much for the LCS to handle.  I intend to vary the number 
of each type of boat from one to six.  I also intend to vary the range at which the red 
forces open fire on the LCS.   
  
Since I was using MANA version 4 for this, one of the limitations is that of speed 
and range.  This version of MANA uses a grid system for range and number of grids that 
one can move per time step for speed.  It is a difficult system to work with.  This is fixed 
in MANA version 5, with there being real world units of measure available so the 
variation of ranges and speeds that I would have used if doing the experiment completely 
in MANA 4 is unnecessary.   
 
One of my expectations is to see the LCS have a higher chance of survival when 
its helicopter is airborne and armed with more hellfire missiles and when the Netfire 
system is available.  I also expect the range at which the red forces open fire on the LCS 
to have an effect on its chances of survival, with survival being more likely the further 
away the red forces are when they begin their attack.   
 
 
4. Design of Experiment 
 
Another benefit in using MANA is that MANA can import from Excel 
spreadsheets.  So I can set the probability of hit of the hellfire missile to be between 0.6 
and 0.8, set there to be twenty rows to read from, Excel will put random numbers 
between 0.6 and 0.8 in those areas and by setting each row to be ran in MANA a certain 
number of times I can ensure that with each row of different parameters I get enough run-
throughs to give me a good amount of data.   
 
5. Data Analysis [to the extent possible] 
 
Data collection is still in progress.  What I’m doing here is heavily related to my 
thesis research and I’m still working on perfecting the numbers as well as finding a way 
to create torpedo boats for the scenario.   
 




Was able to get a working model in MANA 4 but continue to get errors in MANA 
5.  Am ceasing work with MANA 4 since MANA 5 will give me better results; just need 
time to master the intricacies of MANA 5.   
 
7. Lessons Learned, Recommendations, and Future Work 
 
Lessons learned: Need to cease working with MANA 4 and improve my abilities 
with MANA 5.  MANA 5 is more user friendly, I just had not been using it long enough 
to get the scenario to run in it properly and MANA 4 scenarios does not convert over to 
MANA 5.   
 
Recommendations: For MANA to be improved in the weapons tab for the squads, 
made more user-friendly and with more variation possible.   
Would recommend that a MANA database be created that includes exports of all 
the different types of squads, weapons, and sensors that have been made in the courses of 
others’ research so that newcomers are not forced to reinvent the wheel.     
 
Future work: For someone to run a similar model including torpedo boats if I 
continue to be unable to come up with an acceptable simulation of a torpedo in the model 
and if MANA is improved to allow for such as a torpedo to be simulated, with the ship 
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ABSTRACT: This paper describes an agent-based implementation of a model of 
population support for an insurgency to determine how the population's attitude varies 
with the actions of the insurgents.  A non-homogenous population composed of clans is 
modeled along with insurgent and government groups.  A descriptive model of the 
dynamics and interrelationships of popular attitudes in an insurgency based on the work 
of Kress, Szechtman, and Atkinson is used.  First an agent-based model design analysis 
was completed.  Based on the design analysis, the agent-based modeling tool REPAST 
was selected to implement the agent-based behavior desired.  The conclusions of this 
paper discuss the implementation of this model and a pilot experiment run to verify the 




Counterinsurgency operations are among the lower intensity range of military 
operations.  A nation experiencing an insurgent threat is a complex environment to 
model.  Research attempts to identify vulnerabilities of an insurgency in order to defeat it.  
Using the work of Szechtman, Kress and Atkinson, [5] this paper investigates how an 
agent-based model (ABM) implementation of an insurgency environment can be used to 
study the dynamics and interrelationships between insurgent actions and population’s 
support of the insurgency.  The basis of the design for the model uses the method 
described by Macal and North. [6]  An implementation of the model was completed using 
the Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit (REPAST).  Results from a pilot 
experiment using the ABM implementation are compared to the hypothesized behavior of 
Szechtman, Kress, and Atkinson. 
 
1.1 Insurgency Threat to Stability Operations 
 
Insurgency is a threat to the stability of a nation in that it aims to overthrow a 
government while feeding off of the unstable conditions prevalent in a failing state.  One 
definition of an insurgency is a protracted struggle that uses three steps leading to the 
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final objective of the overthrow of an existing government structure.   Traditionally, third 
world insurgencies use three distinct phases to achieve their objective:  an initial phase of 
agitation of the population around a cause, a subsequent phase of expansion of the local 
support base among the population while conducting guerrilla operations against the local 
government, and the final phase of open warfare to overthrow the existing government. 
[1]   The local people are a critical source of support for an insurgency, supplying 
logistical support, recruits, and freedom of movement.  A successful insurgency only 
requires a few members of the population to be active supporters, while the majority of 
the population simply needs to remain passive toward insurgent activities.  The level of 
support exhibited by the local population is a measure of the control exercised by the 
insurgents.  With greater control of the population, the insurgent forces are provided with 
a base of recruitment and the freedom to move through the area.  With popular support, 
the insurgents are able to prolong the conflict, denying conventional battles, while 
wearing down the weak government.  The Vietnam War, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 
and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan all exhibit stability operations 
heavily affected by the existence of a local insurgency.   
 
In an insurgency environment there are dynamic relationships between 
government forces, insurgents, and the population.  Actions by the government or 
insurgents to control the population have various unintended effects.  The population’s 
attitude toward the government or insurgents varies based on the perceived utility of 
these actions.  Szechtman, Kress and Atkinson [5] propose that when insurgents hold 
more support among the population, then the insurgent situational awareness increases 
and their targeting for the application of coercion is more accurate.  Applying coercion 
without accurate situational awareness creates the potential to negatively affect 
population attitude toward the insurgency and further erode insurgent situational 
awareness.  The government is similarly affected by population support, situational 
awareness, and the effects of actions taken on the population. 
 
The research question of interest is to determine how population attitude varies 
with changes in insurgent actions and the level of coercion employed.  The remainder of 
this paper discusses how this one element of an insurgency can be modeled using an 
implementation within an open source agent based modeling tool.    
 
1.2 Model Selection 
 
Current combat models aren’t well suited for the complex interactions presented 
by an insurgency. Tight coupling of agents, behaviors, and the environment exist in 
models such as MANA and Pythagoras that limit these models for use in analyzing this 
type of problem.[2]  These modeling tools have limited ability to change agent behavior 
and require a great deal of adaptation and abstraction to model scenarios outside the 
context of combat operations.  Other ABM frameworks have been developed such as 
MASON (Multi-Agent Simulator of Neighborhoods) and REPAST to allow a more broad 
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application of ABM techniques.  Repast Symphony was chosen to implement this model 
of popular attitude and the effects of insurgent use of coercion. 
 
Repast (Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit) was designed to build 
flexible and reusable components and models.  Repast model design uses the Context, 
Projection, and Agent concepts.  The Context represents an abstract population and 
contains the local state of the population.  The agents in that context interact with the 
attribute fields held by the Context.  Sub-Contexts allow a hierarchical structure of the 
agent population. The Projection maintains the possible interaction relationships between 
agents in a context.   Repast proto-agents hold the properties and behaviors of an agent. 
[2] 
 
Repast Simphony offers a graphical agent editor to, two dimensional and three 
dimensional graphical display options, data collection, data output, and data charting that 
are useful for implementation and analysis of simulation experiments. 
 
2. Scenario Description 
 
The work of Szechtman, Kress, and Atkinson proposes that insurgent use of 
coercion without sufficient popular support can result in a cascading decrease in popular 
support.  Clan or tribal agents represent weighted sub-sections of a homogenous 
population.  Clan decision functions use rational utility functions that assess the utility 
gained by supporting the government versus the utility gained by supporting the 
insurgents.  Clans that receive more utility from actively supporting the government hold 
a contrarian attitude toward the insurgents.  Likewise, clans receiving more utility from 
actively supporting the insurgency hold the attitude of active supporters toward the 
insurgency.  Figure 1 shows this utility scale.  A clan that decides to become a contrarian 
offers no support to the insurgency, but also must decide on becoming an active 
contrarian, offering support to the government.  If the clan estimates that the cost of 
becoming an active contrarian too much, the clan will become a latent contrarian in an 
effort to avoid the extra cost of insurgent coercion. 
   
 
Figure 1.  Clan Agent Utility Function. 
 
As the insurgency modifies the levels of benefits, impositions, and coercion that it 
uses, the population changes their attitude toward the insurgency due to shifting utility.  
Insurgents use coercion to force a clan that is an active contrarian to become latent.  The 
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insurgency’s decision to use coercion is based on an inaccurate perception of the 
environment.  In order to accurately target active contrarians, the insurgency requires 
intelligence from active supporters to identify which clans are actively contrarians that 
support the government.  With increased situational awareness, the insurgents are able to 
accurately target active contrarians.  Loss of active supporters decreases situational 
awareness resulting in coercion being applied to active supporters or latent contrarians, 
lowering the overall level of popular support. 
 
The effect described by Szechtman, Kress, and Atkinson is that since the 
insurgents derive their information from the population, a loss of popular support 
decreases situational awareness, increasing inadvertent coercion which further decreases 
popular support.  This effect shows that an insurgency can force the population away 
from the government with coercion, but inaccurate use of coercion can cost the 
insurgency valuable information and support.  
 
3. Modeling Approach 
 
The design of this model attempts to follow the guidelines described by Macal 
and North [6].  Agents are defined as objects with attributes that live inside and interact 
with an Environment.  The agent updates its attributes with Agent Methods in response to 
its perception of the environment.  Agent Interactions are conducted along networks 
using meta-rules for agent to agent and agent to environment interactions.  The complex 
behavior of interest emerges from these simple rules given to the agents, based on local 
information without a centralized decision controller.  The following implementation 
used Repast Symphony to construct the agents and their interactions.  [3][4] 
 
3.1 Simple Agent 
 
A base agent type was created to derive each of the agent types in the model.  The 
Simple Agent contains a virtual step function that is executed each time step, a set of 
identifier functions that return the type of agent, and basic properties for name, popular 
support, and resource level. 
 
3.2 Clan Agent 
 
A Clan Agent represents a fraction of the population associated with a particular 
tribe or clan.  The utility function of each Clan Agent is independently defined such that 
different Clans will react to the actions of the Government or Insurgents differently.  
Each Clan Agent includes properties of the size and relative importance of the Clan.  
During each time step the clan compares the perceived utility of the three attitude choices 
toward the insurgency:  active supporter, active contrarian, or latent contrarian.  By 
comparing the utility received from the Government and the Insurgency, the clan chooses 
the attitude stance for the time step that results in maximum utility gained.  The popular 
support of the clan for that time step is then transferred to the Government Agent if an 
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active contrarian, to the Insurgent Agent if an active supporter, and neither agent if a 
latent contrarian. 
 
The Insurgent utility is calculated based on popular support of the clan, while 
government utility and coercion is based on the population size.  If the utility from 
insurgency is greater than utility from the government, the clan decides to be an active 
supporter of the insurgency.  Otherwise, the clan will hold a contrarian attitude toward 
the insurgency.  The clan then accounts for the potential cost of insurgent coercion.  If the 
utility of the government minus the cost of coercion remains greater than the insurgent 
utility, the clan becomes an active contrarian toward the insurgency and actively supports 
the government.  If the cost of coercion decreases the government utility below the 
insurgent utility, the clan will become a latent contrarian and neither actively supports the 
government or the insurgency in an attempt to avoid the extra cost of coercion.  
 
3.3 Government Agent 
 
The Government Agent represents the government in the environment.  Benefit 
and imposition level properties model the government actions on the clans.   
The benefits and impositions given to the clans by the government are based on 
population size.  Popular support fraction for the government is calculated each time step 
based on the clan attitudes toward the insurgency. 
 
3.4 Insurgent Agent 
 
The Insurgent Agent represents the insurgency in the environment.  Benefit level, 
imposition level, and coercion level properties model the insurgent actions on the 
population.  The Insurgency derives its situational awareness from the fraction of active 
supporters in the population.  With a higher fraction of active supporters, the insurgency 
has higher situational awareness and is better able to target coercion actions toward active 
contrarians.  The intent of the coercion is to increase the cost to Clan agents to become 
active contrarians, thus making them choose to be latent contrarians that don’t actively 
support the government.  With less situational awareness the insurgency is more 
inaccurate in application of coercion.  This is modeled by a random application of 




=      
3.5 Support Network Projections 
 
The Government Support Network is a projection in Repast that models the 
transfer of popular support to the Government.  The Insurgent Support Network is a 
Repast projection that models the flow of popular support from the population to the 
insurgency.  The level of popular support for both the government and insurgency are 
computed during each time step. 
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3.6 Repast implementation of popular attitude model 
 
The popular attitude model implemented in Repast uses the above described 
agents and networks.  The following figures show the implementation diagrams from 
Repast.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Repast Diagram of Simple Agent. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Repast Diagram of Clan Agent. 
 
3.7 Operation of the Model  
 
To operate this model, the population is represented by several Clan agents 
created with specified population size and clan importance values.  The Government 
agent is added with specified values for benefit level, imposition level, and benefit level 
for active contrarians.  The Insurgent agent is added with specified values for benefit 
level, imposition level, and coercion level.  The Government and Insurgent Support 





Figure 4. Repast Diagram of Insurgent Agent. 
 
 
Figure 5. Repast Diagram of Government Agent. 
 
 





Running the model consists of stepping through time and varying the variables of 
interest.  For example, in the experiment discussed in the next section, a particular 
property value of the Insurgent Agent is varied to determine the effect on the Insurgent’s 
Situational Awareness. 
 
3.8 Limitations/Constraints of model. 
 
The limitations of this model are that the Clan decision functions are simple 
utility functions assuming a rational Clan agent.  Further research into the psychology 
and dynamics of tribal and clan decision making could be used instead to produce more 
accurate behavior.  Another limitation is that the agents are directly linked through 
networks.  An improvement would be to have each agent perceive the environment and 
use those perceptions to make action decisions.  This introduces the concept of inaccurate 
perception and limited knowledge.  Lastly, this model is limited in that each agent is 
assumed to be completely rational.  A more detailed agent would include the internal 
population dynamics that affect each groups’ decision making such as internal politics, 
resources available, and population perceptions. 
 
3.9 Expectations of the model behavior 
 
Szechtman, Kress, and Atkinson propose that a small increase in insurgent 
impositions on the clans results in an acceleration of loss of popular support [5].  As 
insurgents increase the imposition level, their situational awareness decreases when fewer 
active supporters provide information.  With decreased situational awareness, insurgent 
targeting for coercion is less accurate resulting in unintended coercion of supporting 
clans, further decreasing popular support and situational awareness.  Conversely, with 
greater situational awareness there is less unintended coercion and popular support 
increases with increasing benefits.  The overall expected behavior of the model is that 
with increasing insurgent impositions, there is a corresponding decrease in situational 
awareness and an overall decrease in popular support. 
 
4. Design of Experiment 
 
The following experiment was run to verify the Repast implementation of the 
model.  This experiment aims to compare the results of the model with the expected 
results in reference [5].  The following initial conditions were given fixed values: 
a. Fixed government activity for each step including benefits and impositions placed 
on the clans. 
b. Fixed clan weights (size * importance = weight).  The initial values are in Table 1. 
 
Clan Name  Pop. Size  Importance  Pop. Support  
A  100  3  300  
B  250  5  1250  
 103 
 
C  100  3  300  
D  500  2  1000  
E  50  1  50  
Table 1. Experimental Clan  initial conditions 
 
The response variable of interest is the Insurgent Agent Situational Awareness.  
Situational Awareness is measured as a fraction of the total popular support for the 
insurgency given by active supporters.  The experimental factors investigated are the 
benefit level, imposition level, and coercion level attributes for the insurgents.   For each 
experimental run, a single factor is varied independently over several time steps to 
determine its effect on situational awareness.  The data collected is used to demonstrate 
the effects of each factor on the insurgent fraction of popular support as measured by the 
insurgent level of situational awareness.  Finally a comparison with the hypothesized 
model behavior in reference [5] is made. 
 
5. Data Analysis  
 
To measure the effect of insurgent actions on popular support, the level of 
situational awareness was measured.  Situational awareness was calculated as the fraction 
of popular support that the insurgency holds at a time step.   
 
The effect of benefits on popular support was that the fraction of support 
increases with increased benefits given to the clans by the insurgents.   
 
 
Figure 7. Effect of benefits on popular support. 
 
The effect of impositions has an opposite effect than benefits in that the fraction 





Figure 8. Effect of impositions on popular support. 
 
When coercion was varied, the initial Insurgent benefits and impositions were set 
equal to the Government levels.  The effect of coercion on popular support in this model 
results in some rapid erosion of popular support when situational awareness decreases 
with incorrect applications of coercion.  However, if the insurgency attains perfect 
situational awareness, coercion is not applied and there is no loss of popular support from 
that time on. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Effect of coercion on popular support. 
 
6. Results and Conclusions 
 
The output data from the experiment above shows fair correlation with the 
hypothesized expected behavior from reference [5].  The ability to model this OOTW 
scenario using the generalized ABM modeling framework of Repast was demonstrated.  
The potential to extend such an implementation to use knowledge of other domains could 
be built upon such a framework.  For example, instead of using rational utility functions 
for decision making, other decision making functions for agents based on social science 
theory could be implemented within this framework.  This is not always possible to 
accomplish using domain specific ABM tools such as MANA or Pythagoras.  This 
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modeling exercise shows the value of using a common ABM framework that can then be 
used to develop a library of agents and functions that can be reused. 
 
 
7. Lessons Learned, Recommendations, and Future Work 
 
When implementing any ABM, the design process is critical to ensuring that the 
agent framework developed is capable of simulating the particular behavior of interest.   
 
Using Repast Symphony to build this model showed that the graphical agent 
builder can be useful, but requires a moderate level of experience to create a working 
model.  Troubleshooting can be difficult with only the graphical tools and often a look at 
the generated code is required. 
 
Suggestions for further improvements to this model include: 
a. Insurgents operate with intentions based on the phases of the insurgency, adjusting 
their action decisions according to the phase. 
b. The Government Agent could be modified with characteristics such as levels of   
personal freedom, economic freedom, and political model that influence the 
Government’s actions toward the population. 
c. Additional International Community (IC), Non-Government Organization (NGO), 
or Coalition Force Agents could be modeled to show other influencing factors on 
popular attitudes.  For example, if clans receive direct IC support, would the model 
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ABSTRACT: This paper is an attempt at modeling crowd behavior and 
interactions between groups with varying affiliations. More specifically, we try to 
examine how a group of demonstrators can influence – and be influenced by – other 
groups with varying degrees of affiliation towards them. And agents based model 




The modeling of crowd behavior is not an easy thing to accomplish. Many 
attempts have been made in the past with varying degrees of success. Attempting to 
model human behavior of any kind is always subject to social theories and various 
observations about human behavior. It has been observed, for example, that an individual 
might act differently when he/she is alone, as opposed to the case where he/she is part of 
a group. The “group polarization” theory states that a group’s view moves towards the 
extremes of its members’ individual views, when the members are in agreement. On the 
other hand, when members of a group have opposite views, then the group’s view tends 
to compromise these conflicting opinions. This is referred to as “group depolarization” 
(Kennedy, Eberhart, 2001). 
 
A well known attempt at modeling crowd behavior was made by Reynolds in his 
Boids model (Reynolds, 1999), using three basic steering behaviors: Separation, 
Cohesion and Alignment. But it soon became obvious that this model, although it is good 
for the representation of flocks of birds, for example, it is not appropriate for the 




Musse et al gave a definition of a crowd as a set of groups, with each group 
having its own goals. Agents that belong in the same group share the same goals, but, due 
to social effects, agents can change groups and adopt another group’s goals (Musse et al., 
1998). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the behavior of groups during a 
demonstration, according to their individual beliefs and views. We will examine how 
groups of different affiliations towards the demonstrators can be influenced and how this 
influence spreads among the various groups. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement and Relevance to Stability and Support Operations 
 
There is a tendency, in recent times, for the M&S community to focus on Social 
Networking. This type of modeling attempts to address civilian behavior response to 
various situations or events. Since the success of any Stability and Support Operation 
relies heavily on public opinion, it becomes necessary to build tools and models which 
can help decision makers form, in advance, an image of the impact a particular decision 
might have on the populace. The attempt, described in this paper, is focusing on a 
particular aspect of Social Networking, which is crowd behavior. 
 
1.2 Model Selection 
 
MANA was the model we chose to develop our scenarios. MANA is an agent 
based model that is fairly easy to master. It offers a wide variety of options to the 
modeler, including Command and Control (C2), Situational Awareness (SA) and Event 
Driven Personality Changes. It is this last feature that we will use extensively in our 
study. This capability, along with the model’s user friendly setup, makes MANA the best 
tool for our purposes. 
 
 
2. Scenario Description 
 
We are going to investigate the behavior of three different segments of population 
towards a group of demonstrators in an urban environment. The three aforementioned 
segments have varying affiliation towards the demonstrators. One group (green group) 
has views similar to the demonstrators’, the second group (red group) has views opposite 
to the demonstrators’ and the third group (purple group) has a neutral view towards the 
demonstrators. The focus of this study will be the investigation of the interaction between 
these groups. More specifically, how the demonstrators influence – and are influenced by 





3. Modeling Approach 
 
We wish to illustrate in the best possible way how group interactions work. For 
this purpose, we decided that the best approach would be to construct initially a “neutral 
scenario”. This scenario (scenario 0) contains the four groups involved, but supports no 
interactions between them. The forces were constructed as follows: 
 
- Demonstrators: 30 blue agents in one group. 
 
- Unfriendlies: 10 red agents divided into two equal subgroups. 
 
- Friendlies: 10 green agents divided into two equal subgroups. 
 
- Neutrals: 10 purple agents divided into two equal subgroups. 
 
In this scenario, the demonstrators cannot influence any of the other groups and 
all three population groups are looking at the demonstrators in a neutral way. All groups, 
except neutrals, have the tendency to move towards friendly agents, which enhances 
group coherence. Moreover, all groups, except neutrals, have a tendency to move away 
from enemies. Since there is no definition of affiliations in this scenario, this feature does 
not produce any results. 
 
The initial setup of the scenario is illustrated in fig.1. 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Initial setup of demonstration scenario. 
 
The second scenario (scenario 1) gives to the Demonstrators (blue agents) the 
capability to influence the group of Unfriendlies (red agents). When the red agents are 
within the influence range of the blue agents, an interaction between them takes place 
(fig.2). A possible result of this interaction is the “transformation” of a red agent into a 
blue agent for a given amount of time. The probability of such an event occurring can be 
manipulated in MANA. For the purposes of this study, it was decided to be 0.2. The 
transformed red agent becomes, for all intends and purposes, a member of the blue group, 
with all the characteristics of a blue agent, until the blue group’s influence fades and it 
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reverts to its previous red state. The duration of the blue influence on red agents was 
decided to be 50 time steps. 
 
 
Fig.2 - Interaction between two agents (in white circle) 
 
The third scenario (scenario 2) expands on scenario 1 by giving to the 
Demonstrators (blue agents) the capability to influence the group of Friendlies (green 
agents). The interaction takes places in a similar way as the one described above for the 
red agents. The probability of a green agent getting influenced by a blue agent was 
decided to be 0.8. The transformed green agent becomes, for all intends and purposes, a 
member of the blue group, with all the characteristics of a blue agent, until the blue 
group’s influence fades and it reverts to its previous green state. The duration of the blue 
influence on green agents was decided to be 150 time steps. 
 
The fourth scenario (scenario 3) expands on scenario 2 by giving to the 
Demonstrators (blue agents) the capability to influence the group of Neutrals (purple 
agents). The interaction takes places in a similar way as described above for the red 
agents. The probability of a purple agent getting influenced by a blue agent was decided 
to be 0.5. The transformed purple agent becomes, for all intends and purposes, a member 
of the blue group, with all the characteristics of a blue agent, until the blue group’s 
influence fades and it reverts to its previous purple state. The duration of the blue 
influence on purple agents was decided to be 100 time steps. 
 
Finally, the fifth scenario (scenario 4) expands on scenario 3 by giving to the 
Unfriendlies (red agents) and the Neutrals (purple agents) the capability to influence the 
Demonstrators (blue agents) as well. The interaction takes places in a similar way as 
described above for the red agents. The probability of a blue agent getting influenced by a 
red agent was decided to be 0.2. The probability of a blue agent getting influenced by a 
neutral agent was set to 0.5. The transformed blue agent becomes, for all intends and 
purposes, a member of the group that influenced it, with all the characteristics of that 
agent, until the influence fades and it reverts to its previous blue state. The duration of the 
red influence on blue agents was decided to be 50 time steps. The duration of the purple 
influence on blue agents was set to 100 time steps. Furthermore, it was decided that there 
was no need to examine the influence of Friendlies (green agents) on the Demonstrators 




Each scenario was run ten times. For each replication, we recorded the number of 
agents that were influenced from each group. Finally, we calculated the mean number of 




4. Design of Experiment 
 
Due to time constraints, it was decided that there would be no variations of factors 
inside the scenarios; hence no proper design of experiment, as it is commonly 
understood. Instead, we performed ten replications of each scenario and we observed the 
individual scenarios’ results. Finally, we compared these results in order to gain some 
insight on the influence mechanisms between the groups. 
 
 
5. Data Analysis 
 
For scenario 0, there was no need to collect any data, due to its neutral nature. 
 
Scenario 1 showed that the mean number of red agents that were influenced by 
blue agents was 1.3. This is close enough to the probability 0.2 that was set for the red 
agents to be influenced by blue agents. Fig. 3 is a bar chart that shows the number of 
influenced agents for each one of the ten replications. 
 
 
Fig.3 – Influenced agents in scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 showed that the mean number of red agents that were influenced by 
blue agents was 2.0, which is exactly the probability 0.2 that was set for the red agents to 
be influenced by blue agents. On the other side, the mean number of green agents that 
were influenced by blue agents was 4.5, which is not close enough to the probability 0.8 
that was set for the green agents to be influenced by blue agents. Not enough close 
contact between the agents, combined with their sensor range could explain this result. 
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Fig.4 – Influenced agents in scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 showed that the mean number of red agents that were influenced by 
blue agents was 1.3, which is close enough to the probability 0.2 that was set for the red 
agents to be influenced by blue agents. Similarly, the mean number of purple agents that 
were influenced by blue agents was 5.9, which is close enough to the probability 0.5 that 
was set for the purple agents to be influenced by blue agents. On the other side, the mean 
number of green agents that were influenced by blue agents was 5.3, which is not close 
enough to the probability 0.8 that was set for the green agents to be influenced by blue 
agents. Fig. 5 is a bar chart that shows the number of influenced agents for each one of 
the ten replications. 
 
 
Fig.5 – Influenced agents in scenario 3 
 
Scenario 4 showed that the mean number of red agents that were influenced by 
blue agents was 2.5, which is close enough to the probability 0.2 that was set for the red 
agents to be influenced by blue agents. Similarly, the mean number of purple agents that 
were influenced by blue agents was 6.1, which is close to the probability 0.5 that was set 
for the purple agents to be influenced by blue agents. On the other side, the mean number 
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of green agents that were influenced by blue agents was 5.4, which is not close enough to 
the probability 0.8 that was set for the green agents to be influenced by blue agents. 
Finally the mean number of blue agents that were influenced, either by red or purple 
agents, was 2.5, a result that looks reasonable, given the probabilities that were set for 
influencing by red agents (0.2) and by purple agents (0.5). Fig. 6 is a bar chart that shows 
the number of influenced agents for each one of the ten replications. 
 
 
Fig.6 – Influenced agents in scenario 4 
 
Finally, we must notice that the number of agents in each of the groups (red, 
green and purple) was set to 10 because we wanted the mean number of influenced 
agents to be readily comparable to the respective influence probabilities for each group. 
For the blue group, which contains 30 agents, the mean number of influenced agents was 




6. Results and Conclusions 
 
Summarizing the data analysis, described above, we can draw some useful 
conclusions: 
 
- Human crowd behavior is not easy to model, because it is governed by a plethora 
of factors, not the least of which is unpredictability. 
 
- The more cohesive a group is, the more likely it is for it to influence other groups. 
 
- Influencing between groups is based, in large part, on the proximity of those 
groups (how close or far apart they are located) as well as the level of affiliation 
between them (groups with different affiliations are less likely to influence each 
other). 
 
- Although a certain level of influence between groups was hard coded in the 
model, the results did not match. This is mostly due to two factors: the 
randomness of movement of the agents, which drove groups away from each 
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7. Lessons Learned, Recommendations, and Future Work 
 
The purpose of this paper was to explore the influence mechanisms between 
groups with different stances between each other. The use of an agent based model would 
be the obvious choice in order to pursue this study. MANA was chosen as the model with 
which to represent crowd behavior, due to its capability to incorporate influencing 
between groups, and it’s rather user friendly controls. 
 
Data analysis results showed that the model behaved as expected, given the inputs 
of each scenario. In scenario 4, the most complicated one, the results do not follow a 
predictable path. From that arises the need to explore further these results and determine 
more accurately, rather than generally, who influences who and why. 
 
Possible future work could expand on scenario 4 in the following ways: 
- Examine how each group influences the blue group in scenario 4. 
 
- Give the ability to the influenced agents to influence others. 
 
- Design an experiment using as factors the level of influence for each group and 
varying them accordingly. 
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APPENDIX B. NPS CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS 
SURVEY 
Part I (Institution) 
1. Institution: Naval Postgraduate School 
2. Type: USG Military 
3. Website URL: www.nps.edu 
4. Contact Info: 
a. Mailing Address: 1 University Circle, He-022; Monterey, CA 93943 
b. Phone Number: (831) 656-3093 / DSN 756-3093 
c. Email: grad-ed@nps.edu 
5. Mission: “Provide relevant and unique advanced education and research programs in 
order to increase the combat effectiveness of U.S. and Allied armed forces and 
enhance the security of the United States.”  
6. Goals: 
a. Be the world leader in naval, defense, and national security-related graduate 
education and supporting research. 
b. Prepare the intellectual leaders for tomorrow's national security forces. 
 
To fulfill its mission, the Naval Postgraduate School strives to sustain excellence in 
the quality of its instructional programs; to be responsive to technological change 
and innovation in the Navy, defense, and national security environments; to prepare 
students to introduce and employ future technologies; and to work with other 
agencies and nations to ensure global security. 
 
7. Description 
To meet its advanced educational requirements, the Navy has a unique 
academic institution at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) with specially tailored 
academic programs and a distinctive organization tying academic disciplines to 
naval and joint war fighting applications. 
The student body consists of officers from all branches of the U.S. 
uniformed services, officers and civilians from approximately 60 other countries and 
civilian employees of both the federal government and state and local governments. 
A limited number of defense contractors and enlisted personnel are also enrolled. 
Selection for graduate education at NPS is based upon outstanding professional 
performance, promotion potential, and a strong academic background. Students 
receive graduate degrees as a result of successful completion of programs designed 
primarily to prepare them for future career assignments. Degrees are awarded on the 
basis of the same high academic standards that prevail at other accredited 
institutions. 
As an academic institution, NPS emphasizes study and research programs 
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that are relevant to the Navy's interests, as well as the interests of other branches of 
the Department of Defense (DoD). The programs are designed to accommodate the 
unique requirements of the military, defense department and other federal agencies, 
including requirements for Defense Acquisition Certification. 
 
8. Degrees Conferred Relevant to the CCO: 
a. Master of Arts 
i. Security Studies 
ii. National Security Affairs 
b. Master of Science 
i. Combat Systems Technology 
ii. Contract Management 
iii. Defense Analysis 
iv. Human Systems Integration 
v. Information Systems and Operations 
vi. Information Technology Management 
vii. Information Warfare Systems Engineering 
viii. Management 
ix. Operations Research 
c. Master of Business Administration 
i. Master of Business Administration 
ii. Executive Master of Business Administration 
d. Master of Executive Management 
e. Master of Systems Analysis 
f. Doctor of Philosophy 
i. Operations Research 
ii. Security Studies 
g. Doctor of Engineering 
i. Mechanical Engineering 
9. Institution Leadership Information. 
a. President:  Daniel T. Oliver, VADM, USN (Ret.) 
b. Provost and Academic Dean: Leonard A. Ferrari, Ph.D 
c. Chief Of Staff:  David Smarsh, Ph.D., Col., USAF 
d. Phone Number: (831) 656-3093 / DSN 756-3093 (general number) 
e. Email: grad-ed@nps.edu (general email) 
10. Institution Type: Education 
11. Graduate Employment: 
a. Military (mostly officer, limited number of enlisted) 
b. USG Civilians and a limited number of contractors 
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c. International Military 
d. NGOs, other civilians (mobile workshop courses only) 
12. Completion rate:  
13. Program Entry Points: multiple times per year, usually July and January 
14. Program Length: Varies per degree program and type of course (e.g. short course vs. 
graduate course) 
15. POC Info. 
a. Name: Dr. William Shewchuk, Dr. Karen Guttieri 
b. Phone Number: 831-656-3791 (office), 831-206-7201 (cell) 
c. Email: shewchuk@nps.edu, guttieri@nps.navy.mil  
16. Additional Institution Information: 
a. Academic Organization.  The Naval Postgraduate School has four graduate 
schools as well as several research and education institutes and centers. 
Academic departments and faculty are organized within four schools. 
Institutes and centers provide groups of faculty an additional structure for 
collaborative and inter-disciplinary teaching and research activities. The 
Naval Postgraduate School also has a number of inter-disciplinary 
committees and groups that oversee and advise education programs.  
Departments relevant to the CCO shown in bold. 
i. Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
1. Organizations and Management Academic Area 
2. Acquisition Management Academic Area 
3. Financial Management Academic Area 
4. Operations and Logistics Management Academic Area 
5. Manpower and Economics Academic Area 
6. Enterprise and Information Management Academic Area 
ii. Graduate School of Engineering and Applied Science 
1. Electrical and Computer Engineering Department 
2. Physics Department 
3. Applied Mathematics Department 
4. Oceanography Department 
5. Meteorology Department 
6. Mechanical and Astronautical Engineering Department 
7. Space Systems Academic Group 
8. Systems Engineering Department 
iii. Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences 
1. Computer Science Department 
2. Information Sciences Department 
3. Operations Research Department 
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4. Defense Analysis Department 
iv. School for International Graduates Studies 
1. National Security Affairs Department 
2. International Graduate Programs Office 
3. Defense Resources Management Institute 
4. Center for Civil-Military Relations 
5. Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
6. Center for Contemporary Conflict 
7. Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 
b. Degree Requirements.  Requirements for the Master of Arts Degree and the 
Master of Science Degree 
i. The master's degree may be awarded for successful completion of a 
curriculum which has the approval of the Academic Council as 
meriting the degree. Such curricula shall conform to current practice 
in accredited institutions and shall contain a well-defined major. 
ii. General Naval Postgraduate School minimum requirements for the 
master's degree are as follows: 
1. 32 quarter-hours of graduate level credits of which at least 20 
quarter-credits must be earned from NPS*. 
2. A thesis or its equivalent is required. 
3. To be eligible for the master's degree, the student must attain 
a minimum average quality point rating of 3.00 in all of the 
3000 and 4000 level courses (description of these levels are 
in the course catalog) in his/her curriculum a 2.75 in all 
courses of the curriculum. 
4. Information about individual curriculum length (in months), 
department, type of degree awarded, and program officer are 
located on pages 27-32 on the NPS catalog. 
c. Terms: Summer, Fall, Winter, Spring 
d. Categories of Courses 
i. Category 1: Graduate level classes as part of a degree/certificate 
program 
ii. Category 2: Short courses/mobile workshops 
iii. Category 3: Conferences 
 
Part II (Courses) 
1. Naval Postgraduate School 
2. Courses (Category 1: Graduate School Courses) 
a. Organizational Design for Special Operations (4-0) As Required 
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i. Course Number: MN3121 
ii. Course Description: Principles of organizational design are critically 
examined and applied to special operations' missions and 
organizations. Focus is on the organizational level of analysis and 
includes such topics as organizational environments, key success 
factors, technology and information systems, configuration and 
structure, organizational learning, reward systems, and decision 
making. Case method is used to develop diagnostic skills and a 
systemic perspective.  
iii. Prerequisite: Enrollment in the SOLIC curriculum or consent of 
instructor.  
iv. Department/Instructor Info:  Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy (GSBPP) 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: As required 
b. Contract Law (4-0)  
i. Course Number: MN3121 
ii. Course Description: This course examines the legal structure within 
which federal government contracts with private industry are 
formulated and executed. The course addresses the unique aspects of 
government contract law including such topics as agency authority, 
contract interpretation, disputes and remedies, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR), socio-economic laws, labor law, property, patent 
and data rights, conflicts of interest, protests, and ethics. 
Comparisons are made with the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 
Emphasis is on the use of Court and Board of Contract Appeals 
(BCA) cases.  
iii. Prerequisites: MN3303 (Principles of Acquisition and Contract 
Management) or MN3341 (Advanced Contracting Principles) 
iv. Instructor Info:  Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
(GSBPP) 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Fall/Spring 
c. Contingency Contracting (2-0) 
i. Course Number: MN3318 
ii. Course Description: This course is a study of the principles of 
contingency contracting and the fundamental skills required to 
provide direct contracting support to joint tactical and operational 
forces participating in the full spectrum of armed conflict and 
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military operations other than war, both domestic and overseas. 
Topics include: Types of Contingencies, Cross-Cultural Awareness, 
Contingency Contracting Officer Authority, Roles and 
Responsibilities, Anti-terrorism and Security, Planning, Contractual 
Methodologies and Instruments, Contract Administration, and 
Ethics/Standards of Conduct.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor Info:  Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy (GSBPP) 
v. Quarter Hours: 2 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer 
d. Logistics in a Post-Conflict Environment (4-0) 
i. Course Number: MN3378 
ii. Course Description: This course examines logistics support in a post-
conflict environment. The course centers on transitioning from 
logistics support of national forces to effective logistics support of a 
multinational force that may be working with Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). The course stresses the political and 
administrative context of logistics in a post-conflict environment. 
Attention is paid to assessment and planning for support of national 
contingent, mobilization, deployment, and for host-nation 
participation on a multinational logistics planning staff. Emphasis 
will be placed on familiarity with UN, NATO, U.S. and allied 
concepts of logistics operations, terms of reference, assessment tools 
and case studies in multinational and joint logistics. In addition, the 
course will cover logistics support to and coordination with other 
international, regional, NGO and host nation organizations involved 
in civilian police operations, humanitarian crises, and a variety of 
relief, rescue and resettlement actions. 
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor Info:  Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy (GSBPP) 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: As Required 
e. Media Relations and Crisis Communications (2-1) 
i. Course Number: MN4333 
ii. Course Description: This course examines strategies for developing, 
maintaining, and enhancing base-community relations as a means of 
forming partnerships with the community. Students will learn to 
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make strategic media choices so as to develop effective media 
campaigns, interact effectively with the print and broadcast news 
media, and handle press conferences and similar media events. 
Particular attention is focused on anticipating and handling crisis 
communication. Specifically, students will learn to organize crisis 
management teams, develop crisis management plans, and create 
communication plans to manage information and public perception.  
iii. Prerequisite: MN3333 (Communication Strategies for Effective 
Leaders) 
iv. Department/Instructor Info:  Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy (GSBPP) 
v. Quarter Hours: 2.5 
vi. Term Offered: As Required 
f. Jihadi Information Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA3120 
ii. Course Description: This course traces the rise and evolution of the 
Jihadi movement since its birth in the 1960s; analyzes the symbols, 
discourses, and media that Jihadis use in their own information 
operations, primarily vis-à-vis the larger Muslim community; and 
examines the impacts on and receptiveness of the broader Muslim 
community to these information operations. The focus of the course 
is on the transnational Jihadi movement, but some examples of local 
Jihadism will be discussed as well. 
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor Info: Department of Defense Analysis (DA) in 
the Graduate School of Operational and Informational Sciences 
(GSOIS) 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
g. International Perspectives on U.S. Special Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA3202 
ii. Course Description: This seminar-style course is designed for 
international officers assigned to the Department of Defense 
Analysis Special Operations/Irregular Warfare (699) curriculum. 
Designed as an unclassified version of SO 3201 (Strategic Decision 
Making for Irregular Warfare). Students examine the unique 
relationships and associated risks between strategic, operational, and 
tactical decision makers during the conduct of special operations. 
The course begins by surveying popular models and theories of U.S. 
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Government decision making and bureaucracy, while using selected 
case studies to improve the student's diagnostic skills. Roles and 
relationships between key stakeholders in the decision-making 
process are examined to better understand the practical environment. 
Lastly, students will develop alternative methods of high risk/high 
payoff decision making based on the course subject matter. 
iii. Prerequisites: Must be an international student assigned to the 
Department of Defense Analysis or consent of the instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter 
h. The Unconventional Threat to HLS (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA3210 
ii. Course Description: The purpose of this course is to provide an 
introduction to the operational and organizational dynamics of 
terrorism. It considers those who act as individuals, in small groups, 
or in large organizations; it considers indigenous actors, as well as 
those who come to the United States to raise money, recruit, or 
commit their acts of violence. In every instance, its focus is on 
violent clandestine activity that, whatever its motivation, has a 
political purpose or effect. The course addresses such specific topics 
as suicide terrorism, the role of the media, innovation and technology 
acquisition, the decline of terrorism, and ways of measuring the 
effect of counterterrorism policies and strategies. The course also 
looks briefly at sabotage. By the end of the course, students should 
be able to design effective measures for countering and responding to 
terrorism based on an understanding of its organizational and 
operational dynamics. 
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
i. The Unconventional Threat in Homeland Defense (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA3211 
ii. Course Description: The purpose of this class is to provide an 
introduction to some of the debates over the causes of terrorism and 
strategies to defeat it. The causes of terrorism will be grouped into 
individual motivations, group strategies, motivating ideologies, and 
underlying social, economic, and political factors. Over the course of 
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the class, several terrorist groups will be used as case studies, 
including Al-Qaeda, the IRA, and others. This class will also explore 
some possible strategies in response to terrorism, including the 
spread of democracy, intelligence, legal measures, negotiations, and 
the use of military force. By the end of the course, students should be 
able to design effective measures for countering and responding to 
terrorism, based on an understanding of its organizational and 
operational dynamics. 
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter 
j. Geographical and Temporal Dimensions of Dark Networks (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA3600 
ii. Course Description: Using a task-based approach, the first course 
introduces a terror network that students analyze using Google Earth, 
ArcGIS, and software tools that elicit temporal and geospatial 
aspects of terror network activity. This class will teach students to 
think critically and creatively about how different forms of spatial 
data can be integrated into their research. While the class will briefly 
cover fundamentals of remote sensing and coordinate systems, this 
lab-intensive course primarily focuses on real world situations that 
students will face in the field. 
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer 
k. Religion, Politics and Collective Action (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA3721 
ii. Course Description: The relationship between religion and political 
behavior is not as straightforward as many people assume, and there 
is considerable debate as to what the relationship between religion, 
politics and civil society should be. Some think that particular 
religious traditions should play no part; others believe that they 
should. In this class, we will briefly consider these arguments, but we 
will spend the majority of our time exploring the interplay between 
religion and collective action, introducing students to the major 
theories, topics and debates in the field of social movements and 
collective action. It seeks to discover the conditions under which 
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social movements emerge, thrive, and decline, and why some people 
get involved in social movements and others do not. It also explores 
why religious traditions are often at the center of collective action. 
iii. Prerequisite: Must have completed two quarters of coursework 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: As required 
l. Seminar on Jihadi Information Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA4120 
ii. Course Description: This advanced seminar is designed as a follow-
on course to DA 3120 for students pursuing theses or advanced 
research projects relevant to the field of Jihadi information 
operations. Course material will provide a more robust examination 
of the nature and types of IO campaigns used by both local and 
transnational Jihadi groups, but will also allow students to pursue and 
present specialized research on the topic. 
iii. Prerequisite: DA 3120 and a one-page statement of research 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer 
m. Tracking and Disrupting Dark Networks (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA4600 
ii. Course Description: This course focuses on dark networks—covert 
and illegal activity such as drug-trafficking and terror networks. The 
course’s first objective is to identify and describe these networks. We 
use various social network software packages (e.g., UCINET, 
NetDraw, Pajek) to aid our identification and description efforts. The 
second objective is to design intervention strategies to disrupt, 
destabilize and possibly destroy dark networks once they have been 
identified and described. The course’s focus is on the tactical and 
operational levels, although the implications for strategic and policy 
levels also may inform our discussions. 
iii. Prerequisite: SO2410 or consent of the instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring/Fall 
n. Terrorist Financing (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA4601 
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ii. Course Description: This course will examine how terrorists fund 
their activities and how they can be tracked and thwarted through 
their financial networks and footprints. It will cover sources and 
methods of terrorist financing, including the role of charities, 
legitimate businesses, and crime; the use of both formal banking 
systems and informal hawala systems to transfer funds; and money 
laundering. It will also cover national and international structures, 
regulations, tools, and efforts to identify, track, capture, and 
eliminate terrorists and their financial support through their financial 
transactions. Concepts will be illustrated with case studies of terrorist 
groups and regions where terrorism is present. 
iii. Prerequisite: SO3801 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Summer 
o. Advanced Social Network Analysis (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA4610 
ii. Course Description: This course offers advanced substantive and 
methodological tools for social network analysis. Social network 
analysis is a collection of theories and methods that focus on 
understanding how patterns of relationships connecting individuals, 
groups or organizations (formal or informal) generate and constrain 
opportunities and contexts for action. Specifically, this course covers 
in depth (i.e., more so than in the Tracking and Disrupting Dark 
Networks class) key social network concepts such as cohesion, 
centrality, brokerage, equivalence and diffusion with an eye to 
applying these concepts (when applicable) to dark networks (i.e., 
covert and illegal activity such as drug-trafficking and terror 
networks). 
iii. Prerequisites: DA3600 and DA4600 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer 
p. The Rise of Religious Violence (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA4720 
ii. Course Description: This course aims to explore the conditions under 
which religious groups engage in violent activity as a means of 
achieving various political, social and religious goals. In particular, 
this course will a) offer an introductory foundation in the world’s 
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major religious traditions; b) investigate how religion influences 
conflict, violence and war; c) compare the rise and fall of religious 
groups engaging in violent activity with the intent of better 
understanding the conditions under which religious groups resort to 
and abandon violence; d) compare other examples of religious 
violence with the current rise of Islamic militancy; e) consider ways 
in which religiously motivated violence can be mitigated; f) 
investigate how the United States and the U.S. military can address 
religiously motivated violence directed at its government, military, 
citizens and other interests.  
iii. Prerequisite: Student must have completed at least one full quarter 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Fall/Winter 
q. Countering International Terrorism (4-0) 
i. Course Number: DA4810 
ii. Course Description: This course examines the U.S. government's 
response to international terrorism. It examines policy, strategy, 
bureaucracy, the role of intelligence, and the media and information 
campaigns, as well as specific responses to terrorism, such as 
military force, covert operations, policing, economic sanctions, and 
diplomacy. The purpose of the course is to provide students a sound 
basis for developing and evaluating responses to terrorism.  
iii. Prerequisite: None. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter 
r. Warfare in the Information Age (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3101 
ii. Course Description: Given that the emerging Information Age 
heralds stark changes in future military and security policy, this 
course begins with a survey of the literature on the current revolution 
in military affairs (RMA), as well as studies of similar periods earlier 
in history. While significant attention is focused on information 
technologies, the principle emphasis in this course lies in an 
endeavor to understand the ways in which new technologies affect 
military strategy, doctrine, and organization. In particular, the rise of 
networked organizations, nonlinear military operations, and the 
further blurring of the line between war and peace are examined.  
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iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Fall/Winter 
s. Psychological Operations and Deception (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3102 
ii. Course Description: This course surveys current theories of behavior, 
cognition, and perceptual bias, linking them to applied military issues 
across the spectrum of conflict, from irregular to high-intensity 
warfare. The effects of increased information flows on the prospects 
for accurate assessments in crisis and war are also considered in 
detail. Case studies and experimentation complement the theoretical 
framework initially advanced, with students working in teams during 
this portion of the course.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Summer/Fall 
t. Strategic Decision Making for Special Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3201 
ii. Course Description: This course examines the unique relationships 
and associated risks between strategic, operational, and tactical 
decision makers during the conduct of unconventional warfare (with 
emphasis on military special operations). In a classified environment 
using focal point control system information, the course begins by 
surveying popular models and theories of U.S. Government decision 
making and bureaucracy, while using selected case studies to 
improve the student's diagnostic skills. Roles and relationships 
between key strategic and political stakeholders in this decision-
making process are examined to better understand the practical 
environment. Lastly, students will develop alternative methods of 
high risk/high payoff decision making based on the course subject 
matter.  
iii. Prerequisite: MN3121, assigned to U.S. Special Operations 
Command, or consent of the instructor. Classification: 
SECRET/Focal Point 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer 
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u. Anatomy of Intelligence (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3250 
ii. Course Description: This course will be devoted to providing 
students with an improved understanding of the structure, 
capabilities, and shortcomings of U.S. intelligence, with particular 
emphasis being placed on Special Operations (SO) and Information 
Operations (IO). In general, the course approach will be from the 
general to the specific—beginning with an orientation aimed at 
familiarizing students with the basic nature of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (IC), followed by a closer look at the issues surrounding 
the provision of intelligence to SO and IO.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
v. Anthropology of Conflict (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3750 
ii. Course Description: The focus of this course is cross-cultural conflict 
and violent confrontation with a view to considering how 
anthropology might be better used to study modern warfare and 
large-scale ethnic conflict. For instance, military historians, political 
scientists, and foreign policy analysts increasingly refer to “culture” 
and religion, identity politics, and ideology to help explain the new 
world disorder. From an anthropological perspective, are they using 
these social science concepts correctly? This course is designed to 
not only expose students to anthropological concepts useful for 
understanding the motivations of combatants from other cultures and 
the nature of warfare as fought by different people(s), but the extent 
to which cross-cultural miscommunication can complicate the role of 
U.S. military personnel abroad.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Fall/Spring 
w. Theory and Practice of Social Revolution (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3800 
ii. Course Description: This course provides an overview of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency. It reviews the theoretical literature and offers 
an operational focus on social revolution by examining the 
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alternative models of insurgency provided by the doctrine of 
“people's war,” “foco theory,” and the urban guerrilla. The course 
goes on to examine the development of U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine, the difference between the “hearts and minds” and 
“systems” prescriptions of counterinsurgency, and alternative British, 
French, and Russian concepts of counterinsurgency.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: As required 
x. Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3802 
ii. Course Description: Have you ever wanted to seize state power from 
below? Have you ever been responsible for keeping others from 
doing so? This reading seminar is designed to examine the strategy 
and operational art of sub-state conflict. It examines the problems of 
social mobilization; underground organization, command and 
control, and security; alternate strategies of internal war, and 
competing theories of counterinsurgency. These and related issues 
are examined analytically and historically. Comparative cases are 
discussed and evaluated. Throughout the course, attention is also 
given to the manner in which such wars are conducted in the future.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer  
y. History of Special Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3880 
ii. Course Description: What constitutes a “special” operation? This 
course considers special operations in a historical context, with 
emphasis given to their impact on war outcomes, the necessary 
conditions for their success, and the patterns of civil-military 
relations that emerge when elite forces are formed. Successes and 
failures in air, ground, and naval actions are equally considered. 
Historical studies from World War II to the present will provide the 
principle means of analysis to gain insights into the theory, practice, 
and effects of special operations and irregular warfare.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
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v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Summer/Fall 
z. The Rise and Fall of the Nation-State (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO3883 
ii. Course Description: This course provides students with a broad 
overview of the rise, proliferation, and possible fall of the major 
international organizing tool of the modern era: the nation-state. The 
course examines the rise of the nation-state in Europe, focusing on 
the specific political and economic factors that shaped the nation-
state; the adoption of the nation-state system around the world, where 
it did not emerge organically; and the possible decline of the nation-
state in the age of globalization. Does globalization mean the end of 
the nation-state, and if so, what kinds of organizational arrangements 
are likely to compete with and perhaps replace the nation-state?  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
aa. Special Information Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4102 
ii. Course Description: This course serves as a project-oriented 
culmination of the studies of those specializing in the SOLIC "IO 
track." Students are given a specific, real-world problem and 
challenged to find the place for IO in developing solutions. The goal 
is both to mobilize the knowledge amassed from previous study and 
to use practical experience to gain insight into the issues of how IO 
can support special operations, and how special operations can 
support IO. Another key element of the course is the requirement that 
the students work as a team, employing either organizational 
concepts they have learned about or developing new ones that may 
be most suitable to the particular problem at hand. The course 
concludes with briefings to the sponsors of the given project 
undertaken.  
iii. Prerequisite: None; Classification: TOP SECRET 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Summer 
bb. Special Topics in Information Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4105 
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ii. Course Description: This course will focus on special topics in 
information and special operations. The list of topics to be analyzed 
for the seminar is announced at least one quarter prior to the offering 
of the seminar. Advanced study and research is conducted on topics 
not covered in other seminars. A major, graded research paper is 
required.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: As required 
cc. Trust, Influence, and Networks (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4106 
ii. Course Description: This course examines the underlying nature of 
trust and influence, especially as they shape and are shaped by social 
networks. Students will acquire a theoretical foundation for these 
concepts and how they apply to a broad spectrum of activity, 
including work processes, military operations, underground 
movements, information and intelligence operations, governance, 
and the media; how trust and influence are established, maintained, 
exploited, and lost; and the functions they serve for individuals, 
organizations, and societies. Concepts will be illustrated with 
examples drawn from a variety of contexts. The course is aimed 
especially at students concerned with unconventional warfare, 
information operations, network-centric warfare, nation building, 
civil and military affairs, public affairs, terrorism, and intelligence.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Summer 
dd. Public Diplomacy to Psychological Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4107 
ii. Course Description: A nation uses various tools to minimize its 
weaknesses and limitations, and to maximize its strengths and 
capabilities in the international arena. This course aims to stimulate 
serious thought about a forgotten aspect of strategy and lay the 
groundwork for a revival of political-psychological planning and 
operations within a larger framework of U.S. national security 
strategy. Topics include: a historical overview of the sources of 
American diplomacy and values; strategic public diplomacy and the 
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war of ideas; military public affairs and the media; and the power 
and utility of psychological operations. Case studies will be used 
throughout the course to reinforce important concepts.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Fall 
ee. American Approaches to Small Wars (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4301 
ii. Course Description: How do the United States Government and its 
armed forces engage in undeclared wars, expeditions, and conflicts 
below the threshold of wars for the survival of the United States? 
This course examines those elements of American strategic culture 
that affect the United States' capacity to fight these “savage wars of 
peace.” Historical studies from the American colonial period to the 
present will enable students to determine the defining aspects of the 
American approaches to small wars.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
ff. Special Topics in Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4500 
ii. Course Description: low-intensity conflict. The list of topics to be 
analyzed for the seminar is announced at least one quarter prior to the 
offering of the seminar. Advanced study and research is conducted 
on topics not covered in other seminars. A major, graded research 
paper is required.  
iii. Prerequisite: SO3802 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: As required 
gg. The Military Advisor (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4760 
ii. Course Description: This course examines the many roles of the 
military advisor-as leader, trainer, liaison—in a wide variety of 
settings, among very different groups of people, and under 
significantly different conditions. Lessons will be drawn from first-
person accounts. What field craft lessons can be learned from past 
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endeavors? What challenges might advisors expect to encounter in 
the future? This course is open to Department of Defense Analysis 
students only or by consent of the instructor.  
iii. Prerequisite: Consent of the instructor. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: As required 
hh. Ethnic Conflict (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4770 
ii. Course Description: This course poses a series of questions, such as 
“what is a state?” and “what is a nation?”, in order to better 
understand when and why ethnic conflict erupts and persists. Often 
cited as the most prevalent form of warfare today, “ethnic conflict” 
as a term may conceal more that its reveals. For instance, strife in 
Northern Ireland and in Israel is often explained away as ethno-
nationalist and ethno-religious in nature. On the face of it, both cases 
would seem to have much in common. However, once local histories 
and regional politics are considered, the two represent radically 
different models of (and for) ethnic conflict. This course will 
examine a series of such examples in order to better understand the 
origins, trajectory, and virulence of ethnic conflict.  
iii. Prerequisite: SO3750 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: As required 
ii. Regional Seminar in Low-Intensity Conflict: Africa (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4820 
ii. Course Description: This course teaches students how to analyze the 
nature of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa—who is likely to fight, 
where, why, and when, with special attention paid to the significance 
of regional complexities and local particularities. Eight cases are 
presented with two aims: to present a history of post-colonial conflict 
and to achieve regional balance. Students are specifically taught how 
to compare and contrast among different sets of factors that tend to 
feed conflict in Africa. Students also learn about sources of 
information to which they can turn in the future should conflict flare 
up in places with which they are unfamiliar.  
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iii. Prerequisite: Student must have completed at least two quarters of 
instruction in the Defense Analysis Department or NSA or consent of 
the instructor. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter 
jj. Regional Seminar in Low-Intensity Conflict: Middle East (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4830 
ii. Course Description: As part of the regional seminar series, this 
course examines political violence in the Middle East. The course 
focuses on the major systemic causes of violence in the Middle East 
at both the state and nonstate levels. At the state level, sources of 
violence include the consolidation of state power in fragmented 
societies, survival strategies by weak states, and competition for 
scarce regional resources. Violence by nonstate actors is also 
examined, including violence associated with the Jihadist movement 
and with the conflict over Palestine.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
kk. Regional Seminar in Low-Intensity Conflict: Europe and the Trans-caucasus 
(4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4840 
ii. Course Description: As part of the regional seminar series, this 
course examines low-intensity conflict issues in Europe and the 
Caucasus. The seminar reviews the theoretical literature on political 
violence and analyzes the recent history of European and Caucasus-
based terrorism and insurgency. It offers a series of detailed case 
studies of local organizations and conflict, and focuses on functional 
issues in Europe and the Caucasus.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
ll. Regional Seminar in Low-Intensity Conflict: Latin America (4-0) 
i. Course Number: 
ii. Course Description: As part of the regional seminar series, this 
course examines insurgencies in Latin America. The seminar reviews 
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the history of the continent and the Caribbean from colonial times to 
the present; examines theoretical literature on political violence; and 
analyzes the recent history of Latin American-based terrorism and 
insurgency. It offers a series of detailed historical case studies of 
insurgent organizations and conflicts.  
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
mm. Regional Seminar in Low-Intensity Conflict: Far East (4-0) 
i. Course Number: SO4860 
ii. Course Description: As part of the regional seminar series, this 
course examines low-intensity conflict issues in the Far East. The 
seminar reviews the theoretical literature on political violence and 
analyzes the recent history of Asian-based terrorism and insurgency. 
It offers a series of detailed case studies of local organizations and 
conflict, and focuses on functional issues in the Far East. 
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Defense Analysis 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Spring 
nn. Introduction to Information Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: IO3100 
ii. Course Description: This course, available in the classroom or 
through asynchronous Internet-based education, provides a survey of 
Information Operations (IO) along the time line of peace, to conflict, 
and back to the cessation of hostilities. Students study the specific 
methods and elements of IO and how they integrate with other 
elements of national power to meet national security objectives. 
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Information Sciences (in 
GSOIS) 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Fall/Spring 
oo. Information Operations Planning and Targeting (3-2) 
i. Course Number: IO4300 
ii. Course Description: This course refines the students' ability to 
develop and analyze IO plans. Students learn to integrate seemingly 
disparate disciplines (national security affairs, information 
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warfare/operations, computer science, physics (kinetic warfare), and 
operations analysis) into a cogent operations plan as an integral part 
of a theater campaign plan.  
iii. Prerequisites: NW3230 and IW3101 and OS3000 (or equivalent 
Operations Analysis course). Classification: SECRET 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Information Sciences (in 
GSOIS) 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 (3 lecture, 1 lab) 
vi. Term Offered: Spring/Summer 
pp. Information Operations Planning and Execution (3-2) 
i. Course Number: IO4301 
ii. Course Description: This course, available, through asynchronous 
Internet based education software, refines the student's ability to 
develop and analyze Information Operations plans. Students learn to 
integrate seemingly disparate disciplines (national security affairs, 
information operations, computer science, physics (kinetic warfare), 
and operations analysis) into a cogent operations plan as an integral 
part of a theatre campaign plan.  
iii. Prerequisites: IW3101, IO3100; Classification: SECRET; access to 
SIPRNET is required 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Information Sciences (in 
GSOIS) 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 (3 lecture, 1 lab) 
vi. Term Offered: Summer 
qq. War in the Modern World 
i. Course Number: NS3000 
ii. Course Description: This course provides an introduction to war as a 
political and social phenomenon, and as a force in the international 
system. Major themes include: the development of leading ideas 
about war; the mutual interactions of politics, society, and warfare; 
the impact of military doctrine on war fighting; allocation of 
resources and coordination of effort among land, sea, and air forces; 
national strategic cultures, and their implications for strategic 
practice.  
iii. Prerequisites: None. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Quarterly 
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rr. War and Its Impact on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3001 
ii. Course Description: The problem of post-conflict reconstruction is 
hardly a new one. In the past, victors in wars frequently had to 
manage and rebuild societies shattered by conflict. This course will 
examine historical examples of post-conflict reconstruction. War 
creates a competitive environment exploited by groups who seek 
political power. This competition begins while the war is under way. 
Competitors seek to place themselves in a position to take advantage 
of the new post-war environment by choosing allies and enemies, 
perhaps also arming themselves. On the new post-war playing field, 
old antagonisms assume new guises. Groups who might have been 
insignificant or repressed before the conflict can often exploit the 
new post-war environment to seek power. The military may also be 
strengthened by war, posing challenges to civilian governments or 
occupying powers. Social disorder, economic dislocation, and the de-
legitimization of old political groups or ideas may invite chaos and 
even civil war. 
iii.  Prerequisites: None. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
ss. Introduction to Post-Conflict Security Building (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3026 
ii. Course Description: This course introduces students to the fuller 
program, intended to prepare them to work together in operations 
that build security in post-conflict environments. As such, it provides 
both conceptual tools for thinking about post-conflict security 
building and empirical referents to ground later study. Military 
strategists have written much about going to war, but have given less 
consideration to the movement from war to peace. How can one 
think strategically about the post-conflict environment? This course 
introduces students to characteristics of post-conflict environments 
and the diverse actors seeking to shape it. The course draws upon 
real-world cases to identify patterns of conflict and their 
consequences for post-conflict transition. In particular, the course 
will focus on interventions by external actors, civilian and military, 
in peace implementation. What are the typical components of post-
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conflict security building programs? This course covers practical 
issues in, and normative dimensions of, post-conflict security 
building.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
tt. Comparative Government for Homeland Security (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3028 
ii. Course Description: Comparative politics for students in Homeland 
Security and Defense.  
iii. Prerequisite: None. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
uu. Economics of Insurgencies for Security Building (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3042 
ii. Course Description: The course examines the economic issues 
related to civil wars and insurgencies, and reconstruction and 
development after conflict.  
iii. Prerequisites: None. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
vv. Strategies for Building Consensus (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3118 
ii. Course Description: Post-conflict environments bring together 
representatives from different nations and organizations. In order to 
accomplish the goals of interest, these varying representatives must 
develop awareness, appreciation, and ability to collaborate with each 
other. There is no formal organization that provides structures or 
standards to guide the collaboration of these individuals; they must 
rely on informal mechanisms for collaborative post-conflict efforts. 
Because the goals and interests of the participating parties frequently 
are not in alignment, consensus building capabilities contribute 
importantly to success. Consensus is a decision process that makes 
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use of all available resources and perspectives for the resolution of 
problems. Consensus is difficult to reach and requires a complex set 
of skills related to interpersonal and group dynamics, such as conflict 
management, trust building, perspective taking, and negotiation.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
ww. Intelligence and Democracy (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3155 
ii. Course Description: This course examines the methods civilian 
authorities in emerging democracies can use to establish strong, 
effective controls over their intelligence agencies. The course begins 
by examining the intelligence process in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and the potential problems that intelligence 
activities can pose to democratic governance. Next, students will 
analyze the mechanisms used by the U.S., the U.K., France and other 
long-established democracies to maintain control over their 
intelligence organizations. These instruments of control include use 
of the power of the purse, structural and organizational arrangements, 
legislative oversight, and legal mechanisms. Employing the case 
study approach, students will examine the recent efforts by 
democracies in Latin America, Central Europe, Africa, and Asia to 
establish their own democratic controls over intelligence, and the 
challenges that such nations will face in the future.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
xx. Drug Control Strategy and Policy 
i. Course Number: NS3260 
ii. Course Description: This course provides an overview of the 
challenges posed by the production, trafficking, and consumption of 
illegal drugs, both in the U.S. and abroad, and evaluates government 
drug control efforts. It addresses the presidential, congressional, and 
bureaucratic politics that shape the formulation of domestic and 
international drug control policies. The challenges of implementing 
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drug control policies will be analyzed, in particular the need for 
interagency coordination and international cooperation to address 
this complex threat. Both supply-side and demand-side policies will 
be discussed in detail and their effectiveness assessed.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
yy. Islam 
i. Course Number: NS3300 
ii. Course Description: Islam is one of the great monotheistic faiths of 
the modern world. This survey course examines the history and 
tenets of Islam and the breadth of Muslim cultures and civilizations.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
zz. African History and Cultures (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3301 
ii. Course Description: This course provides a broad overview of 
African history, with an emphasis on understanding the historical 
foundations of important contemporary issues. In addition, it 
examines the process of cultural change in Africa over the course of 
the twentieth century, through an in-depth study of the fiction of 
Chinua Achebe.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
aaa. Survey of Middle East History to 1914 (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3310 
ii. Course Description: A broad survey of Middle East history prior to 
World War I. While some earlier history may be covered, the 
emphasis in this course is primarily on the late Ottoman and Persian 
empires, and on the rise of colonialism in the Middle East.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
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iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
bbb. Government and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3311 
ii. Course Description: This course is designed for graduate students 
with little or no background in the study of African government and 
politics. It introduces students to the main structures and processes of 
contemporary African politics, and to important theoretical debates 
in the field of African studies. The emphasis is less on formal 
institutions of government and more on the informal practices that 
comprise the primary arena of African government and politics.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
ccc. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3320 
ii. Course Description: The course reviews the historical background 
and current status of American interests and policies in the Middle 
East. The course focuses on how different U.S. administrations in the 
post-World War II era defined American interests in the Middle East, 
and on the major policies enacted to pursue those interests.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
ddd. The Middle East in World Affairs (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3330 
ii. Course Description: Focuses on the Middle East region's role in 
world events in the post-World War I era, including the impact of 
great power rivalries in the region, transnational movements, and 
environ-strategic considerations. 
iii.  Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
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v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
eee. The Middle East in the International Economy 
i. Course Number: NS3340 
ii. Course Description: This course explores timely international and 
regional economic development issues. We will examine both 
international and regional economic interactions and possibilities, 
including regional trade agreements, negative and positive 
international agreements (sanctions, foreign aid, the WTO, etc.) and 
shared international resources such as water. We will tackle the 
problem of late development, the effects of oil, labor migration, and 
tax regimes on the economies and business-government relations, 
privatization moves, and current prospects for employment and 
poverty-alleviation.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
fff. Anthropology of Africa (4-0) As Required 
i. Course Number: NS3351 
ii. Course Description: Examines various facets of African 
anthropology.  
iii. Prerequisites: None. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
ggg. Politics and Security in North Africa (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3360 
ii. Course Description: A survey course on the politics and security of 
North Africa in the post-World War I era. The geographic focus is on 
the countries of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
hhh. Politics and Security in Levant (4-0) 
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i. Course Number: NS3361 
ii. Course Description: A survey course on the politics and security of 
the Levant in the post-World War I era. The geographic focus is on 
the countries of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine.  
iii. Prerequisites: None. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
iii. Politics and Security in the Northern Tier (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3362 
ii. Course Description: A survey course on the politics and security of 
the Northern Tier in the post-World War I era. The geographic focus 
is on the countries of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
jjj. Politics and Security in the Persian Gulf (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3363 
ii. Course Description: A survey course on the politics and security of 
the Persian Gulf in the post-World War I era. The geographic focus 
is on the countries of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 
Oman and the UAE.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
kkk. Politics and Security of The Arabian Peninsula (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3367 
ii. Course Description: Examines the twentieth century history of the 
Persian Gulf, the evolution of U.S. regional strategy and policy, and 
summarizes threats to regional security in the new century. The 
course will also provide students with general background behind 
security issues in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and cover 




iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
lll. History of Russia and Eurasia (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3400 
ii. Course Description: An examination of the history of Russia, Eastern 
Europe, and Central Asian nations. The emphasis is on historical 
influences, political institutions, ethnic and social problems, and the 
economy.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
mmm. Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia in World Affairs (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3410 
ii. Course Description: This course is concerned with the international 
conduct and security policies of Russia, the other countries of 
Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. It examines their major 
geopolitical, historical, demographic, and economic influences.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
nnn. Government and Security in the Central Asian Republics (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3412 
ii. Course Description: With China and Russia taking an ever-
increasing greater interest in central Asia, U.S. policy makers face 
the challenge of maintaining an influential presence in the region. 
Over a decade since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the five Central 
Asian Republics have emerged as a critical security issue as WMD, 
terrorists and hard-line regimes have come to dominate the 
landscape. In a land where Islam is more cultural than religious, 
communism more trusted than capitalism, and ethnic divisions a 
Soviet invention, how can stable democracies emerge? This course 
will represent a comprehensive assessment of the newly formed 
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states of central Asia that were formerly parts of the Soviet Union. 
Through examination of the complex historical, ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic factors that unite and divide the Central Asian Region, we 
will better understand the challenges of political modernization, 
economic reform, and integration into the international community. 
The course topics will include: the history of the region; the 
relationship between Islam and Central Asia; environmental issues; 
economic development and emerging energy markets in the region; 
the contemporary political scene; and the role of the region in world 
affairs. Special emphasis will be placed on the contemporary crises 
in the region. 
iii.  Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
ooo. The Balkans: History & Politics (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3730 
ii. Course Description: A survey of the historical background of and 
contemporary developments in the Balkans region, with a special 
focus on the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, the various conflicts 
that followed, including that in Kosovo, the role of other regional 
actors in these events, and the prospects for future stability and 
progress in the region.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
ppp. International Law and Organizations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS3900 
ii. Course Description: An introduction to the principles of international 
law including origins, sources, sovereignty, states, territory, 
jurisdiction, persons, treaties, settlement of disputes and the Law of 
the Sea. The course also traces the evolution of international 
organizations from the Concert of Europe, through the League of 
Nations, United Nations, European Economic Community, NATO, 
and various forms of multi-national and transnational organizations.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
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iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
qqq. Capstone Seminar: Reconstruction of Civil Society (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4026 
ii. Course Description: student learning in the post-conflict security 
building track. It explores multiple approaches to reconstruction and 
the conditions under which they tend to work in post-conflict 
transitions. Fundamental questions are addressed. From the 
perspective of international financial institutions, how can societies 
experiencing humanitarian emergencies make transition from relief 
to development? From the perspective of external actors, civilian and 
military, what patterns of interventions emerge in peace 
implementation? Considering perspectives of the host nation and 
external implementers of peace agreements, what are the costs and 
benefits of outside intervention? How can program responsibility 
shift effectively from military officials to civilians? What institutions 
and processes are vital to reconstruction of civil society, and how 
might military demobilization, reconstitution programs and police 
reform programs fit with those institutions and processes? How can 
indigenous stakeholders "own" the reconstruction in the face of 
outside intervention? Students participating in this course will share 
their insights from case analyses and build a data set for future 
students and researchers.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
rrr. Comparative Strategic Cultures (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4036 
ii. Course Description: Overview of strategic cultures around the world 
and the manner in which they affect defense/military strategies. 
iii. Prerequisite: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
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sss. Conflict in Africa (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4040 
ii. Course Description: This course examines multiple aspects of ethnic 
conflict in Africa. In the first half, we consider theoretical approaches 
to ethnicity, ethnic conflict, cross border contagion, and regional 
conflict. The second half of the course is dedicated to case studies, to 
be prepared and presented by the students.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
ttt. Civil-Military Relations and Transitions to Democracy (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4225 
ii. Course Description: A seminar which reviews selected cases of 
transitions from authoritarian rule in the post-1945 period. The 
course compares the various roles played by the military and other 
actors in these transitions, examines the participation of the military 
in the consolidation of democracy and the problem of democratic 
consolidation. Students will also examine different theories and 
concepts of democratic transition and consolidation.  
iii. Prerequisites: NS3025 or consent of instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
uuu. Seminar on Terrorism Financing and State Response (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4231 
ii. Course Description: This course examines exactly how far we have 
come in understanding how terrorists raise, store, and transfer funds. 
It also evaluates challenges facing the U.S. government and 
international community in responding to this problem. In each 
module, we use a mix of official reports, academic papers, and other 
works to explore the subject and identify problems with the received 
wisdom about terrorist financing.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
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vi. Term Offered: As required 
vvv.   Seminar on Peace Support Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4235 
ii. Course Description: This seminar examines the problems of military 
alliances in the post-Cold War era, and the civil-military relation 
issues raised by defense cooperation, including operations other than 
war.  
iii. Prerequisites: NS4225 or consent of instructor. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
www. Stability Operations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4236 
ii. Course Description: The theme of this course is the nexus of policy, 
doctrine and operations in stability operations. In the first part of the 
course, we will discuss the policy in which doctrine and operations 
are embedded, and the considerations for translating policy into 
doctrine and operations. In the second part of the course, we directly 
address the challenges of war termination, occupation, 
counterinsurgency and coalition stability operations. This course 
focuses primarily on the American approach to stability operations. 
These military operations have been variously described as 'small 
wars,' 'low intensity conflict,' and in current joint doctrine JP 3-07 
(1995), 'military operations other than war' (MOOTW).  
iii. Prerequisites: NS4225 or consent of instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
xxx. Special Topics: Border Security and Civil-Military Relations (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4239 
ii. Course Description: The purpose of the Special Topics course is to 
provide students with an extra focus on 2 or 3 major issues that have 
current visibility in debates about homeland security. Currently, 
those topics focus on dilemmas in the evolving relationships between 
civil and military authority and between government and community.  
iii. Prerequisites: NS4156, NS3180, and SO3210 
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iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
yyy. Counter-proliferation (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4285 
ii. Course Description: This course will prepare students to counter 
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons threats in future 
operational or staff assignments by improving their understanding of 
the causes and consequences of NBC weapons proliferation and use 
and the strategies and capabilities available to counter these threats.  
iii. Prerequisites: None; Classification: U.S. citizen holding a TOP 
SECRET clearance with eligibility access to SCI 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
zzz. African Political Economy 
i. Course Number: NS4301 
ii. Course Description: This course examines economic development 
issues in Sub-Saharan Africa from a very broad perspective. We will 
consider how political and social as well as economic structures 
impact economic growth and development, assess policy and 
performance in the postcolonial period, and discuss the challenges 
for the twenty-first century. 
iii.  Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
aaaa. Contemporary Issues in African Politics (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4311 
ii. Course Description: This course will survey the major issues 
confronting African states today: the HIV/Aids epidemic, endemic 
civil wars, dimensions of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, issues of 
democratization and authoritarian rule, the nature of states and the 
phenomenon of state collapse, and patterns of trade and economic 
development. The focus will cover the entire sub-Saharan region, 
while utilizing country case studies to elaborate each of the main issue 
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areas. Designed as an upper-level seminar, the course will focus on 
discussion and debate of weekly reading assignments. Prior 
coursework in African Politics is desired, but not required. 
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
bbbb.  Government and Security in West Africa (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4313 
ii. Course Description: This course introduces students to government 
and politics in West Africa, with an emphasis on political, economic, 
and social change since the end of the Cold War. Why are some 
countries in the sub-region making peaceful progress toward 
democratic consolidation while others are dissolving into violent 
conflict? How does the coexistence of zones of conflict and peace 
affect regional security?  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
cccc. Security and Politics in Iran (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4315 
ii. Course Description: Iran has been one of the most important countries 
in the Middle East region. It is located strategically, connecting the 
Caucasus and Central Asia to the Persian Gulf on the one side, and 
South Asia to the Arab Middle East on the other. Iran is home to one 
of the principal languages and cultures of the region. It is also one of 
the most populous countries in the Middle East with one of the 
largest economies. Iran has been a politically and strategically 
significant country for most of the past century. It was a frontline 
state during the Cold War. It was the scene of a major revolution that 
changed the face of the Muslim world and the relations between the 
United States and regional powers. Since 1979, Iran has been an 
avowedly Islamic state that has been engaged in a protracted war 
with the West. However, Iran has also witnessed profound political, 
social, and cultural changes that can be consequential for the future 
of the region. This course provides an overview of Iranian politics. It 
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also uses social science theory to examine what factors have 
determined the evolution of Iranian politics, and how those 
developments in turn change our views on political change in the 
Muslim world and beyond.  
iii. Prerequisites: None. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
dddd.  Islamic Fundamentalism 
i. Course Number: NS4320 
ii. Course Description: A research seminar on the ideology and practice 
of Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East. Students read primary 
source translations of major fundamentalist ideologues, such as 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Sayyid Qutb, in addition to focusing on the 
strategies and histories of specific fundamentalist groups. Students 
will conduct and present original research on this topic.  
iii. Prerequisites: NS3000 or consent of instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
eeee. U.S. Interests and Policies in Africa (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4321 
ii. Course Description: This course examines U.S. foreign policy in Sub-
Saharan Africa since 1960, with emphasis on the post-Cold War 
period.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
ffff. War in the Middle East (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4325 
ii. Course Description: This course studies the international history of 
the Middle East and North Africa since the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, with a particular focus on the origin, conduct, and 
consequences of the region's major wars.  
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iii. Prerequisites: Prior completion of NS3000 and at least one 3000-level 
Middle East course, or permission of the instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
gggg.  Social Mobilization and Conflict in the Middle East (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4326 
ii. Course Description: This course analyzes the organization, incentives, 
and goals of non-state actors. Subjects include protest and 
mobilization of civil society and their relations with violent actions, 
how available alternatives shape the form for opposition action takes, 
and the effects of repression and political inclusion.  
iii. Prerequisites: Prior completion of at least one 3000-level Middle East 
course, or permission of the instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
hhhh.  Southern African Politics (4-0) 
i. Course Number: 
ii. Course Description: The countries of the Southern African region are 
closely linked by economics, social demographics, and history. This 
course will examine the dynamics of Southern Africa combining 
detailed studies of individual countries with themes that cross the 
region, such as migration, trade, regional security, economic 
development, and post-conflict reconstruction. Some of the topics we 
will cover include attempts by Southern African countries to 
strengthen regional integration; the role of South Africa as local 
hegemony; how recent events in Zimbabwe have impacted on 
regional dynamics; democratization and demobilization in South 
Africa, Namibia and Mozambique, and the peace process in Angola. 
Designed as an upper-level seminar, the course will focus on 
discussion and debate of weekly reading assignments. Prior 
coursework in African Politics is desired, but not required. 
iii.  Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
 155 
 
vi. Term Offered: As required 
iiii. Government and Security in the Horn of Africa (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4328 
ii. Course Description: Addresses government and security issues in the 
Horn of Africa. Its main focus is on how conflicts in the region -- 
persistent civil war in Sudan, state collapse in Somalia, contentious 
ethnic politics and secessionist movements in Ethiopia and Djibouti, 
state formation processes in (internationally recognized) Eritrea and 
(internationally unrecognized) Somaliland -- interact to produce a 
particularly challenging regional security environment. We conclude 
with a consideration of what this regional security environment 
means for the War on Terrorism, as well as how the War on 
Terrorism is impacting the regional security environment.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
jjjj. Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Developing World (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4332 
ii. Course Description: The goal of this course is to examine issues of 
ethnicity and ethnic identity as they relate to conflict and democracy 
in the non-Western world. This course will be offered as an elective 
that will fit in with the regional studies curricula for students in the 
Africa, Latin America, Middle East, and Asian curricula in the NS 
department. The course will provide students with the theoretical 
tools and approaches to the study of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in 
multiple-country contexts. The course is divided into three main 
subject areas: (1) the nature of ethnicity, (2) the nature of and 
explanations for ethnic conflict, and (3) solutions to ethnic conflict. 
Weekly course readings present a mix of theoretical approaches and 
case studies, and will cover all the major areas of the world: Africa, 
the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
kkkk.  Political and Ethnic Violence in Southeast Asia (4-0) 
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i. Course Number: NS4621 
ii. Course Description: The course will examine the sources, evolution 
and outcomes of political violence in Southeast Asia in the post-
World War II period. We will explore the reasons for violence, its 
manifestations, and the various instruments that might be used to 
hasten its end. Readings will include classic works on violence and 
war in the region, along with important contemporary analyses of 
ongoing conflicts. Throughout the course, we will investigate the 
evolution of war and other forms of large-scale violence, especially 
within states and as perpetrated by states against citizens. We will 
focus on Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
llll. Contemporary Afghan Politics (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4661 
ii. Course Description: This course will explore recent developments in 
Afghan politics during the 1990s through 2005, including a detailed 
analysis of the 2004 Presidential and 2005 Parliamentary elections.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
mmmm. Religious Activism in South Asian Politics (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4664 
ii. Course Description: The events of September 11 have underscored 
the importance of religious activism in South Asian politics. These 
movements have impacted regional politics and international security 
and are likely to continue to do so in the years to come. This course 
aims to provide students with an in-depth understanding of the role of 
religion in South Asian politics by familiarizing them with the 
historical context for religion's involvement in South Asian politics, 
introducing the important actors, key ideas and major events. The 
course will deal with both Islamic and Hindu religious movements in 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India arc. This will provide a 
comprehensive approach to the topic and will provide students with a 
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comparative framework to analyze relevant issues. The course will 
use important works in the disciplines to provide a historical 
framework for the study of religion and politics in South Asia.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
nnnn.  Political Development in South Asia (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4667 
ii. Course Description: This course covers a selected range of topics for 
understanding current South Asian political developments and 
towards answering the larger question of why South Asia is the way 
it is: What are the internal and external structures and institutions in 
South Asian countries that shape their political activities and stance? 
In this course we study contemporary issues in the context of 
regional, national, and local political developments in India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. This will assist in 
thinking relationally and comparatively across nations of the region, 
as well as provide an understanding of different movements and 
events that shape this region.  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
oooo.  Security in South Asia (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4668 
ii. Course Description: The seminar places particular emphasis on the 
conditions affecting the occurrence, conduct and aftermath of war in 
the region. Topics covered in the seminar include the independence 
of India and Pakistan in 1947 and the creation of political, ethnic, 
religious, and territorial disputes between the two countries; ethnic 
and religious sources of instability in the region; civil-military 
relations; South Asia during the Cold War; South Asia and the global 
war against terrorism; the foreign relations of India and Pakistan with 
the United States, Russia, China and neighboring countries; the 
origins and military conduct of the three India-Pakistan wars; and the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and their 
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impact on regional security and international stability. Depending on 
student interest, the course also will cover security dynamics of 
smaller South Asian states (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, and Bhutan).  
iii. Prerequisites: None 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: As required 
pppp.  Seminar on Applied Terrorism/Insurgency Research Methods (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4806 
ii. Course Description: This course studies the use and application of 
advanced methodologies for investigating the organizational 
dynamics of terrorist and insurgent movements. A significant 
independent research paper is required.  
iii. Prerequisite: Prior completion of NS4805 or consent of instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
qqqq.  Legal and Military Responses to Political Violence (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4880 
ii. Course Description: The course will first review the variety of legal 
and military policy options open to any state that confronts political 
violence, with particular attention to short versus long-term 
consequences of different policy options. It then analyzes a few 
individual cases (the British in Ulster, violence in Spain) in depth, in 
order to assess how different policy options combine or cancel each 
other.  
iii. Prerequisites: Consent of instructor 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA) in the School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Annually 
rrrr. The Psychology of Fear Management and Terrorism (4-0) 
i. Course Number: NS4131 
ii. Course Description: This course serves as an introduction for 
homeland security professionals to terrorism as a psychological 
phenomenon. Government agencies involved in homeland security 
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need to understand the psychological consequences of mass-casualty 
terrorist attacks and other disasters. This course provides a broad 
overview of psychological effects of terrorism.  
iii. Prerequisites: NS3180 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Homeland Security in the 
School of International Graduate Studies 
v. Quarter Hours: 4  
vi. Term Offered: Winter 
 
3. Courses (Category 2: Mobile Workshops/Short Courses) 
a. Mobile International Defense Management Course - Stability, Security, 
Transition, Reconstruction (MIDMC SSTR),  
i. Course Number: MASL P319026 
ii. Course Description: The MIDMC SSTR is designed for civilian 
officials and military officers responsible for the efficient and 
effective allocation and use of resources in support of SSTR 
operations. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of SSTR 
operations supports not only the goals of the forces charged with 
bringing peace and stability to war-torn lands, but also the national 
security objectives of those nation's contributing forces. DRMI 
faculty integrate analytical concepts, principles, and modern 
management techniques drawn from the disciplines of accounting, 
economics, and management and apply them to decisions involving 
the allocation of resources in environments characterized by strategic 
and operational risk. 
iii. Department: Defense Resource Management Institute in the School 
for International Graduate Studies (SIGS) 
b. Mobile International Defense Management Course - Counter Terrorism 
(MIDMC CT) 
i. Course Number: MASL P319025 
ii. Course Description: The MIDMIC CT is designed for military 
officers and civilian officials who are responsible for the economic, 
efficient and effective allocation and use of resources to combat 
terrorism. DRMI faculty integrate analytical concepts, principles and 
modern management techniques drawn from the disciplines of 
management, economics and quantitative methods, and apply them 
to decisions involving the allocation of financial, logistic and human 
resources. A variety of analytical frameworks are presented that will 
enhance individual competence in assessing and evaluating risk 
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tradeoffs that must be made among competing counter-terrorism 
programs at both the strategic and operational levels of the 
organization. 
iii. Department: Defense Resource Management Institute in the SIGS 
c. The following short courses are offered by the Center for Civil-Military 
Relations (CCMR): 
i. The Civil-Military Relations (CMR) program is tailored to the needs 
of the recipient country and addresses general or in-depth aspects of 
civil-military relations, including challenges of democratic 
consolidation, formulating national defense strategy, civilian control 
of the military, military professionalism, media-military relations, 
building linkages between the military and the legislature, 
intelligence and democracy, and defense transformation. 
ii. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) program builds peace 
support operations (PSO) capability and capacity through education 
and training worldwide. 
iii. The Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace 
(LDESP) program prepares U.S. military leaders and units deploying 
to Stability Operations, to accomplish the mission in cooperation 
with multinational partners, other U.S. Agencies and civil authorities. 
LDESP provides an educational foundation enabling leadership and 
units to establish a frame of reference for understanding the complex, 
ambiguous, and rapidly changing stability operations environment. 
iv. The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) is a 
teaching institute created in September 2004 to educate the full-
spectrum of stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) actors, including 
U.S. and foreign military officers, civilian government officials, and 
representatives from non-governmental organizations, and 
international organizations. 
v. A listing of short courses offered by Mobile Education Teams 
(MET): 
1. P179021, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and 
Combating Terrorism 
2. P273001, Regional Civil-Military Relations 
3. P273011, Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism (Regional) 
4. P273013, Regional GPOI Peace Support Operations (PSO) 




6. P309042, Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism: Countering 
Ideological Support of Terrorism (CIST) 
7. P309043, Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism: Intelligence 
and Combating Terrorism 
8. P309044, Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism: Maritime 
Security 
9. P309064, Preparing for Peacekeeping Deployments: 
Negotiating Effective Support Agreements with International 
Org 
10. P309065, Preparing for Peacekeeping Deployments: 
Reviewing Inter-Ministerial Peace-keeping Roles & Missions 
11. P309066, Preparing for Peacekeeping Deployments: 
Reviewing MOD and Defense HQ's PK 
12. P309067, Preparing for Peacekeeping Deployments: 
Adopting Task Lists and Standing Operating Procedures 
13. P309068, GPOI UN CMCOORD 
14. P309070, Civil-Military Relations 
15. P309073, Civil-Military Relations Pre-Survey 
16. P309077, Enhanced International Peace Keeping Capabilities 
(EIPC)  
17. P309078, EIPC Peace Support Operations 
18. P309079, Enhancing Border Security through National 
Means  
19. P309098, Civil-Military Relations Continued Education 
20. P309102, GPOI Program Design & Development Visit 
(PDDV) 
21. P309103, GPOI Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
22. P309140, Implementing Strategic Planning: Developing 
Effective Peace-keeping Strategies 
23. P309141, Defense Strategic Planning: Transformation 
Strategies for Peace-keeping 
24. P309142, Implementing Strategic Planning: Developing 
Strategic  
25. P309143, Implementing Strategic Planning: The Operational 
Dimensions of Peace-keeping  
26. P309144, Implementing Strategic Planning: The 
Development of Nations 




28. P309146, Implementing Strategic Planning: Developing 
National Lo 
29. P309147, Security Building in Post-Conflict Environment 
30. P309148, The Media and the Military 
31. P309149, Intelligence and Democracy 
32. P309150, Building Linkages between the Legislature and the 
Military 
33. P309151,Domestic Support Operations (Military Support to 
Civilian Orgs) 
34. P309152, Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in a 
Democracy 
35. P309153, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC): Support of 
Multinational Operations 
36. P309154, Civil Affairs (CA)/Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC)  
37. P309156, Establishing Democratic Civil-Military Relations 
and the  
38. P309157, Global Peace Ops Init (GPOI) 
39. P309158, International Homeland Defense 
vi. In Residence Programs Short Courses 
1. P159200, Principles of Defense Acquisition Management 
(IDARM) 
2. P159202, Principles of Defense Procurement and Contract 
Management  
3. P170001,  Executive Program in Defense Decision Making 
4. P171400, Civil-Military Relations CONUS Planning 
5. P171401, Planning Peace Operations (PPO) 
6. P171402, Defense Restructuring 
7. P171404, Intelligence and Democracy 
8. P171405, Multinational Logistics 
9. P171406, International Defense Transformation 
10. P173400, EIPC Instructor Course 
11. P179018, Civil-Military Response to Terrorism (Global) 
12. P179022, Maritime Terrorism 
13. P179045, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) United 
Nations Staff  
14. P179046, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) United 
Nations Military and Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI) United Nations Logistics 
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15. P179048, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) United 
Nations Peace Course 
16. P179069, International Negotiations (IDARM) 
17. P181006, Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour (DVOT) 
4. Courses (Category 3: Conferences) 
a. Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) Future 
Conferences: 
i. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (March 30-April 2, 
2008) 
ii. Making Sense of it All: Cross-Cultural Understanding (June 24-27, 
2008) 
iii. Sustaining Healthcare in Post-Conflict Environments (July 13-16, 
2008) 
iv. Cross-Community Understanding: Working in the Same Space 
(September 21-24, 2008) 
v. Coming in first half of FY09: 
1. Creating Jobs in Post-Conflict Situations 
2. Whole-of-Government Approach to Security Sector Reform 
3. Melting Arctic: Avoiding Conflict in New Waters 
vi. To apply for any of these programs or gather more information one 
must consult the CSRS website at www.nps.edu/csrs. 
b. Past CSRS Conferences: 
i. United States Navy 2008 Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Conference, January 30-31, 2008. 
ii. Cleaning House: Confronting Illicit Power Structures in the Post-
Conflict World, November 4-7, 2007. 
1.  
iii. Making Sense of It All: Cross-Cultural Understanding, September 9-
12, 2007 
1.  




v. Healing the Wounds: Rebuilding Healthcare Systems in Post-
Conflict 




5. Common Attributes of All Courses 
a. Course Level 
i. Graduate/Post-graduate 
ii. Short courses and conferences are for appropriate levels of operator 
b. Course Delivery 
i. On-site  
ii. Mobile Education Teams (off-site) 
6. Distance learning (Director = COL Stephen Visco):  
a. Teaching Methods 
i. Lecture (1st half of class)  
ii. Seminar (2nd half of class) 
iii. Case Studies 
iv. Simulations 
v. Conferences 
b. Course Length 
i. Grad School Classes: 1 quarter 
ii. Short Courses: 3-5 days to 2 weeks (residence short courses) 
iii. Conferences: 3-5 days 
c. Course Capacity 
i. NPS: 1700 (42% US Navy, 16% International Military Officers, 5% 
US Government, 10% US Army, 11% USMC, 16% USAF, 1% 
USCG) 
ii. National Security Affairs Department: 466 (80 USN, 27 USMC, 49 
US Army, 174 USAF, 11 USCG, 95 US Government, 30 
international) 
iii. Per classroom:  
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1. Seminars: 15-20 
2. Lower level classes: 30 
d. How often is the course offered? 
i. Variable for each class.  See course descriptions. 
e. Cost: Nothing to government employees 
f. Prerequisites: Bachelor’s degree 
g. Course Accessibility 
i. USG Military Officers (O-3/4 to O-6 usually) 
ii. USG Civilian 
iii. Foreign Military Officers (must take TOEFL) 
iv. US Government Contractors 
v. NGOs, UN, etc. for some MET short courses 
h. Target Participant Level: Mid to Senior Level 
i. Military: O-3/4 to O-6 (usually) 
ii. Civilian Equivalent (State, CIA, DIA, etc.) 
i. Course Type 
i. Part of a degree (Master’s) program 
ii. Short courses 
iii. Conferences 
j. Evaluation Tools: term/research papers, class participation, final written 
exams, capstone simulation. 
k. Course Update:   
i. NPS is an academic institution and receives curriculum updates in 
generally three ways: 
1. Academia 
2. SECNAV/OPNAV education requirements 
3. Inter-service input 
l. Course Completion Rate: 90-100% 
Addendum to Consortium for Complex Operations Survey of NPS Courses 
Addendum Part A: Full-length graduate level courses for inclusion in the CCO Survey: 
a. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) (4-0) 
i. Course Number: OA 3650   
ii. Course Description: The seminar studies the improvised explosive 
device (IED) problem with special emphasis on its use by 
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. The seminar will discuss the 
use of IEDs as one tactic in an insurgency and the goals and 
strategy with respect to the use of IEDs. The focus of the seminar 
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will be the use of models, analysis, and systems technology to 
defeat the IED system. The topics will include: short history of 
Iraq including demographics, religion, politics, and economics; 
access to SIPRNET data on IED incidents and analysis of attacks; 
geographic information systems (GIS) for display of incidents; a 
short overview of counterinsurgency methods that have been used 
in Iraq and elsewhere; systems engineering approaches to 
countering the use of IEDs; and operations research models of IED 
issues  There will be guest speakers with current knowledge of the 
IED threat. The class is open to students from all NPS curricula. 
iii. Prerequisites: probability (OS2103 or equivalent); U.S. citizenship 
and SECRET clearance 
iv. Department/Instructor: Department of Operations Research 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer 
 
b. Survey Research Methods (4-2) 
i. Course Number: OA4109 
ii. Course Description: The course covers the basic principles of 
survey research methods.  It provides students with a practical 
grounding in all aspects of survey methodology, from survey 
instrument design, to sample design, to modes of data collection, to 
methods for survey data analysis.  Students will be able to 
immediately apply coursework to thesis research and real-world 
applications, including SSTR, COIN, IW, and IO applications.  
The class conducts a capstone project in which students design, 
field, and analyze a survey on behalf of a USG organization. 
iii. Prerequisites: OA3102, OS3101, or OS3113 or equivalent, or 
permission of the instructor. 
iv. Department/Instructor: Professor R.D. Fricker, Jr., Operations 
Research Department 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer 
 
c. Joint Campaign Analysis (4-0) 
i. Course Number: OA4602 
ii. Course Description: The course studies the development, use, and 
recent applications of campaign analysis in actual procurement, 
force structure and operations planning.  Emphasis is on 
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formulating the problem, selecting assumptions, structuring the 
analysis, and measure effectiveness.  Interpreting and 
communicating the results in speech and written word is an 
important part of the course.  Students conduct a broad gauge, 
quick reaction campaign analysis. 
iii. Prerequisites: A course in basic probability and statistics theory, 
and operational experience. 
iv. Department/Instructor: CAPT Wayne Hughes, USN (ret) and 
CAPT Jeff Kline, USN (ret) 
v. Quarter Hours: 4 
vi. Term Offered: Winter/Summer 
d.  Modeling and Simulation for SSTR Operations (4-0) 
 
 i.   Course Number: MV4657 
      ii.   Course Description: This course present and discovers issues, 
challenges, and opportunities for application of modeling and 
simulation (M&S) to military support for SSTR operations.  The 
course considers application of M&S for SSTR from the 
perspectives of analysis, training, acquisition, and mission 
planning/rehearsal.  Students are given hands-on experience with 
current and emerging simulations and computational tools relevant 
to the non-traditional, irregular warfare aspects of these operations.  
 iii.   Prerequisite: OA4655 Introduction to Joint Combat Modeling or 
consent of instructor. 
 iv.   Department/Instructor: MOVES/Curtis Blais 
 v.   Quarter Hours: 4  
vi.   Term Offered: Annually 
 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Track 
 
A Stabilization and Reconstruction track is available as a component of MA 
degree in National Security Affairs Department or MS degree in Defense Analysis 
Department.  
The curriculum on Stabilization and Reconstruction is based on a very simple premise. 
Sustainable economic and political development can go forward only when effective, 
democratically-controlled institutions can provide security for a nation's people. In 
nations where U.S. and international forces are providing this security, those forces need 
to work with civilian development agencies and NGOs to help build indigenous security 
institutions. Otherwise, military forces risk creating a climate of dependency, in which 
continued local reliance on those forces slows their exit and impedes progress towards 
broader political and economic development. 
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The purpose of the program is the creation of a security environment within which 
economic and political development can flourish. By building indigenous capacities to 
provide security, military forces can "work themselves out of a job" and facilitate their 
own exit. Moreover, by conducting operations in close cooperation with civilian 
development agencies and NGOs, forces can facilitate the hand-off to these partners and 
contribute directly to their development work. In short: the Security Building program is 
designed to help the United States and its allies win and maintain the peace long after 
their military forces have returned home. 
The program will accomplish its purpose by providing the specialized expertise, problem-
solving skills, and management tools required by civilians and military officers (U.S. and 
international) operating in the post-conflict environment. 
The courses in the Stabilization and Reconstruction track are all appropriate for 
complex operations: 
Curricular Core Courses 
NS3026 Introduction to Stabilization and Reconstruction [already included in survey] 
NS4026  Cpstone Seminar: Reconstruction of Civil Society [already included in 
survey] 
 Either: 
NS4235 Seminar on Peace Support Operations [already included in survey] 
  Or 
NS4236 Stability Operations [already included in survey] 
 
MN4123 Organizing & Planning in Complex Networks 
MN4123 Organizing and Planning In Complex Networks (4-0) Summer 
In 21st century operational and policy settings, people are expected to work in 
networks to get things done. Operating beyond the boundaries of any one 
organization in an inter-organizational domain, network members are called upon to 
join forces and work collaboratively with others. Network collaborations are 
difficult, however, because they challenge traditional management assumptions. 
Members must coordinate without hierarchy, lead without formal authority, and 
solve problems and make decisions without someone being "in control:" or "in 
charge." This course provides the basic knowledge, skills, and abilities to enable 
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students to work collectively in networks, especially those with members who come 
from different cultural, ethnic and national organizations. With the use of cases, 
experiential exercises, and simulations, students learn how to craft and execute 
collaborative strategies to improve network performance. Prerequisite: Consent of 
instructor. 
 
MN3118 MN3118 Strategies for Building Consensus (4-0) Spring 
Post-conflict environments bring together representatives from different nations and 
organizations. In order to accomplish the goals of interest, these varying 
representatives must develop awareness, appreciation, and ability to collaborate with 
each other. There is no formal organization that provides structures or standards to 
guide the collaboration of these individuals; they must rely on informal mechanisms 
for collaborative post-conflict efforts. Because the goals and interests of the 
participating parties frequently are not in alignment, consensus-building capabilities 
contribute importantly to success. Consensus is a decision process that makes use of 
all available resources and perspectives for the resolution of problems. Consensus is 
difficult to reach and requires a complex set of skills related to interpersonal and 
group dynamics such as conflict management, building trust, perspective taking, and 
negotiation. Consensus building challenges students to develop their skills on two 
levels. At the dyadic level, students learn communication, mediation, and negotiation 
strategies, especially for use in scenarios marked by high levels of cultural, ethnic, 
organizational, and ideological diversity. At the group level, students learn how to 
function as high-performing teams in complex dynamical systems. Using 
simulations, cases, and experiential exercises, they become proficient at small group 
meeting management, problem solving, conflict management, team building, and 
decision making. Consensus building at both the dyadic and group levels is based on 
principles of self-organization and self-management, given the value diversity, 
potential for conflict, and inability to use hierarchical controls as the mechanism of 
coordination in these situations. Prerequisite: None. 
 
NS3025 Introduction to Civil-Military Relations Theory 
This course introduces students to the basic concepts and issues in civil-military 
relations. It offers a historical and comparative analysis of different patterns of 
military participation in politics, defense policy making and national development. 
The course also introduces alternative models for structuring civil-military relations, 
and examines the problems associated with the models adopted by the United States 
and other nations. Prerequisites: None. 
 
Addendum Part B:  Short Course 
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Civil Affairs Planner’s Course 
- Conducted jointly by Joint Special Operations University and the Naval Postgraduate 
School 
- Approximately 40 students participated in the first iteration in November 2007.   
- The purpose of this course is to provide Civil Affairs personnel with key planning 
skill and strategic capacity to provide a maximum contribution in missions. 
Professional Army CA training generally ends with completion of the CA Advanced 
Course taught by the USAJFK Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The U.S. Army 
Reserve needs a consistent training pipeline for CA officers that are certified to 
conduct Civil Military Operations and Stabilization and Reconstruction at Brigade 
staff and above, with a comprehensive plan to support GWOT initiatives and the 
intent of DOD directive 3000.05 “Military Support to SSTR”.  
Addendum Part C:  Certificate Program Development 
Stability, Security and Development in Global Context 
 
 
1. Program Background and Overview 
 
This initiative pairs members of a new generation of security practitioners with 
established researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the US Army 
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and partners at Harvard, UCLA and 
National Defense University.  
 
Globalization, despite its many positive attributes, also brings complex security 
challenges including state failure, trans-national terrorism, nuclear proliferation, energy 
crises and pandemics. The problems themselves and the tools to address them cross 
disciplinary as well as geographic boundaries. These global security challenges compel 
us to think about prevention and stability operations in a new way. The whole of 
government is now called to respond in ways that affect how the US Navy, the 
Department of Defense, and civilian agencies will do business.  
 
Courses will be developed in FY08 for in-residence instruction, supported by 
distributed learning technology, leading to fully online courses in FY09. Objectives for 
this program of study include the following: 
 
 Develop understanding of stability, security and development in the 
global environment 
 Provide certification for leaders and practitioners of complex 
operations 
 Compare cases / develop analogical reasoning 
 Provide assessment / planning tools for integrated / complex missions 
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 Enable connections across boundaries (sectoral / actor / national) for 
learning & operations 
 Foster ability to develop strategies in field / AoR for staffs 
 Capture knowledge base and build scenarios / lessons 
 
 The interconnectedness of development and security calls for an integrated 
approach.  SAGE will develop an integrated program with partner institutions. A course 
leader and instructional designer from the Office of Continuous Learning will ensure 
continuity of interdisciplinary faculty teams and continuity of courses across the series. 
Faculty members may work on multiple courses.  The first phase of the program is 
development of a three course overview of security, stability and development.  This core 
program of instruction can be taught independently but will have the capability to 






2. Research Focus Areas 
 
Research provides intellectual capital for graduate instruction.  SAGE seeks to 
support communities of researchers in the following program areas: 
 



























































3. Course Development and Integration 
 
Courses will utilize the case studies and scenarios constructed in the research 
component. Case studies will be incorporated into the teaching program and also 
prepared for publication in an edited volume.  Model and simulation tools will translate 
the products into interactive case studies.  Figure 2 defines the basic course development 
cycle used for the project. Figure 2 depicts the development cycle: 
 
 
1. Project Timeline 
 
The long term intent of this program is to create an interdisciplinary program that 
builds on the three core courses.  Figure 3 shows a graphic of the potential out year 



























Course 1:  Introduction to Security, Stability and Development in the Global Context 
 
1. Globalization  
2. Conflict analysis 
3. Environmental, energy, economic factors 
4. Human Security 
5. Welfare, Trade, Taxation 
6. Health 
7. State effectiveness 
8. Rule of law 
9. Safe and secure environment 
10. Social well-being / social mobilization 
11. Case studies/scenarios 
 
Two institutional innovations, US Navy Global Fleet Stations and Africa Command, 
clearly point to a need to a new kind of work that needs a new generation of leadership. 
Global Fleet Stations based at sea will engage civilian and military components in 
cooperation initiatives to build global partnerships. Their work is primarily to focus on 
phrase zero shaping operations, partner capacity building and prevention.  The work of 
the new Africa Command will be focused on the prevention of conflict.  AFRICOM will 
be networked across several countries and its staff structure will include elements from 
the US Department of State, and other government agencies engaged in Africa such as 
the US Agency for International Development; it will also seek to involve partner nation 
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and humanitarian agencies. At the international level, a comprehensive approach to peace 
missions and increasing focus on human security likewise signal the importance of 




Course 2:  Analytics for Security, Stability and Development 
 
1. Analytic decision-making 
2. Analogical reasoning 
3. Statistical thinking 
4. Risk analysis 
5. Wicked problems 
6. Strategic collaboration 
7. Information sharing tools 
8. Planning 
9. Conflict resolution 
 
What makes the challenge of stability operations in the context of globalization so 
complex are networks – interactions and ripple effects that yield unintended 
consequences. Graduate training in will provide a rigorous approach to the network-
thinking needed to deal with global security issues. A science involves hypothesis 
formulation and testing, measurement, prediction and analysis. Analytical decision 
making involves formulation of problem goals, evaluation of alternatives, cost-
effectiveness analysis, consideration of trade-offs, sensitivity of analysis to assumptions, 
and assessment of uncertainties and risk.  Statistical thinking includes understanding of 
distinctions between random variation and actual patterns.  Observational data is 
particularly relevant to better understand in stability operations. 
 
Course 3:  Scenarios in Security, Stability and Development 
 
1. In-stride / contingency operations  
2. Post-crisis operations / stability.   
3. Post-natural disaster:  Zero start 
4. Pre-crisis planning / mitigation 
 
Crisis planning should have some impact on certificate program planning.  Relevant 
participants include those affected by, seeking to prevent or ameliorate war and conflict 
such as humanitarian workers, disaster planners, NGO’s, Joint Staffs, Urban Planning, 
United Nations (UN), Donors and NATO.  Our goal is to develop scenarios that define 
exactly how crisis planning should occur with “pre-written” guidelines on what this 








SAGE is in interdisciplinary research and education initiative at the Naval Postgraduate 
School to address the challenges of conflict prevention in the context of globalization, and an 
institutional and multinational initiative to build security and development in our shared security 
arena. Globalization and its effects – political, social, economic and environmental - bind our 
fates together. The emergence of non-state actors as significant actors in international politics, 
energy crises, global warming, economic inequalities and shocks, rapid transmission of culture, 
disease, and weapons, and fragmentation of violence require innovative and integrated 
approaches to promoting human security. Fortunately, we are in the midst of an emerging 
consensus on what is needed for progress: security and development are inextricably connected. 
 
Our strategic-level collaborative educational initiative addresses issues of global 
transformation and stabilization, with new multinational and cross-sector approaches to 
developing analytic and policy tools, economic and social models, risk management, technical 
innovations and social networks for peace building and global security.  The following activities 
are under development:  
 
Interdisciplinary Research Program  
A collaborative network of scholars and practitioners crossing disciplinary boundaries will 
identify needs, extant capabilities and gaps, and investigate identified questions about both root 
causes of conflict and immediate needs in peacebuilding. Research will identify indicators of 
social dislocation, and to develop and test strategies for peacebuilding. 
 
Education and Training Programs  
Online educational modules in the form of certificate programs to be developed and offered to the 
international community in support of professional competency in peace building and global 
security. 
 
• The program of instruction may be carried out in partnership with the Peacekeeping 
and Stability Operations Institute, other domestic and international partners.  
• Both in-residence or on online platforms are engaged. 
• Clients include domestic and international security sector participants, international 
organizations, and non-governmental organizations. 
 
Future Leaders Program  
The future leaders program will be cross-posting scholars and practitioners to build cultural and 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
ABM  Agent Based Model 
ASCM  Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
AT/FP  Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection 
BAA  Broad Agency Announcement 
C2   Command and Control 
CAS  Complex Adaptive System 
CCMR  Center for Civilian Military Relations 
CCO  Center for Complex Operations 
CG   Cultural Geography 
CNO  Chief of Naval Operations 
COE  Contemporary Operating Environment 
COIN  Counter Insurgency 
CTTSO Counter-Terrorism Technology Support Office 
DA  Defense Analysis 
DES  Discrete Event Simulation 
DIME  Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoDD  Department of Defense Directive 
DoDI  Department of Defense Instruction 
DRMI  Defense Resources Management Institute 
Dstl  Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
DTED  Digital Terrain Elevation Data 
ERGM  Extended Range Guided Munition 
ESSM  Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile 
FAST  Flexible Asymmetric Simulation Toolbox 
FFH  Fast Frigate Helicopter 
FOB  Forward Operating Base 
FY   Fiscal Year 
GUI  Graphical User Interface 
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HADR  Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief 
HSCB  Human Social Culture Behavior 
INP  Innovative Naval Prototype 
IPB  Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
ISSM  Interim Semi-static Security Model 
I/ITSEC Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference 
IW   Irregular Warfare 
JHU/APL Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 
LCS  Littoral Combat Ship 
M&S  Modeling and Simulation 
M&S CO Modeling and Simulation Coordination Office 
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
MANA Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata 
MASON Multi-Agent Simulator of Neighborhoods 
MI   Military Intelligence 
MIGIT  Military Intelligence Gaming Integration Team 
MOE  Measure of Effectiveness 
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
MOP  Measure of Performance 
MOS  Military Occupational Specialty 
MOVES Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation 
MPICE Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments 
MTBF  Mean Time Between Failure 
MTTR  Mean Time to Repair 
MTWS MAGTF Tactical Warfare Simulation 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NMSO  Navy Modeling and Simulation Office 
NOLH  Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 
NSA  National Security Affairs 
NSS  Naval Simulation System 
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ONR  Office of Naval Research 
OPNAV Office of Naval Operations 
OR   Operations Research 
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Ph   Probability of Hit 
Pk   Probability of Kill 
PMESII Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure 
PSOM  Peace Support Operations Model 
PSYOPS Psychological Operations 
PTO  Pacific Theater Operations 
REPAST Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit 
ROE  Rules of Engagement 
SA   Situational Awareness 
SAGE  Security and Globalization Effects 
SBE  Sea Base Enabler 
SE   Systems Engineering 
SEED  Simulation Experiments and Efficient Design 
SISO  Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization 
SSTR  Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
SSTRO Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations 
SUW  Surface Warfare 
T-craft  Transformable Craft 
TCAPF Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework 
TRAC  TRADOC Analysis Center 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 
UAS  Unmanned Aircraft System 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USMC  United States Marine Corps 
VBS  Virtual Battlespace 
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